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“…we know today that the life of the people is only secured if the racial traits and hereditary
health of the body of the people are preserved.”—Ottmar von Versucher, Nazi ‘racial hygiene’
specialist
“Ah, reason, seriousness, mastery over the affects, the whole somber thing called reflection, all
these prerogatives and showpieces of man: how dearly they have been bought! How much
blood and cruelty lie at the bottom of all ‘good things’!”—Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of
Morals
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INTRODUCTION: LIBERALISM AND THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEOLOGICAL
FANTASY
When Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man was published in 1992,
it was greeted with fanfare in the American press. This reception came as no surprise to
political observers who were familiar with the book’s thesis; it was an exercise in
triumphalism which celebrated the virtues (and global hegemony) of liberalism and ‘freemarket economics’.1 Likewise, it was hardly shocking to discover that his homage to a
dominant political theory (which happened to coincide with the state ideology of
American empire) was written by a deputy director in the State Department of George
H.W. Bush. At any rate, Fukuyama’s essay captured the essentials of a quasi-official
narrative which had been circulating in the American media since the collapse of the
Berlin Wall in 1989. According to Fukuyama, the grand Hegelian metanarrative of
History had reached its inevitable termination with the defeat of liberal democracy’s only
significant theoretical competitor, Soviet-style communism. He wrote that
Both Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of human societies was not
open-ended, but would end when mankind [sic] had achieved a form of society
that satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings. Both thinkers thus
posited an “end of history”: for Hegel this was the liberal state, while for Marx it
was a communist society. This did not mean that the natural cycle of birth, life,
and death would end, that important events would no longer happen, or that
newspapers reporting them would cease to be published. It meant, rather, that
there would be no further progress in the development of underlying principles
and institutions, because all the really big questions had been settled.2
Fukuyama, needless to say, accepts the Hegelian rather than the Marxist conception of
historical progress; and while he acknowledges that liberal societies have encountered a
1

Fukuyama prefers the term ‘free-market’ economies to ‘capitalism’ because the latter “has acquired so
many pejorative connotations over the years.” See The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The
Free Press, 1992), 44.
2
Ibid, xii.
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variety of social problems, such as “drugs, homelessness, and crime {as well as]
environmental damage and the frivolity of consumption” he nevertheless insists that
“these problems are not obviously insoluble on the basis of liberal principles.”3 Indeed,
liberalism provides the ideal basis for recognizing the fundamental dignity of human
beings; he suggests that “[n]o other arrangement of human social institutions is better
able to satisfy this longing, and hence no further progressive historical change is
possible.”4 In other words, liberal social and economic institutions (as well, it goes
without saying, as liberal political theory) represent the highest conceivable political
achievement for humanity, and even though liberal democracies carry on an internecine
struggle with certain social problems we can also recognize that the improvement of
living conditions and social welfare is merely a question of referring to the solutions
available to us within the parameters of liberalism itself.5 This constitutes, at any rate,
the basic premises of a consensus in the West regarding the inherent superiority of liberal
institutions and free-market economics.
It is clear that, over a decade after the publication of Fukuyama’s essay, liberalism’s
hegemony is no longer uncontested; there are challenges both from retrograde
fundamentalisms and populisms (on the right) as well as anti-globalization and prodemocracy movements (on the left).

Despite the emergence of alternatives at the level

of practice, however, liberalism remains the dominant theory in contemporary political
3

Ibid, xix.
Ibid, xviii.
5
As Jacques Derrida has noted, however, there is an important equivocation in Fukuyama’s work: when he
(Fukuyama) wants to highlight the triumph of liberal democracy, he points to empirical evidence that
liberalism is on the march, emerging across the globe as communist regimes are transformed into open,
free-market societies; when he admits that liberal governments continue to grapple with socioeconomic
problems, however, he shifts to the level of normativity. There is, then, a problematic vacillation between
different two levels of argumentation. Cf. Specters of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf ( New York: Routledge,
1994), especially pp. 56-75.
4
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philosophy (at least among Western intellectuals). In an essay from 2005, for example,
Chantal Mouffe offers a summary of the Western intelligentsia’s beliefs concerning the
efficacy of liberal values, and her report on the current state of affairs (which it is
difficult to argue against) is disconcertingly similar to Fukuyama’s analysis (although
Mouffe is highly critical of modern liberalism); she outlines the key assumptions in the
following passage:
The ‘free world’ has triumphed over communism and, with the weakening of
collective identities, a world ‘without enemies’ is now possible. Partisan conflicts
are a thing of the past and consensus can now be obtained through dialogue.
Thanks to globalization and the universalization of liberal democracy, we can
expect a cosmopolitan future bringing peace, prosperity and the implementation
of human rights worldwide.6
Mouffe, of course, rejects the premises of neoliberal orthodoxy, and I will return to her
arguments in the final two chapters. At this point, however, I have simply cited her
assessment in order to indicate the basic continuity and hegemony of a position that fails
to recognize the profound, indeed structural, contradictions which haunt the formulation
of liberalism’s theoretical program.

This essay, or at least the idea for the essay,

originated in part as a reaction to the celebratory and hyper-optimistic discourses of
contemporary liberals. It has changed in numerous ways; the central arguments and
guiding narrative threads have evolved over time.

Yet there is still, as Mouffe’s

observations emphasize, an unwarranted confidence in the ability of liberal theory and
institutions to grapple with fundamental socioeconomic problems, such as gaps in
opportunity between the rich and poor in the so-called ‘First World’, and the intolerable
chasm of inequality which separates even poorer Americans or Europeans from the
overwhelming majority of people who live in the developing world.
6

Cf. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1.
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While I think the so-called ‘contingent difficulties’ of free-market institutions and
parliamentary democracies are serious, a substantive critique of any theoretical program
has to address normative, in addition to empirical, deficits. I will try, therefore, to
highlight fundamental problems relating to the structural assumptions of liberal political
philosophy, specifically focusing on the politics of embodiment. Why, however, body
politics? Liberalism has consistently ignored, or at least marginalized, the politics of
embodiment, by focusing on conditions of rationality and hyper-idealized decision
procedures which negate the real, concrete embeddedness of agents in a lifeworld,
obscuring the ways in which a person’s identity is linked up with his or her body, as well
as the modes of relating to the world and others vis-à-vis embodiment. This is, however,
a critical oversight; I will argue that liberal political theory, despite its emphasis on
pluralism, inclusion and tolerance, is still under the sway of what Slavoj Zizek calls the
‘fundamental ideological fantasy’, namely the corporatist fantasy of constructing a
homogeneous body politic uncontaminated by signs of social division (social divisions
which threaten to subvert the homogeneity and, ultimately, stability of the social body—
in short, a threat to the body politic’s collective health, an existential danger). He writes
that
the stake of social-ideological fantasy is to construct a vision of society which…is
not split by an antagonistic division, a society in which the relation of its parts is
organic, complementary. The clearest case, is of course, the corporatist vision of
Society as an organic Whole, a social Body in which the different classes are like
extremities, members each contributing to the Whole according to its function—
we may say that ‘Society as a corporate Body’ is the fundamental ideological
fantasy.7

7

Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 1998), 126.
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Liberalism’s desire for a ‘unified’ social body (i.e. a body politic without antagonism)
has at least two theoretical (and problematic) implications. First of all, it is forced to
exclude certain persons or classes of persons who exhibit beliefs which are incompatible
(or so it argues) with its solution to the question(s) of political stability (i.e. how do we
establish a political order given the existence of competing understandings of the good?).
Secondly, liberalism relies on the social contract as a mechanism for guaranteeing the
legitimacy of institutional arrangements. The social contract, in turn, presupposes a
governable subject who transfers his/her sovereignty to a recognized government or
legislative body. Yet the governable subject is him or herself the product of history and
socialization, a socialization which is never chosen. Here the politics of embodiment
emerges in a different way, this time in relation to the particular agents (rather than the
body politic of society). Thus, despite liberalism’s attempts to avoid the question(s) of
body politics, they return with a vengeance. My criticisms in the dissertation will
elaborate why, precisely, the two implications mentioned above present serious
difficulties for liberal political philosophy. At this point, however, I want to introduce
the subject of this study by highlighting the central features of liberalism.

What is Liberalism?
As Raymond Geuss has noted, liberalism is “conceptually and theoretically…elusive.”8
He argues that liberalism is a political philosophy which is “practically engaged”,
meaning that it “struggles for influence on the minds and actions of modern populations”

8

Cf. Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), 69.
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and is forced to adapt to changing historical circumstances.9 This fact, in turn, presents at
least three problems for any attempt to define ‘liberalism’. First of all, it is difficult to
locate a single or essential characteristic which unifies the authors/theories generally
identified as liberal;10 secondly, it has a tendency (like any important political theory) to
re-write its own history11 and finally (as a consequence of the second difficulty) it will, in
all probability, continue to revise its self-understanding in the future.12 If we accept
Geuss’s points concerning the malleability of liberal political theory (or more specifically
the plasticity of liberalism’s identity), therefore, it is clear that there are serious obstacles
encountered by anyone who is trying to uncover the ‘essence’ of liberalism.
One strategy for dealing with the problems highlighted above, proposed by Geuss
himself as well as John Gray, is to search for general features or family resemblances
which are shared by liberal theories.

Geuss argues that liberalism exhibits four

characteristics: (1) it values toleration, (2) it emphasizes the importance of freedom, (3)
it celebrates individualism and (4) it exhibits a suspicion towards “absolute, excessive,
unlimited or discretionary power.”13

Gray, meanwhile, agues that liberalism is (1)

individualist, (2) egalitarian, (3) universalist (i.e. it affirms the “moral unity of the human
species”14 and (4) meliorist (in the sense that it assumes the feasibility of “progress” or
“corrigibility” vis-à-vis the organization of political and social institutions).15 While there

9

Ibid.
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid., 73; he examines the four characteristics in greater detail in the rest of the chapter (pp. 73-109).
14
Cf. John Gray, Liberalism, 2nd Ed. (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1995), xii.
15
Ibid. For a more extensive list, which is economically summarized in the characterizations of Geuss and
Gray, see L.T. Hobhouse’s Liberalism, a classic statement originally published in 1911 (Oxford: Oxford
UP, 1964, especially pages 16-29). There are, of course, other ways of classifying different tendencies,
features, etc., of liberalism. J.G. Merquior, for example, examines the contrasts between English, French
and German liberalism, arguing that national forms emphasize one set of values over others (so that English
10
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are differences between the two lists, there are enough similarities to recognize a core set
of principles emphasized by both authors; I propose, therefore, the following candidates:
liberalism is (1) individualist, (2) egalitarian, (3) tolerant, (4) universalist and (5) critical
of arbitrary and/or centralized power (I exclude ‘meliorism’, since it is unclear that
Hobbes, for example, or even Locke, recognizes the possibility of ‘improving’ social
institutions).16
The components mentioned above represent theoretical principles which are valued in
liberal political philosophy. There is another important aspect of liberal political theory,
however, which addresses the question of governmental legitimacy. Here it invokes the
idea of a social contract, arguing that regimes are a product of agreement (or at least tacit
agreement) between rational agents who decide to transfer the sovereignty they possess in
the state of nature to a ruler or rulers. The subjects of the newly constituted political
order surrender their power of arbitration to governmental authorities, which allows them
to enter civil society. In the language of contractarianism, they form a “body politic”
which has a monopoly on coercive force, and it is used both to instill fear in the citizenry
as well as to punish ‘criminals’17 who violate the laws. While the social contract
emphasizes the consent of agents as a prerequisite for legitimacy, however, the tradition
of social contract theory has excluded women, people of color, the disabled, the poor and
the ‘mad’ or ‘irrational’ (and sometimes the concept of ‘madness’ includes the other
liberalism privileges what Berlin calls negative liberty, while French liberalism, inspired by Rousseau,
underscores the right of collective self-determination—Constant’s political philosophy is obviously an
exception—and German liberalism celebrates the idea of autonomous self-realization). Cf. J.G. Merquior’s
Liberalism Old and New (Boston: Twayne Pubs., 1991), pp. 9-14.
16
It is important to emphasize that I am highlighting ‘family resemblances’, and not offering a fixed,
immutable definition of liberalism; rather, I think the list I have constructed, following Geuss and Gray, is a
fair characterization of current liberal theory, and generally captures contemporary liberalism’s
interpretation of its intellectual heritage.
17
I put the term in scare quotes because the concept of ‘criminality’ is often invoked against political
dissidents or other parties who object to unjust practices within the regime itself.

8
groups mentioned above, since they are assumed to lack rationality). Carole Pateman, for
example, has argued that the social contract is actually a sexual contract; she notes that
“[t]he standard commentaries on the classic stories of the original contract do not usually
mention that women are excluded from the original pact.”18 Likewise, Charles W. Mills
highlights the racial bias of social contract theory, noting that the initial agreement
between subjects in the state of nature reflects the consent of “just the people who count,
the people who really are people (‘we the white people’). So it is a Racial Contract.”19
As I highlighted above, therefore, the social contract emphasizes the importance of
consent, while at the same time (at least in the Western political canon) marginalizing
agents who are ‘incapable’, for whatever reason, of exercising autonomy.
In addition to highlighting the theoretical trajectory of liberal concepts, however,
we can also examine a second, generally neglected aspect of liberalism, namely its
practical application. Michel Foucault’s lecture course from the 1977-78 cycle at the
Collège de France, for example, argues that liberalism is not, fundamentally, a project of
justification or legitimation for political authority, which the traditional understanding of
social contract theory has tended to emphasize, but rather a “technology of power.”20 In
both the 1977-78 and 1978-79 lecture series, Foucault re-interprets liberalism as a
method of governing which reacted against the excesses of the seventeenth century
Polizeiwissenschaften (or police sciences) that tried to exercise control over both the
18

Cf. The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988), 5.
Cf. The Racial Contract (Cornell: Cornell UP, 1997), 3.
20
Cf. Sécurité, Territoire, Population, eds. Fracois Ewald, Alessandro Fontana and Michel Senellart (Paris:
Seuil/Gallimard, 2004), 50. Foucault’s summary of the course is anthologized in Ethics: Essential Works
of Michel Foucault, Volume 1 , ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), 67-71, and a lengthier
discussion of the contents is found in Colin Gordon’s “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction”, in
The Foucault Effect, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1991),
1-51.
19
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public and private spheres. Foucault views liberalism, at least in part, as a strategy for
more effectively regulating economic processes, a strategy which recognizes the
limitations of bureaucratic agencies; yet he also underscores the importance of security in
classical liberal discourses, which is frequently overlooked in the discussions of early
liberalism (primarily because it is regarded as promoting ‘freedom’; to suggest that it
valued ‘security’ as highly, if not more so, than autonomy is both novel and disruptive for
the typical revolutionary/progressive narrative of liberal historians). Thus, in its attempts
to protect its citizens against risks and dangers which circulated in the body politic, it
developed new ways of thinking about, and deploying, power. In this essay, I will
explore Foucault’s reading of liberalism and its intersection with his work on power in
greater detail, arguing that if we shift the focus away from ‘liberty’ and towards
‘security’, we get a very different picture of how liberalism operates; in short, I will argue
that liberalism has more in common with its historical opponents (such as the Old
Regime in France, or authoritarian/totalitarian, states) than it wishes to acknowledge.
Since liberals defined themselves, at least initially, in and through their differences from
absolutist monarchies, or more recently against the totalitarian experiments of the
twentieth century, this forces us to complicate liberalism’s self-understanding or selfinterpretation. In the next section, I want to introduce the question of parallels between
liberalism and its historical enemies vis-à-vis its attitude towards power. If it is the case
that liberalism is not just a theory, but also a technology of government, however, it is
important to determine how the theory and practice are related, and how the latter
complicates, or even contradicts, the former.
Liberalism and Political Theology; or, Why the King Never Dies

10
One of the great historical ironies of liberalism’s emergence is that the birth of the
republic required the death of the monarch, in both a figurative and literal sense. As
Robespierre gleefully suggested in the wake of Louis XVI’s execution, there was no
more effective method for effacing the nostalgic memory of the decapitated king than to
stage a public execution, after which the executioner should display the bloodied and
severed head of the king and parade it through the streets, symbolizing the abolition of
the ruler’s ‘divine’ right to sovereignty as well as his mortal body.21 Likewise, in the
consummate apologia for the American revolution (Common Sense), Thomas Paine
argued that the foundations of the English constitution were located in “the base remains
of two ancient tyrannies”, namely “the remains of monarchical tyranny in the person of
the king” and “the remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the Peers”22, and the
only way to establish a government which could be definitively separated from the
heritage of arbitrary monarchical power was by “breaking off all connections with…the
British court.”23
The two great liberal revolutions, therefore, announced their intention to expurgate the
trace of divine right, the sovereign’s revered privilege, from the constitutions of the new
republican orders. Yet liberalism was hardly satisfied with the actual elimination of the
king’s bodies, whether it was the physical body or, more importantly, the king’s ‘body
politic’; in France, at least, it also aimed at the total annihilation of the Ancien Regime,
targeting and ultimately subverting the very social institutions which transmitted customs
and law from one generation to the next in an unbroken chain of succession. It intended
21

Cf. Mona Ozouf, “La proces et la mort de Louis XVI” in La Mort du Roi, ed. Jacques Julliard (Paris:
Gallimard, 1999) p.135
22
Thomas Paine, Political Writings, ed. Bruce Kuklick (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989) p.6
23
Ibid., p.37
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to establish a new basis for political legitimacy, namely the consent of the governed, and
the liberty of the people to decide was, at least in theory, complemented by a new
egalitarianism, the idea of a fundamental human equality which defied the old hierarchies
of hereditary privilege and the divine right to rule. As Burke shrilly noted in a renowned
passage from his Reflections on the Revolution in France:
All the pleasing illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal, which
harmonized the different shades of life, and which, by a bland assimilation,
incorporated into politics the sentiments which beautify and soften private
society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason.
All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the superadded ideas,
furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns, and
the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our naked,
shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are to be
exploded as ridiculous, absurd and antiquated fashion.24
In this passage from Burke, which rhythmically oscillates between nostalgia and
indignation, we can detect the outlines of at least one prominent and influential
interpretation of the French Revolution: it represented a terrifying attempt to demolish
the old social relations in the name of an unprecedented tabula rasa, a political blank
slate which promised to facilitate the reconstruction of the natural order in the images of
Reason and Autonomy. In short, liberalism (and here I’m referring to the ideological
core which unites the French and American revolutions, namely an emphasis on the
consent of the governed as a criteria for political legitimation) signified a radical break
with the ancient and sacred right of monarchical privilege, and the newly-formed political
regimes heralded the birth of a heretofore unimagined space and time, where the popular
assembly would establish the law which at the same time constrained it, entailing a
redistribution (and decentralization) of power from the palace to the masses.

24

Cf. Reflections on the French Revolution (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1910) p.74

The
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precipitous leveling of social and economic inequalities gestured towards the emergence
of a new sociological datum, the democratic subject, and the definitive separation of
church and state accelerated the emergence of a fully secularized society, ascendant and
confident in the wake of the death of God. Or so we’re told.
By the middle of the nineteenth-century, the great myths of revolutionary scandal and
upheaval were already beginning to disintegrate under the weight of historical evidence.
Indeed, Tocqueville highlighted the continuity between the old regime and the newlychristened liberal societies in his brilliant study on the historical events which generated
the conditions for a successful overthrow of the monarchy (I’m referring, of course, to
The Old Regime and the Revolution); in the preface to the essay he offers the following
reflections on the composition of the text:
As I progressed in this research, I often encountered to my surprise many traits of
modern France in the old regime. I rediscovered there a mass of feelings that I
thought had been born of the Revolution, a crowd of ideas that pass for having
been created by the Revolution alone. Everywhere I found the roots of present
society deeply implanted in the past. The closer I got to 1789, the more I saw the
spirit which made the Revolution sprout and grow. Little by little I saw the whole
shape of the Revolution unveiled before my eyes. Already it displayed its
temperament, its spirit, its very self. In the old regime I found not only the source
of what the Revolution would do at the start, but still more what it would do in the
end.25
Tocqueville offered a compelling argument for the thesis that the centralization of power
which occurred under the Jacobins was, in actuality, simply a continuation of the
administrative policies of the baroque absolutist monarchy constructed by Louis XIV.
This is a theme which I will return to, at least in a general way; at this point, however, I
would like to examine a peculiar assumption which was implicit in the ideological fervor

25

Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, eds. Francois Furet and Francoise
Melonio (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1998) pp.84-5
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to terminate the biological existence of the king, namely that his physical body was in an
important sense co-terminous with or synonymously related to his body politic. The
liberal revolutionaries imagined that by shattering the body of the king they could also
disperse his authority; if this is the case, it is helpful to isolate the assumptions which
permitted a problematic (to put it mildly) belief to motivate the theoretical program (and
subsequently praxis) of modern liberalism. As Foucault noted in a 1975 interview with
the editorial collective of Quel Corps, the king’s physical body functioned as the
guarantor of his political power;26 therefore, the execution of the sovereign was
tantamount to destroying the foundations of his political legitimacy. Yet the metaphor of
the social body exercised a strangely pervasive influence in the history of liberalism and
social contract theory. In order to introduce the continuity between the imagery of the
body politic in the Old Regime and its historical successor, however, it is important to
examine certain aspects of Ernst Kantorowicz’s work.27 As I will highlight in a moment,
the medieval conception of the body politic informs both the theory and praxis of the
liberal regimes which emerged in its wake.
Kantorowicz’s essay The King’s Two Bodies offers a conceptual genealogy of the
imagery/language of the body politic in European medieval political theology. One of
the clearest examples, by way of introduction, is found in the legal documents of Edmund
Plowden, an apprentice during the reign of Elizabeth:
For the king has in him two Bodies, viz., a natural Body, and a Body politic. His
Body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal, subject to all
Infirmities that come by Nature of Accident, to the Imbecility of Infancy or Old
26
27

Cf. “Body/Power” in Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 55.

Ernst Kantorowicz (1895-1963) was a Jewish German scholar who left Germany in 1938 and emigrated
to the United States. He was a world-renowned authority on medieval history.
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Age, and to the like Defects that happen to natural Bodies of other people. But
his Body politic is a body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and
Government, and constituted by the Direction of the People, and the management
of the Public weal, and his Body is utterly devoid of Infancy, and old Age, and
other natural Defects and Imbecilities, which the body natural is subject to, and
for this cause, what the King does in his Body politic, cannot be invalidated or
frustrated by any disability in his natural Body.28
According to Plowden, therefore, the king’s subjectivity actually contained two bodies:
the first was a biological body, while the second was a legal or public body, also known
as the monarch’s ‘Body politic’. The body politic “is utterly devoid of Age, and other
natural Defects and imbecilities”; furthermore, “what the King does in his Body politic,
cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any disability in his natural Body.” One body,
therefore, is mortal, but the second body (i.e. the body of the sovereign’s authority and
power) will survive via the king’s descendents and the laws that s/he formulated during
his/her rule, which included, as Plowden’s commentary recognizes, the management of
the polis and the “Direction of the People”.
The idea of an immortal social body was transmitted from medieval political theology
to modern liberalism via the imagery of the body politic in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau
(a theme which I will return to later in the dissertation). Claude Lefort, for example, has
analyzed the passage from monarchical regimes to modern democratic societies by
examining the metaphor of the social body. He argues (following Kantorowicz) that the
king’s “body politic” was the incarnation of a national or political community.29 The
democratic revolutions, however, destroyed both the temporal instantiation, as well as the

28

See The King’s Two Bodies (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997), 7.
See Lefort’s “Image of the Body and Totalitarianism” in The Political Forms of Modern Society, ed.
John Thompson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 302. Kantorowicz develops this argument throughout The
King’s Two Bodies, but especially relevant are pp. 193-232.

29
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political basis, of the king’s authority, leaving an “empty space” in its wake; he writes
that
We must…analyze the disengagement of civil society from a state, itself hitherto
consubstantial with the body of the king. Or, to put it another way, we must
examine the emergence of social relations, not only economic ones, but legal
educational and scientific relations which have their own dynamic; and, more
specifically, we must examine the disentangling of the spheres of power, law and
knowledge that takes place when the identity of the body politic disappears. The
modern democratic revolution is best recognized in this mutation: there is no
power linked to a body. Power appears as an empty space and those who exercise
it as mere mortals who occupy it only temporarily or who could install themselves
only by force and cunning.30
This language also figures importantly in the propaganda of totalitarian regimes; he
argues that, at least in part as a response to what he labels the “indetermination that
haunts the democratic experience,” the totalitarian ruler manufactures the idea of the
People-as-One, i.e. as a social body which is uncontaminated by division or otherness.
According to Lefort, “what is at stake is always the integrity of the body. It is as if the
body had to assure itself of its own identity by expelling its waste matter or as if it had to
close in upon itself by withdrawing from the outside, by averting the threat of an
intrusion by alien elements [i.e. the ‘enemies’ of the State].”31
While Lefort’s analysis provides a valuable starting point for any discussion of
the body politic, he is incorrect to suggest that the spheres of “power, law and
knowledge” are “disentangled” with the demise of the monarchy.

Indeed, the new

“democratic” regimes tried to restore the fracture which had been opened in the body
politic with the death of the king. Foucault has argued that after the collapse of the
monarchs
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it’s the social body which needs to be protected in a quasi-medical sense. In place
of the rituals that served to restore the corporal integrity of the monarch, remedies
and therapeutic devices are employed such as the segregation of the sick, the
monitoring of contagions, the exclusion of delinquents. The elimination of hostile
elements by the supplice (public torture and execution) is thus replaced by the
method of asepsis—criminology, eugenics and the quarantining of
‘degenerates’.32
In this respect, it is helpful to refer to a different conceptualization of the imagery of the
body politic in the work of Foucault, a theorization which recognizes, in contrast to the
analysis of Lefort, that the emergence of liberal-democratic societies also saw an
unprecedented proliferation of bureaucratic networks and apparatuses of police control.
Indeed, the mechanisms of juridical power, sociological observation and knowledge
became densely intertwined, creating regimes which perfected, or at least attempted to
perfect, technologies of bodily discipline. Foucault’s re-interpretation of the body politic
in the liberal regimes which succeeded the Old Regime argues that, contrary to the
hypothesis that liberalism executes a break with the fantasies of medieval political
theology, it has remained under the sway of the ideological desire for homogeneity and
unity. In the next section, therefore, I will examine Foucault’s re-reading of the imagery
of the body politic in greater detail, focusing on his discussion of biopower.

Biopower and the Body Politic
In a 1976 interview with Foucault, Allesandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasqiuno introduce
a set of concepts which I appropriate in my examination of the body politic. Referring to
Foucault’s study of disciplinary power, they argue that in the eighteenth century
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‘population’ emerges as an object of scientific investigation.33 In addition, it became a
focus of political interest, and rulers begin to search for methods of controlling
demographic tendencies (such as birth and death rates). As Foucault puts it, “a real and
effective ‘incorporation’ of power was necessary, in the sense that power had to be able
to gain access to the bodies of individuals, to their acts, attitudes and modes of everyday
behavior.”34 According to Fontana and Pasquino, the political strategies of discipline
operated at two different levels. On the one hand, they focused on the “molar body”, or
macro-body, of the social order, which is the body of the population (i.e. what I have
called the ‘body politic’); on the other hand, they also studied the ‘micro-bodies’ of
society, or the docile individuals who contributed to the material and ideological
reproduction of the body politic.35 How, therefore, did the new forms of power operate?
In this regard, it is important to highlight Foucault’s work on what he calls ‘biopower’.
What is “biopower”?

According to Foucault, the sovereign’s power was

historically (i.e., up to the seventeenth century) limited to his/her right to sacrifice the life
of a subject who transgressed the laws of the state. It was generally invoked, therefore, in
exceptional or emergency situations. Sovereign power was called ‘deduction’ because it
operated as a ‘subtraction’ mechanism, entailing a ‘right of seizure’;36 furthermore, it
represented a form of power which was specific and localized, concentrated in the figure
of the monarch. Beginning in the seventeenth century, a new kind of power emerged; it
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employed a complicated, multivalent web of political strategies, as Foucault notes in the
following passage:
Since the Classical Age the West has undergone a very profound transformation
of these mechanisms of power. ‘Deduction’ has tended to be no longer the major
form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce,
control, monitor, optimize and organize the forces under it: a power bent on
generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one
dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. [This] is a
power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer,
optimize or multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive
regulations.37
The new model of power was exercised over life itself; unlike sovereign power, which
seized the body at the moment of transgression, it invaded every aspect of quotidian
culture, and consisted of two essential forms. The first, which he identifies as “an
anatomo-politics of the human body”38, targeted subjects and operated according to
logics of normalcy and pathology.39 It distributed individuals in space, setting up
hierarchies, divisions and barriers which isolated the body and subjected it to constant
observation, eventually materializing in educational institutions, factories, hospitals and
prisons.40 The goal of “anatomo-politics”, which Foucault also refers to as disciplinary
power, was the creation of ‘governable’ political agents who contributed to the
‘reproduction’ of the social body.41
The second form, which appeared at a later date than anatomo-politics, was a
“biopolitics of the population” which “focused on the species body, the body imbued
with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of biological processes: propagation,
37

Ibid., 136-37.
Ibid., 139. Foucault had already discussed the specific historical practices of anatamo-politics in the first
two chapters of Part III of Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
39
Ibid., 139. Also see Foucault’s January 25th lecture from Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 59.
40
Cf. Discipline and Punish, especially pages 135-69.
41
I mean ‘reproduction’ in a double sense: the reproduction of material conditions necessary for the
survival of a given regime, as well as its ideological assumptions.
38

19
births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the
conditions that cause it to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of
interventions and controls”42 In his 1977-1978 lecture series at the Collège de France, he
characterizes it as a “dispositif of security” which developed sophisticated technologies
of power by harnessing the predictive and instrumental capacities of the human sciences
(i.e. through studying statistical probabilities and evaluating economic costs43) in order to
guard against threats to the survival of the social body.
Taken together, disciplinary power and biopolitics constituted a vast machinery of
social control which regulated the ‘metabolism’ of the body politic, a politics of life and
vitalism which Foucault called biopower. Returning to the categories introduced by
Fontana and Pasquino, we can see how the question of biopower fits in with the imagery
of the macro and/or micro body: it operated at two levels, with disciplinary power
targeting the bodies of individuals, or the ‘micro-bodies’ of society, while biopolitics
focuses on the ‘macro-body’, or body politic of society. Biopower is the name for a
specific logic or technology of power which grasps life itself, attempting to extend the
collective health of the nation-state indefinitely by mobilizing the population, a
mobilization which is achieved by working on the body, on its surfaces and in its depths,
as well as the networks and interstices between bodies (in this case, of course, we are
referring to the ‘body’ of society as well as the body of the subject). As this discussion
implies, however, the relationship between the three major regimes of power (i.e.
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sovereign, disciplinary and biopolitical/security) is complicated. Foucault, recognizes,
for example, that mechanisms of security represent, at least at one level, an effort to
ensure that the old systems of sovereign power and disciplinary power were ordered more
efficiently.44 Therefore, it is important to view the regimes as a complex network of
political technologies in which one schema temporarily emerges as the hegemonic
practice, while at the same time maintaining a proximity to other logics which preceded
and/or followed it.
Biopower, then, is a strategy for guarding the body politic. It operates at both the
‘macro’ as well as ‘micro’ levels of society. Borrowing Foucault’s description in his
1974-74 lecture series at the Collège de France, I will characterize discipline as an
‘inclusionary’ power which tries to ‘normalize’ the individual and incorporate him or her
into the body politic; it transforms the subject into a ‘productive’ citizen or member of
society who identities with the nation. Biopolitics, meanwhile, excludes agents or groups
from the body politic who represent difference; it is an ‘exclusionary’ power which seeks
to homogenize the body politic, since alterity is a threat to the unity of the social body.45
My categories are, admittedly, highly schematized; as qualifications, it is important to
note that disciplinary power also marginalizes agents, and biopower contains
‘inclusionary’ elements. Indeed, it is more correct to say that while disciplinary power
contains both inclusionary and exclusionary elements, as does biopolitics, I will
emphasize the inclusionary aspects of the former, and the exclusionary aspects of the
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latter. In addition, I will reiterate the cautionary note I attached to the paragraph above;
the major regimes of power overlap and reinforce one another, which makes it difficult to
identify clear breaks or ruptures. If we keep in mind the provisional character of the
descriptions I have offered, however, they allow us to examine the technologies of power
which have emerged in the context of biopolitical societies, technologies of power which
guard the social body against division and conflict.

Liberalism and Biopower
What is the connection between liberalism and biopower? As my reconstruction of
Foucault’s discussion highlights, the emergence of biopower parallels (at least
approximately) the birth of liberal political regimes. Biopower was a political technology
which appeared in liberal societies, a technology that guarded the social body. It is
incorrect, therefore, to argue that liberal regimes destroyed the ideological fantasies of
medieval political theology, the desire for a unified social body which never dies; rather,
the ‘fundamental ideological fantasy’ continued to occupy a critical place in the
architectonic of liberal political theory, and biopower was the strategy, or more precisely
the collection of tactics, it developed in order to execute its program. As I mentioned
above, liberal regimes drew on the instrumental power of the newly emerging social
sciences, allowing them to refine the operation of policing and social control.

As

Foucault notes in Discipline and Punish, for example, the ‘humanitarian’ legal reformers
of the late eighteenth century, who were ostensibly concerned with reducing the severity
and arbitrariness of punishment, were equally, if not more so, interested in normalizing
and refining the application of judicial power, as well as reducing the costs of
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administering justice.46 In any case, liberalism (like its historical predecessor) tried to
suppress political antagonism, and more generally traces of ‘deviance’, while at the same
time exercising disciplinary power, attempting to ‘pre-empt’ the emergence of ‘marginal’
subjects by intervening at the level of the subject’s body and psyche.
There is, however, another disturbing parallel which emerges from liberalism’s
continuing obsession with the ‘fundamental ideological fantasy’, namely its commonality
with totalitarianism. As Lefort has noted, totalitarian regimes also view society as a
body, and the ‘enemies’ of the regime are ‘waste matter’ or ‘excrement’, which the
Leader must expel in order to protect the collective ‘health’ of the state. Thus, liberalism
finds itself drawn into a strange kinship with its predecessor, the Old Regime, as well as
its twentieth-century arch-rivals, the Fascist/Communist dystopias. I stress ‘kinship’,
since it is incorrect to say that liberalism is simply the continuation of absolutist
monarchies, or the obscene double of Stalinism (but even more sinister, since it hides its
oppression, masking it under catchwords such as ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’). I obviously
recognize the specificity of liberalism, its difference from other political forms
(otherwise, I would have no basis for defining its unique characteristics). What I insist
on, however, is that there are uncomfortable similarities at the level of ideology, having
to do with a desire for oneness and unity; in short, a fantasy that the body politic is
uncontaminated by difference or heterogeneity, with no political antagonism or conflict.
The method of actualizing this fantasy is biopower.
If we re-interpret the canon of political theory from the standpoint of praxis and
technologies of power, we are forced to re-think the traditional demarcations between, for
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example, liberal democracies and authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, since biopower
increasingly orders the structure of both liberal and non-liberal regimes. Agamben has
emphasized the indeterminacy of contemporary political theory, which is now haunted by
the specter of what he calls ‘bare life’, or biological necessity; he writes that
only because biological life and its needs had become the politically decisive fact
is it possible to understand the otherwise incomprehensible rapidity with which
twentieth century parliamentary democracies were able to turn into totalitarian
states and with which this century’s totalitarian states were able to be converted,
almost without any interruption, into parliamentary democracies. In both cases,
these transformations were produced in a context in which for some time politics
had already turned into biopolitics, and in which the only real question to be
decided was which from of organization would be best suited to the task of
assuring the care, control and use of bare life. Once their fundamental referent
becomes bare life, traditional political distinctions (such as those between Right
and Left, liberalism and totalitarianism, private and public) lose their clarity and
intelligibility and enter into a zone of indistinction.47
Indeed, he amplifies his comments by highlighting a paradoxical phenomena that
characterizes political life in modernity; he notes that “it is almost as if, starting from a
certain point, every decisive political event were double-sided: the spaces, the liberties
and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always
simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the
state order.”48
It is important to qualify Agamben’s characterization, which is sweepingly
general.

It is not evident, for example, that the “conversion” of parliamentary

democracies into totalitarian regimes has occurred “without interruption” (or vice versa).
Nevertheless, Agamben is correct to point out the hybridization of state and civil society
and the increasingly uncertain conceptual boundaries of traditional political labels. In
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addition, we must recognize the ambivalence of liberal “rights” discourses, since the
practical realities of demanding more rights include an appeal to, and often a deeper
entangling in, the mechanisms of state power. As I had stated earlier in the chapter (and
the point bears repeating here) it is false to say that the differences between liberalism
and authoritarianism/totalitarianism are non-existent, nor is it correct to insist that we can
re-write the history of modern political theory as a bio-technological hall of mirrors in
which the substantial divergences, breaks and ruptures between competing regimes are
collapsed into a new metanarrative of bodily control. It does, however, require us to
interrogate theoretical categories, in order to bring certain unsettling continuities, both
theoretical and practical, into sharper relief.

Overview of the Argument
In the introduction, I have sketched out the general themes which motivate my project.
Speaking broadly, I will focus on the imagery of the body politic in the history of
liberalism, arguing that if we re-read it from, say, a Foucaultian standpoint (or at least an
interpretive perspective informed by Foucault’s work on biopower), we can uncover
another side of liberalism. It has been interpreted, at least traditionally, as an image of
consent. But I contend that we should understand it more literally, as the space in which
the body is politicized. The unity of the body politic is actually an expression of the
‘fundamental ideological fantasy’, and liberalism achieves social homogeneity in two
ways: through biopolitical strategies of inclusion and exclusion. This, in turn, forces us
to complicate the pristine image of liberalism as the defender of freedom; rather, we
should regard liberalism, like its ideological opponents, as striving for social unity, often
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at the price of the subject’s autonomy. In addition, we have to revise another aspect of
liberalism’s self-image; if my reading is correct, the body politic is actually the site of an
antagonistic struggle for hegemony, and by focusing on consensus or non-coercive
decision procedures liberals overlook the constitutive role of exclusions and power in the
formation of the social body. Now I will turn to the details of the argument.
In Chapter One, I focus on the canonical authors of the liberal/social contract
tradition (i.e. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau), arguing that the fundamental ideological
fantasy continues to play an important role in traditional liberalism. I highlight the
imagery of the body politic, and examine the privilege accorded to unity over differences
in the construction of the social body. I also focus on the politics of ‘micro-bodies’,
discussing the technologies of power which create ‘governable’ subjects who contribute
to the ideological/material reproduction of the dominant order. In Chapter Two, I move
to contemporary liberalism, examining the politics of the body in John Rawls. While I
admit that this approach looks unpromising (the original position consists of what are, for
all practical purposes, disembodied agents), I argue that Rawls’s subject has a history,
and is actually formed through what Norbert Elias calls “the civilizing process”. More
specifically, I contend that we can only understand, or render comprehensible, the
choices of agents in the original position if we assume they have strong moral values, or
(to use Rawls’s terminology) a “thick conception of the good”. Thus, the agent begins to
assume contours; I will begin, if you’ll permit a bad joke, to “flesh it out”. While the first
half of the chapter on Rawls focuses on A Theory of Justice, the second part examines the
problem of exclusion in Political Liberalism, arguing that Rawls is forced to exclude
non-liberals from his construction of the “body politic”, but that he incorrectly
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characterizes exclusion in moral terms.

In actuality, as Chantal Mouffe notes, the

exclusions are political. But what difference does that make? I return to this question in
Chapter Four.
In Chapter Three, I move from the level of theory to praxis, examining the actual
strategies of rule which have constituted liberal governmentality. Here I focus on the
appearance of biopower in society, examining the technologies of power which allow
liberalism to defend the body politic against division, risk and conflict. I highlight the
operation of inclusionary/exclusionary logics, arguing that normalized or ‘governable’
subjects are a product of disciplinary technologies of power; in addition, however, there
are also exclusionary logics at work, which are motivated by the fear of society’s
‘degeneration’. In Chapter 4, I conclude the essay with a discussion of how political
theories/identities are formed, arguing (following Ernesto Laclau) that every system has
to exclude its ‘other’ in order to constitute itself. I also defend the argument (formulated
by Chantal Mouffe) that power and antagonism are important features of social life.
Taken in combination, the two arguments entail that any political theory (and a fortiori
liberalism) has to exclude incompatible conceptions of the good, and the site of politics is
always an arena of hegemonic conflict and struggle.

This presents difficulties for

liberalism, which tends to construct its normative assumptions in the language of
universality, inclusion, non-coercion and undistorted communication. I contend, along
with Chantal Mouffe, that we have to recognize the necessity of exclusions, but we have
to conceptualize them in political, rather than moral, terms.

I argue that if we

conceptualize exclusion in political terms, they have a contingency and reversibility, at
least in democratic societies, which moral judgments tend to lack. In other words, they
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are subject to contestation within a democratic process. And how does the inescapability
of power and hegemonic struggle come into play here? If there is no way eliminate
antagonism from the body politic, we should abandon the ‘fundamental ideological
fantasy’ and begin thinking about new ways to conceptualize the social body which
recognize that conflict is a necessary feature of political life. Finally, I return to the
question of the ‘micro-body’. In the dissertation I contend that it is problematic to ignore
the role of power in the formation of ‘governable’ subjects. How, then, should we think
about power and subjectivity? Here I examine Foucault’s reflections on this question,
arguing that, instead of trying to eliminate power from theoretical discourse/political
practice, we should recognize its important and begin re-conceptualizing dominant
approaches to politics. I conclude with general reflections on the implications of my
study vis-à-vis attempts to re-examine the imagery of the body politic.
Before I turn to the Chapter 1, a final note is in order, concerning the
argumentative and narrative style of the dissertation. Peter F. Strawson has contrasted
two different approaches to philosophy; one, which he identities as the analytic tradition,
deals with conceptual analysis, while a second (which he associates with Heidegger,
Sartre and Nietzsche—in short, the Continental tradition) offers a systematic reflection on
the human condition “which can sometimes lead to a new perspective on human life and
experience”.49 I draw on both traditions in my work—I include, for example, discussions
of both Rawls and Foucault. But the spirit of the essay is, unapologetically, aligned with
the second tradition. I am, indeed, engaged in conceptual analysis (specifically, an
analysis of the image or concept of the body politic), but my methodology and approach
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to the body politic is less concerned with ‘getting it right’ (and what that means,
precisely, is a vexing philosophical question which generally remains unthematized);
rather, I’m trying to offer new ways of thinking about the social contract tradition, and
more generally the received political wisdom of our age. In short, I agree with Gilles
Delueze when he writes that “[y]ou should not try to find out whether an idea is just or
correct. You should look for a completely different idea, elsewhere, in another area, so
that something passes between the two which is neither one or the other.”50 I have tried,
therefore, to draw on opposed disciplines and defy the limitations imposed by the empire
of specialization (and even, I hope, the rules or conventions of academic philosophy),
pursuing a bricolage approach which mixes together ideas, bodies, spaces, powers and
antagonisms. The task of philosophy (and here, once again, I’m thinking of Deleuze51) is
to invent new concepts, as well as re-imagine or re-think old ones which have become
‘self-evident’. We must (and this is an admittedly difficult task) re-capture the sense of
strangeness and ambiguity which initially accompanied the concept’s emergence and
allowed it to disrupt the oppressive sameness which always threatens to swallow up
alterity, so that we can experience its contingency and recognize that it, too, has a history;
it reminds us, in short, that we can think and act differently.
In the final analysis, therefore, my hope is that this dissertation helps us to see the
world, if only a small and obscure corner of it, otherwise; that it leads, perhaps, to an
interrogation of the given. As Foucault writes, we must “be very mindful that everything
one perceives is evident only against a familiar and little-known horizon, that every
50
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certainty is sure only through the support of a ground that is always unexplored. The
most fragile instant has its roots. In that lesson, there is a whole ethic of sleepless
evidence that does not rule out, far from it, a rigorous economy of the True and the False;
but that is not the whole story.”52
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CHAPTER 1: LIFE AND DEATH OF THE MACRO-BODY IN CLASSICAL
LIBERALISM
In the first chapter, I begin my examination of the body politic in liberalism with a
discussion of three important authors from the social contract tradition: Hobbes, Locke
and Rousseau. The imagery of the body politic is important for the liberal/social contract
tradition in two ways: first of all, it represents the institutions which are produced by
agents who agree to exit from the state of nature and transfer their sovereignty to civil
authorities; the language figures prominently, for example, in the authors I mentioned
above. Secondly, liberal political philosophers argue that individuals have the right to
personal autonomy; the subject can explore different forms of thinking or living, and this
space of freedom is protected, at least in theory, against the intervention of external
forces.53 One of the most compelling formulations of this basic principle is located in
section twenty-seven of Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, where he writes that
“[t]hough the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has
a Property to his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour
of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.”(Locke’s italics)54
This passage from Locke highlights a critical, if not the critical, aspect of liberalism’s
conception of autonomy, namely its emphasis on the body as personal property which no
government has the right to appropriate or control; indeed, in liberal authors as different
as Hobbes and Locke the cornerstone of natural law is the right to self-preservation. In
Hobbes, for example, the fundamental natural right is defined as “the Liberty each man
53
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hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature;
that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own
Judgment, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”55 Likewise,
in section 16 of the Second Treatise Locke characterizes the “Fundamental Law of
Nature” as “Man being to be preserved.”56
As I mentioned in the introduction, however, the secondary literature on liberalism
and the social contract tradition has failed to recognize the importance of the body politic,
and more generally the significance of “body politics”, or the politics of embodiment. In
the case of the social body, it is often ignored, and when it is discussed it is interpreted as
an image of consent.57 If our interpretative framework is informed by Foucault’s work
on biopolitics, however, a new vantage point emerges. Corporeal language is no longer
viewed one-dimensionally, as a metaphor of popular consent; rather, we can re-read the
body politic in a more literal way, as the intersection of cooperation and antagonism
between subjects who vie for power. In other words, the body of society, as well as the
body of the individual, is transformed into a space of politics.

Charles Mills has argued,

for example, that in the history of Western political philosophy the social contract has
functioned, in both explicit and implicit ways, as a racial contract; indeed, “[w]hite
supremacy…is a political system predicated on racial superiority and inferiority, on the
demarcation and devaluation of different races”; thus, “the ‘body’ in the body politic
55

See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), ch. 14, 91.
Hereafter I will refer to the chapter, followed by the page number in Tuck’s edition.
56

Two Treatises, II, 16, 279.
For examples of the kind of reading I have in mind, see Quentin Skinner’s ‘The Purely Artificial Person
of the State” in Visions of Politics, Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
2002) on Hobbes, or A. John Simmons’s On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993) esp.
pp.167-77 concerning Locke.
57

32
naturally becomes crucial—and nonmetaphoric—in a way it does not in the abstract
polity of (official) Western theory.”58 In that case, however, the word ‘transformed’ is,
strictly speaking, incorrect, since the texts of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have always
contained (bio)political elements which were overlooked or obscured. It is more correct
to say that reading the social contract tradition in a Foucaultian manner transforms the
range of interpretive possibilities which are open to commentators. Thus, it allows us to
see the canon, at least hopefully, in a fundamentally new way. It will also demonstrate
that when political theorists focus exclusively on questions of normativity and
legitimation, they miss important aspects of the text relating to the operation of power
vis-à-vis the construction of the social body and its subjects.
In the first chapter (and throughout the essay), I focus on the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’
bodies of society. The first term relates to the social body as a collectivity; the second
refers to the individuals or ‘micro-bodies’ which constitute the body politic. I argue that
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau turn to biopolitical forms of ‘inclusionary’ and
‘exclusionary’ power in order to guarantee the unity of the social body. I highlighted my
understanding of the two faces of power in the introduction; here, I will simply note that
‘inclusionary’ power is a form of normalization, which produces subjects who contribute
to the ‘reproduction’ of the body politic, while exclusionary power marginalizes agents
who are ‘different’ and threaten the unity of the body politic (with the relevant
qualifications attached, i.e. that inclusionary power also excludes agents, while
exclusionary power has normalizing components).59
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In any case, my reading of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau examines the technologies of
control behind the rhetoric of consent and freedom which typically accompanies liberal
discourse. I will show that ‘irrational’ agents are excluded from the initial decision
procedure which legitimizes the social contract, while disciplinary power targets the
‘micro-bodies’ in society, which normalizes and integrates political agents.

Thus, the

micro-bodies ‘consent’ to the formation of the body politic and guarantee it continuing
legitimacy; at the same time, the ‘other’ is excluded from the social body (both from its
foundation, as well as the political order which is constructed from the initial consent of
agents). Yet the individual’s consent to transfer his/her sovereignty to a governmental
authority presupposes that s/he is willing to recognize the legitimacy, and obey the laws,
of the newly constituted political order (or body politic). The willingness to submit to
governance, however (which in turn presupposes capacities such as rationality), or the
governable individual, is a product of social habituation, which isn’t ‘chosen’ by the
subject. The clearest example of this will emerge in my discussion of John Locke’s work
on education, which is indispensable for understanding his political theory (or so I will
argue). But there are instances of this tension in Hobbes and Rousseau as well, and I will
point out cases which illustrate this general contention. In addition, I will highlight
examples of exclusion in social contract theory; as I emphasize in my discussion, there
are moments of exclusion which occur after the formation of the body politic, but the
most interesting (and telling) forms of marginalization happen during the contract’s
liberalism; like any other grouping of historical or sociological categories, there is a certain degree of
arbitrariness at work here. I am not, therefore, suggesting that other interesting and fruitful analyses could
not be offered, or even that different categories for organizing the data in question would not be useful; I
do, however, want to suggest that if the practices of exclusion/inclusion were omitted from a discussion of
the history of liberalism, as it often has been in the past, the author would be guilty of an important
oversight (to put it mildly).
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initial decision procedure, when ‘idiots’, ‘madmen’, etc. are eliminated from the
legitimation pool because they lack ‘rationality’.

I argue that the process of

inclusion/exclusion has important philosophical implications for social contract theory;
the ‘inclusionary’ normalization of agents is the condition of ‘autonomy’, and the
exclusion of agents from the initial decision procedure shows that liberalism, which
emphasizes its tolerance and pluralism, actually excludes subjects in order to constitute,
and maintain, a unified body politic. I will elaborate on these points in the course of the
first chapter; I will begin with an examination of Hobbes.

Re-reading the Imagery of the Body Politic in Hobbes
Before I discuss the imagery of the body politic in Hobbes, it’s important to address one
criticism which, if correct, would force me to abandon my claim that he is a liberal. The
criticism is this:

There are clearly authoritarian elements in Hobbes’s political

philosophy, such as his defense of a powerful executive and the limitations placed on
subject’s rights; therefore, it’s inappropriate to include him in a study of the liberal
tradition. It is obviously difficult to characterize Hobbes in a straightforward way, either
as a proto-liberal or as an apologist for seventeenth century absolutism; nevertheless,
Oakeshott insists he is a more committed liberal than the majority of its self-appointed
advocates.60

Leo Strauss, however, has developed the most compelling argument

concerning Hobbes’s liberalism; he writes that
[For Hobbes] there are…no absolute or unconditional duties; duties are binding
only to the extent to which their performance does not endanger our selfpreservation. Only the right of self-preservation is unconditional or absolute...[I]f
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we define liberalism as that political doctrine which regards as the fundamental
political fact the rights, as distinguished from the duties, of man and which
identifies the function of the state with the protection or the safeguarding of those
rights, we must say that the founder of liberalism was Hobbes.61
Norberto Bobbio, on the opposite end of the political spectrum, echoes the comments of
Strauss, he argues that one of the key differences between classical and modern natural
law is a shift in emphasis from the language of obligation to rights.62 While the historical
academic consensus tended to identify Grotius as the founder of modern natural law
theory, there is a newfound openness to the idea that Hobbes, in actuality, initiates the
break with the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition.63
If Strauss’ argument is correct to assert that the critical moment in the intellectual
transition from medieval political theory to the hegemony of liberalism is the emphasis
on self-preservation, it is also possible to identify an important connection with biopower.
Indeed, Agamben has noted that “[a]ccording to Foucault, a society’s ‘threshold of
biological modernity’ is situated at the point at which the species and the individual as a
simple living body become what is at stake in a society’s political strategies.”64 In short,
the preservation of what Agamben calls ‘bare life’ is invested with a heretofore
unimaginable political significance; the basic survival of the citizen and the body politic
becomes one of the central elements in liberalism’s theoretical foundation; as Agamben
notes, both the species and the subject are the targets of a new ‘biopolitics of the
population’ (to borrow a term from Foucault). Another way to challenge the criticism I
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began with, then, is to demonstrate that the connection between liberalism and biopower
is closer than we think.
The question of the body politic has been neglected in the secondary literature on
Hobbes’s political theory.

As C.D. Tarlton notes, David Gauthier’s The Logic of

Leviathan65 influenced a series of studies, especially in analytic circles, which identified
Hobbes as a forerunner of rational-choice/game theorists (we can recognize the contours
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example, in Hobbes’s initial contract procedure).66 The
transformation of the Hobbesian self into a hyper-egoistic, utility-maximizing subject has
led to a disembodied view of the political agent. The erasure of the body, however, also
erases the conditions of identity formation; it fails to grasp the connection between
persons or the ways in which desire is influenced by corporeal networks. In this regard,
Mary G. Dietz has highlighted the centrality of disciplinary technologies in Hobbes’s
work, since they constitute ‘docile bodies’ who obey the laws of the sovereign.67 This
chapter tries to recover the politics of embodiment in Hobbes (as well as Locke and
Rousseau).
The importance of the social body in Hobbes’s political theory is clear, especially
if we return to a frontispiece engraving from the 1651 edition of Leviathan.68 It is well
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known to students of political philosophy; at the top of the page, the sovereign, which
Hobbes characterizes as a “mortall God”, towers over a rustic landscape with mountains
and villages. He carries a sword in his right hand and an Episcopal cross in his left,
which symbolize the power of the executive branch and state religion.69 The torso of the
king is apparently covered by a façade of armor. As we look more closely, however, we
can detect the outline of human bodies; the sovereign’s body, the body politic, is literally
constituted by his subjects. In this version, they are faceless and anonymous; in later
printings, we can actually see human faces. Above the head of the king, there is a Latin
inscription from Job 41:24 (“non est potestas super terram quae comparetur ei”), which
Carl Schmitt translates as “upon earth there is not his like.”70

There are two columns,

each containing five motifs, below the landscape; here I will refer to Schmitt’s
description of the images:
Under each arm, the secular as well as the spiritual, there is a column of five
drawings: under the sword a castle, a crown, a cannon; then rifles, lances and
banners, and finally a battle; to these correspond, under the spiritual arm, a
church, mitre, thunderbolts, symbols for sharpened distinctions, syllogisms, and
dilemmas; finally, a council.71
Schmitt argues that the engraving illustrates the friend-enemy antithesis72, while Lucien
Jaume argues that “the drawing of the author seems to establish the unity of the State
doubly; the unity of its structure, as an integration of individuals, and the unity of its will
as political subject.”73

69

The latter image is rather ambiguous; here I’ve followed the reading of Lucien Jaume in Hobbes et l’Etat
Représentatif Moderne (Paris: PUF, 1986), 19-24.
70
See his classic study of the language/figure of the Leviathan, The Leviathan in the State Theory of
Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol, trans. George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Pub., 1996), 18.
71
Ibid., 18.
72
Ibid., 18.
73
Jaume, 24.

38
What the two interpretations implicitly reveal, it seems to me, is the Janus-faced
nature of biopower vis-à-vis the construction of Hobbes’s body politic. On the one hand,
the king exhibits his absolute power, represented by the sword, in order to terrify
“enemies” of the state. This is the exclusionary motif, directed towards subjects (both
individual and collective) which threaten to subvert the homogeneity and unity of the
social body.

On the other hand, the sovereign assimilates his/her citizens into a

disciplinary archipelago of social control; under the vigilant gaze of the monarch, his
subjects perform the vital tasks of societal reproduction, a ‘disciplinary inclusion’ which
contributes to the life of the body politic.

If we examine the engraving from a

biopolitical perspective, therefore, a new interpretive possibility opens up; we can
examine the metaphor of the social body from the standpoint of the marginalized and the
subjugated.74 Hobbes’s frontispiece (which was intended, I think we can safely assume,
as an homage to sovereign power) is turned against itself, and becomes the entry point for
a critical analysis of the imagery of the body politic.
In Hobbes, the body politic emerges from the state of nature, or the war of all
against all (where the “life of man” is characterized as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and
short”).75 Hobbes argues that in the state of nature there is no sovereign, which leads to
violence and chaos; he describes the state of nature as anarchy, with no science, industry,
commerce or art,76 and the competition for survival produces a brutal existential struggle.
Three factors contribute towards this generalized warfare.
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competition for finite resources77; secondly (anticipating the master-slave dialectic in
Hegel), agents struggle for recognition;78 and finally, individuals have the right of selfpreservation, as well as the right of self-defense (which obviously follows from the first
right). According to Hobbes, “[t]he Right of Nature…is the Liberty each man hath, to
use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to
say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement,
and Reason, he shall conceive as being the aptest means thereunto.”79
The “body politic” is Hobbes’s description of the commonwealth formed by
rational agents. The parties universally (or at least by a majority vote) consent to transfer
the right of self-preservation to a collectively recognized sovereign power. The form of
sovereignty is contingent, although Hobbes emphasizes his preference for monarchy over
democracy and aristocracy80. Two passages are relevant in this context. First of all, in a
section from Elements of Law Hobbes refers to the ‘body politic’ in the following way:
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The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself
to some one and the same man, or to some one and the same council, by them all
named and determined, to do those actions, which the said man or council shall
command them to do; and to do no action which which he or they shall forbid, or
command them not to do…The union so made, is that which men now-a-days call
a BODY POLITIC or civil society and the Greeks call it polis, that is to say, a
city; which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united as one person by a
common power, for their common peace, defence and benefit.81
In Leviathan, we encounter a similar characterization of the newly constituted polis; here
the body politic is christened a “Mortall God”, and Hobbes writes that
the Multitude, so united in one person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in Latin
CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak
more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Imortall God,
our peace and liberty…And in him consisteth the Essence of the Commonwealth;
which…is One Person, of whose acts a great Multitude, by mutual Covenants one
with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use
the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace
and Common Defence.82
Following the trajectory of my argument, which I outlined in the introduction, I propose
situating the two passages against the backdrop medieval political theology (or what
Kantorowicz called the doctrine of ‘the king’s two bodies’). In this regard, it is important
to highlight at least two ruptures or breaks with the medieval theory of sovereign
legitimacy which implicitly underscores Hobbes’s liberal modernity. First of all, the
sovereign’s power is only granted to him or her by the consent of governed subjects.
Here we can identify a hallmark of all the major social-contractarians, and it allows us to
establish the following distinction between the two theologies: the old medieval political
theology insisted that the king received his right to rule from a divine source, namely
God, whereas the new liberal political theology discovers the source of legitimacy in the
consent of the political agents who form the original social contract. The basis of
81
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legitimacy, therefore, has been secularized. As a consequence, it is more contingent (and
more subject to dissipation).
This leads me to a second important difference between medieval political
theology and Hobbes’s liberal/modernist re-working of the social body. If the survival of
the new body politic is contingent on the submission of the contracting parties (and is no
longer legitimated or guaranteed by the appeal to divine right) the life of the body politic
is transformed into a finite, mortal entity, subject to all the 'diseases' and 'pathologies'
which threaten to terminate the ordinary, biological life of the sovereign (obviously
interpreted here in a metaphorical way). It is as if finitude becomes an imminent double
of the body politic, inhabiting it from within and threatening to annihilate it. This is
undoubtedly why Hobbes writes (again, in Leviathan) that “[t]hough nothing can be
immortal, which mortals make; yet if men had the use of the reason they pretend to, their
Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing through internal diseases.”83
He also describes the various “Infirmities” or “Diseases” which “weaken the Commonwealth” (the language is Hobbes’); they include “the poison of seditious doctrines”
(remember that the sovereign has the final right to stipulate which doctrines are
‘seditious’ and which are not), the ‘problem’ of conscientious objection, and the idea that
the sovereign is in any way subject to civil law.84
A new question, therefore, arises for political theory:

how, precisely, can the

sovereign prevent the disintegration of the body politic? How is s/he able to defend it
against social antagonism and plurality? In articulating this question, we can recognize
(despite certain differences, which I tried to indicate above) liberalism's ideological
83
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proximity to the ‘antiquated’ conceptual schemes of Plowden's medieval political
theology: i.e. the desire to achieve immortality, or more precisely the ideological fantasy
of social homogeneity. Social homogeneity, in turn, functions as an ‘immunization’,
against ‘pathology’ (since Hobbes admits that the newly-formed body politic is destined
to confront mortality) by eliminating the traces of political division (or in Hobbes’s text,
the differences aggravated by a logic of dissent).
In framing the argument of the dissertation, I had situated liberalism in the
horizon of biopower.

Biopower relies on strategies of inclusion and exclusion;

disciplinary power tries to create individuals who are ‘productive’ citizens, i.e. persons
who are integrated into the social body, while biopolitics or the security paradigm
maintains social cohesion by excluding ‘undesirable’ groups from the body politic. Here
I want to demonstrate that Hobbes’s commonwealth is held together, and reproduces
itself, through biopolitical technologies of power.

I will examine the operation of

inclusionary/exclusionary logics in Hobbes’s political theory.

We can begin with

exclusionary power, focusing on two aspects of marginalization: (1) the exclusion of
agents during the initial decision procedure which forms the social body, and (2)
exclusion of persons identified as ‘enemies’ of the body politic.
The first moment of exclusion (which occurs at the inception of the social
contract) is the marginalization of agents who are incapable of recognizing the validity of
covenants. According to Hobbes, certain humans are beast-like; in the same way that
laws are non-binding over animals, because they lack reason, the “foole”, the child and
the “mad-man” are not bound (but also not protected) by the social contract. Hobbes
writes the following: “[o]ver naturall fooles, children or mad-men there is no Law, no
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more than over brute beasts…because they had never power to make any covenant, or to
understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to
authorise the actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a
Common-wealth.”85

‘Irrational’ agents, therefore, are unable to appreciate the

consequences of transferring basic rights according to principles of consensual
agreement, and as a result they are not able to authorize the exercise of sovereign
power.86
It is necessary, in this regard, to examine Hobbes’s criteria for excluding certain
candidates, and admitting others, to the architectonic of the social contract, i.e. the birth
of the body politic. I will focus specifically on Hobbes’s conception of madness; the
other two groups are too complex, both in terms of Hobbes’s definitions as well as the
rationalizations provided for marginalizing the parties in question (although the figure of
the “naturall foole”, has been studied by David Gauthier87). In the anthropological
introduction to Leviathan, which offers discussions of sense, imagination, speech and the
passions (among other topics), Hobbes includes a diagnosis of madness. It is a defect of
the virtues, and it is defined as having “stronger, and more vehement passions for
anything, than is ordinarily seen in others”88

(further down the page, he describes

madness as “all Passions that may produce strange and unusual behavior”89). There are

85

Ibid., 26, 187.
This interpretation is verified by a similar passage in chapter sixteen, in which Hobbes writes that
“Children, Fooles and Mad-Men, may be Personated by Guardians or Curators; but can be no Authors
(during that time) of any action done by them, longer than (when they recover the use of Reason) they shall
judge the same reasonable.” (Ibid., 113) De Cive, which preceded the appearance of Leviathan, contains
very similar passages; see especially chapter one, addenda to paragraph two (92/24). For an elaborate
discussion of the theory of authorization, and its relationship to the ‘artificial person’ of the state, see
Quentin Skinner’s “Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State”(op. cit.)
87
See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), esp. 157-89.
88
Leviathan, 8, 54.
89
Ibid.

86

44
several varieties of madness;90 nevertheless, Hobbes provides an overview of the most
important types. An excess of anger, for example, is fury,91 while an excess of dejection
(a strange characterization of ‘dejection’, needless to say) is melancholy.92 Even the
“abuse of words”, which Hobbes dismisses as “Absurdity”, is a kind of madness: “and
this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible;
as the Schoole-Men; or in questions of Abstruse Philosophy.”93
Whatever one may think about the “madness” of philosophers (and any honest
member of the profession is undoubtedly tempted to agree with Hobbes’s assessment),
the problem with Hobbes’s argument is that it hinges on a quantitative definition. As
Hegel has noted in his study of the dialectical relationship between quantity and quality,
quantitative conceptions suffer from an inherent ambiguity, since a quantitative increase
or decrease, if it is significant enough, produces a qualitative transition.94 If we return,
for example, to the characterization of ‘fury’ as an excess of anger, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine the exact point where normalcy is transformed into pathology,
and the person becomes ‘mad’. Indeed, we can assume that any person, at a given time
or place, is capable of exhibiting signs of ‘madness’ (such as ‘fury’, ‘melancholy’ or—
why not?—the ‘abuse of words’). Borrowing an argument from Uday Singh Mehta, who
makes a similar point concerning the question of madness in Locke’s political theory (an
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argument which figures heavily in my discussion of Locke95), we can pose the following
question: Who, precisely, decides that X is mad, whereas Y is sane? The sovereign?
But remember that we have yet to recognize a common legal authority; we are still
examining the parameters of the initial decision procedure. Furthermore, Hobbes fails to
provide us with criteria either for (a) selecting a competent authority which could
differentiate between the ‘mad’ and the ‘sane’ or (b) indicating a set of parameters which
allow us, at a minimum, to identify such an expert.
The first moment of exclusion which operates in the founding of the body politic,
therefore, is the exclusion of non-rational agents. The second moment of exclusion is the
elimination of ‘enemies’ from the contractual social body. In order to guard the body
politic against degeneration (Hobbes notes, for example, that “[t]hough nothing can be
immortal, which mortals make; yet if men had the use of the reason they pretend to, their
Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing through internal diseases”96),
the sovereign is granted absolute powers. The authority delegated to the executive
includes the ability to declare certain doctrines ‘seditious’ (and the sovereign’s
prerogative is the final tribunal)97, the right to establish civil laws governing the conduct
of subjects98 and finality of decision regarding judicial matters.99 The sovereign’s power
identifies and targets sites of ‘pathology’ in the body politic: the labeling of positions as
‘seditious’ criminalizes dissidents, the formulation of laws regulating the behavior of
citizens undermines critical distinctions between the public and private spheres and
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executive oversight of the judiciary eliminates separation of powers between branches of
government.

This hypothesis is verified if we recall Hobbes’s discussion of the

“Infirmities” or “Diseases” which “weaken the Common-wealth” (the language is his).
They include “the poison of seditious doctrines”100 the ‘dangers’ of conscientious
objection,101 and the idea that the sovereign is subject to civil law102 (in a previous
chapter, Hobbes also describes “Unlawfull Assemblages” as the political equivalent of
“Biles…engendered by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours”).103
In addition to exclusionary logics, however, there are ‘inclusionary’ forms of
power which target the bodies of subjects. In De Cive, for example, he writes that “[i]t is
evident therefore that all men (since all men are born as infants) are born unfit for
society; and very many (perhaps the majority) remain so throughout their lives, because
of mental discipline or lack of training [disciplina]. Yet as infants and adults they do
have a human nature. Man is therefore made fit for Society not by nature, but by training
[Ab Societatem ergo homo aptus, non natura sed disciplina factus est].”104 This passage
is illuminating for two reasons. First of all, it differentiates Hobbes’s theory of political
subjectivity from Aristotelianism, which argues that humans are innately social,105 and
secondly, it anticipates Nietzsche’s genealogical account of the political agent.
According to Hobbes, the ‘social’ animal is a product of instruction or ‘training’
[disciplina]. As Geoffrey Vaughn notes, “Political education [in Hobbes] has as its
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end…the discipline of citizens.”106 In Hobbes’s system, inclusionary power operates in
two ways: through (to cite Vaughn’s phrase) ‘political education’ (or ‘instruction) and
direct coercion.

I will examine the two forms in turn, beginning with ‘political

education’.
In Chapter 30 of Leviathan, Hobbes argues that the sovereign has a responsibility
to “instruct” the “Common People”, whose “minds…are like clean paper, fit to receive
whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them.”107 While it is a “Duty” of
sovereignty, however, it also benefits the ruler, since it provides “Security…against the
Danger that may arrive to himselfe in his Natural Person, from Rebellion.”108 The
political education of the subjects guards, at least indirectly, against the disintegration of
the social body. It is essential, then, for the sovereign to communicate seven principles of
obedience and loyalty. First, the subjects should not express admiration for different
forms of government (which threatens to disrupt the stability of a given regime).109
Secondly, they should not praise the virtues of other citizens, especially powerful
aristocrats or members of the assembly.110 Third, the citizenry must understand that it is
“a great fault” to criticize the ruler.111 Fourth, given that ‘the masses’ are generally
incapable of remembering simple commands (at least according to Hobbes), the
sovereign must establish a day of instruction, where the people will temporarily leave
their work to hear the laws read aloud. The parallel Hobbes draws, interestingly enough,
is to the Sabbath, when the “Soveraign of Soveraigns” ordered the Hebrews to reflect on
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the Ten Commandments.112 Fifth, children owe their parents obedience113; sixth, the
subjects have to learn respect for property and human life114 and finally, they are
reminded that, in addition to evil actions, evil intentions constitute “Injustice”.115
There is also, however, a second aspect of inclusionary power in Hobbes, the
coercion of individuals. While political education tries to condition the behavior of
subjects through discipline or ‘training’, there are also technologies of power which
directly target the bodies of citizens, exploiting their productive labor force.

The

sovereign, for example, has the authority to conscript workers, who contribute to the
“Nutrition” and “Procreation” of the social body. Its “nutrition” is equated with the
mineral wealth of a given country,116 and in order to increase national resources, “strong
bodies” should “be forced to work; and to avoid excuse of not finding employment, there
ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all manner of Arts; as Navigation,
Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of manufacture that requires labor”117 (which also
discourages what Hobbes refers to as ‘idleness’). When the surplus population begins to
exceed available territory in the social body, however, “[t]he multitude of the poor…are
to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently inhabited.”118 The process of forced
emigration (for colonialist ends, nonetheless), which culminates either in the settling of
empty territory, or the extermination of the inhabitants, is characterized as the
“procreation” of the commonwealth; according to Hobbes, “[t]he Procreation, or Children
of a Common-Wealth, are those we call Plantations or Colonies; which are numbers of
112
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men sent out from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a
Forraign Country, either formerly void of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by Warre”119
(although the concept of forced emigration is more appropriately classified as
exclusionary power).
The deployment of ‘inclusionary’ power, therefore, encourages stability by producing
obedient subjects or ‘docile bodies’. As I had indicated above, it is a complement to the
exclusionary gesture. Hobbes ostracizes the enemies of the polis, while at the same time
advocating ‘political education’ for citizens of the body politic. Mary G. Dietz has noted
that conventional interpretations of Hobbes often return to the following question: “what
sustains the absolute obedience of the people and so the absolute rule of the
sovereign?”120 Two answers are provided; it is either the case that (a) it is in the rational
self-interest of contractual agents to honor the agreement or (b) the sovereign obtains
his/her subject’s compliance by exuding the terrifying aura of a “Mortall God”.121 Dietz,
however, suggests a third possibility which is consistent with my response to the question
(or rather, my response is consistent with hers), namely that
the rights of the sovereign, and the commonwealth itself are secured only when
the people have a sense of duty that springs ‘naturally’ from the cultivation of
certain qualities, such as the keeping of faith. The commonwealth that takes no
care for the people’s instruction in…civic attributes is destined to ‘relapse into
disorder’, for without a virtuous population, the essential rights of the sovereign
cannot be sustained.122
If my interpretation of Hobbes is correct, the imagery of the body politic, or more
precisely its materialization in Leviathan, allows us to decipher the logic governing the
social-contractarian ideological fantasy. Hobbes constructs a political ‘organism’ which
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is unified by terror and indoctrination. My interpretation, however, sharply contrasts
with the predominant trends in secondary literature. C.D. Tarlton, in an essay I cited
earlier, has discussed the ‘liberalization’ of Hobbes, highlighting an effort (beginning in
the nineteenth century) to revise the seventeenth and eighteenth century interpretations,
which recognized the authoritarian features of Hobbes’s system.123 According to Tarlton,
“[t]hose parts of Hobbes’s text that conveyed [his] despotical doctrine have been ignored
[or] misinterpreted…in an effort to make Leviathan a more liberal, politically pragmatic
and generally palatable theory.”124 While I agree with Tarlton that sanitizing Hobbes’s
text is problematic, both for textual as well as political reasons, (and that Hobbes’s
political theory is a study in what Tarlton calls ‘despotic’ governance), it is important to
underscore the liberal elements of Hobbes’s writing, such as the emphasis on consensual
legal agreements, as well as his evident recourse to logics of exclusion and
normalization.

My reading of liberalism, however, allows for the coexistence of

normative appeals to consent and biopolitical technologies of governance; indeed, as both
Nietzsche and Foucault recognize, ‘autonomous’ subjects, the subjects presupposed by
contract theory, are the product of history and culture. Tarlton, therefore (as well as his
‘liberalizing’ interlocutors) sets up a false dichotomy.

In order to understand the

ambiguities of Hobbes’s political theory, we have to situate it in the horizon of
liberalism’s own tortured relationship with power.
It is clearly true, however, that I’d like to retrieve the ‘despotic’ aspects of
Hobbes’s system (if only as a corrective to the hyper-rationalized, proto-liberal
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interpretations mentioned by Tarlton). As a counterpoint to my reading, therefore, I will
examine Richard Flathman’s Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality and Chastened
Politics, a provocative essay which challenges the assumption that Hobbes’s system is
authoritarian. He summarizes the argument of his text in the following way: “My claim
is that the primary unit of Hobbes’s thinking is the individual person and her makings
[and] the primary objective of his political and moral thinking is to promote and protect
each person’s pursuit of her own felicity as she sees fit.”125 If it is the case that Hobbes
has constructed a terrifying disciplinary regime, Flathman is incorrect (unless we assume
that tyrannical regimes “promote and protect each person’s pursuit of her own felicity as
she sees fit”). It turns out, however, that Flathman contests the premise of traditional
interpretations which emphasize Hobbes’s authoritarianism (or more precisely, the
tyranny of Hobbes’s ideal regime); he suggests that “the gimcrack contraption he calls
Leviathan could have little effective authority and even less power over its subjects.”126
While Flathman’s argument is complex, there are at least three examples which
(on his reading) demonstrate the legitimacy of this position. First of all, Hobbes defends
the right of self-defense (as well as access to basic necessities); if a subject is ordered to
“kill, wound, or mayme himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from
the use of food, ayre, or medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet
hath that man the Liberty to disobey.”127 Secondly, Hobbes notes that if a group of
subjects “have already resisted the Sovereign Power unjustly, or committed some Capitall
crime, for which every one of them expecteth death”, then have the right “to joyn
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together, and assist, and defend one another.”128 Finally, the subject has the liberty of
“forbearance”, which entails that “in cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule,
there the Subject hath the Liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion.”129
While it is the case that the three rights listed above, taken collectively, represent
challenges to the absolutist interpretation of Hobbes, it is incorrect to argue that they
constitute either (a) evidence for the assertion that “the primary objective of his political
and moral thinking is to promote and protect each person’s pursuit of her own felicity as
she sees fit” or verification of the more limited claim that (b) “the gimcrack contraption
he calls Leviathan could have little effective authority and even less power over its
subjects.” I will restrict myself to the (relatively) modest (b). We can examine the three
rights in turn, beginning with (1), the right to basic necessities/self-defense. It is unclear,
first of all, why the sovereign would order a subject to kill or “mayme” his/herself;
assuming, however, that s/he did issue the order and it was disobeyed, how (or why) is
the sovereign’s power challenged (at least in any substantial way)? Again, why would
the sovereign command his/her subjects to “abstain” from necessary food, medicines,
etc., especially given the fact that the social body needs healthy citizens in order to
‘reproduce’? As for (2) it is important to remember that Hobbes explicitly prohibits
rebellion; but if that’s true, how could a citizen possess a right which is already
delegitimized by antecedently existing proscriptive laws?130 Finally, we have (3), the
liberty of ‘forbearance’. This is the most promising candidate, since it permits citizens to
engage in activities which are not explicitly forbidden by the sovereign. It is important to
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recall, however, the extensive scope of sovereign oversight. If we return to chapter
eighteen, for example, Hobbes includes the following rights in his list of sovereign
powers: “Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing the
Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he
may does, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects”.131 While this passage,
at least at first glance, supports Flathman’s theory (notice, for example, the emphasis on
protecting the subject from “molestation” by his/her fellow citizens), it is important to
reiterate that the sovereign has “the whole power of prescribing the Rules” which govern
individual action. To the extent that the subject is granted individual freedom, therefore,
it is only because the sovereign initially circumscribed a space of non-intervention. This
passage contradicts Flathman’s proposition (b), concerning the power (or lack thereof)
given to the sovereign. In addition, however, it undermines (a), since Hobbes explicitly
states that the sovereign prescribes “what Goods he [the subject] may enjoy.” The
sovereign intends to promote happiness (a docile happiness), one suspects, but it is no
longer the individual’s right to select a “felicitous” course as “she sees fit”. When we
add the power highlighted above to the list I mentioned earlier, Flathman’s thesis is
severely tested; if anything, it brings the disciplinary regime into sharper focus.132
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If Hobbes’s status as a ‘liberal’ is subject to debate, John Locke’s influence on modern
liberalism is beyond dispute. John Gray, for example, writes that “in the period of Whig
ascendancy following the Glorious Revolution, in the debates during the English Civil
War and, most importantly, in John Locke’s Second Treatise on Civil Government…the
central elements of the liberal outlook crystallized for the first time into a coherent
intellectual tradition expressed in a powerful, if often divided and conflicted political
movement.”133

In opposition to the seventeenth century discourse of monarchical

absolutism, Locke defended “a right to liberty and the acquisition of property with which
none may interfere.”134

The foundation of autonomy was the natural right of each

subject in his or her own “Person”, a right which “no Body” is entitled to transgress.135
Embodiment, therefore, is a, if not the, central issue in Locke’s political philosophy.
While Locke is recognized as anticipating, at least ideologically, the eighteenth
century struggle for democratic liberties, his revolutionary credentials have recently been
challenged. In Ruth Grant’s excellent study (John Locke’s Liberalism), for example, he
is described as a “cautious liberal”. According to Ruth, his work is characterized by a
fundamental ambiguity; it is torn and conflicted, almost schizophrenically, between the
desire for freedom and a defense of order.136 This uncertainty, moreover, affects the
development of liberalism as a tradition; she writes that “[t]his ambivalent attitude is an
expression of the central axis of conflict within liberalism generally. Every liberal theory
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must find some more or less uneasy reconciliation of the claims of order and revolution,
society and the individual.”137
Grant’s insight also complements the interpretation of Uday Mehta Singh in The
Anxiety of Freedom, who argues that
The liberalism with which John Locke…is commonly identified has its origins in
two widely shared assumptions: first, that human beings are by nature free,
rational and equal; second, that they are therefore capable of murder, theft, and
mayhem and hence are in mortal danger. Liberalism thus originates in
ambivalence—in the need to order, if not limit, what it valorizes to be natural and
emancipatory.138
Mehta highlights a basic question which standard commentaries on Locke evaded: how
can liberalism balance its emphasis on autonomy with its anxiety concerning excess?
The answer given by Locke (according to Mehta) is that the stability of society requires
the “embedding” of subjects in liberal institutions; in short, it presupposes a “liberal
education.”139
In this section of the chapter, I will emphasize a neglected aspect of Locke’s work,
investigating the status of the body in his political theory (i.e. Locke’s “body politic(s)”).
As with my discussion of Hobbes, I will highlight the presence of exclusionary, as well
as inclusionary, logics in Locke’s major essays.

I want to focus on the apparent

dissidence between liberalism’s normative components, which privilege autonomy, and
the imperatives of maintaining a political regime. I will return to the imagery of the body
politic, a metaphor which is particularly illuminating as an entry point to Locke’s
political philosophy (since it revolves around concepts of embodiment).
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In Locke’s Second Treatise, the ‘body politic’ originates from the state of nature.
Before we turn to the image of the social body, however, it is important, at least briefly,
to examine the concept of property rights in Locke.

According to John Plamenatz,

Locke uses the word ‘property’ in two different ways.

The first definition is “co-

extensive with [one’s] rights”, while the second definition parallels “the right to the
exclusive use of external objects” (the latter definition, obviously, is nearer to
contemporary understandings).140 A second proposal, advanced by John Simmons and
James Tully (among others) argues that there is a single definition of “property” which
Simmons describes as “that which one has a right to”141 and Tully characterizes as “any
sort of right, the nature of which is that it cannot be taken without a man’s consent.”142 In
this chapter, I refer to the more general conception, which corresponds to Plamenatz’s
first definition as well as the interpretation formulated by Simmons and Tully. In both
cases, “property” includes the embodied self; indeed, another excerpt from the Two
Treatises insists that the “Person” is actually the very foundation of property: “Man (by
being Master of himself, and Propietor of his own Person, and the Actions or Labour of
it) has still in himself the great Foundation of Property”.143
We can now return to the state of nature in Locke, which differs from Hobbes’s
“war of all against all”; in section nineteen of the Second Treatise, for example, he
explicitly distinguishes between the “state of nature” and the “state of war”. Locke
argues that prior to the formation of the social contract, “[m]en live together according to
140
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reason”144 (Locke contends, for example, that natural law is binding prior to the
formation of a civil authority; in the state of nature, humans are in a “State of perfect
Freedom to dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds
of Laws of Nature”145). If the state of nature is characterized by rationality and
cooperation, however, it is unclear why the agents transfer their liberty to a political
authority.

According to Locke, the “great and chief end of Men uniting into

Commonwealths…is the Preservation of their Property”146; indeed, Locke argues that
“’tis not without reason that [a person’ seeks out, and is willing to joyn in Society with
others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual Preservation of
their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.”147 We can
assume, however, that property rights are respected in the state of nature; therefore, the
question arises once again: What necessitates the formation of political societies? Locke
offers three reasons. First of all, the law of nature is generally evident to “rational”
people, but there is still a tendency to engage in “Biassed” (i.e. egoistically selfinterested) conduct. Secondly, there are no disinterested third parties (i.e. judges) who
could settle disputes.

Finally, even if we assume that magistrates existed with the

capacity for arbitrating disagreements, there is no executive authority invested with the
power of enforcing judicial decisions.148
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In order to exit from the “ill condition” of the state of nature, therefore, humans “are
quickly driven to Society”, and Locke describes the formation of this new commonwealth
in the following passage:
Where-ever therefore any number of Men are so united into one Society, so as to
quit his Executive power of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the publick,
there and there only is a Political, or Civil Society. And this is done where-ever
any number of Men, in the State of Nature, enter into a society to make one
People, one Body Politick under one supreme Government, or else when any one
joyns himself to, and incorporates with any Government already made.149
The new body politic is characterized by unity and irresistible force; it is legitimized by
the will of the majority, as the next excerpt highlights:
For when any number of Men have, by the consent of every individual, made a
Community, they have thereby made that Community one Body, with the Power to
Act as one Body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. For
that which acts any Community, being only the consent of the individuals of it,
and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary
the Body should move that direction whither the greater force carries it, which is
the consent of the majority…And thus every Man, by consenting with others to
make one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under an Obligation
to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to
be concluded by it…150
The will of the majority, therefore, determines the trajectory of the body politic’s motion;
it advances forward and shifts direction, but it moves with a singular momentum, carried
along by a physics of power. It is important to emphasize the references to univocity;
Locke refers to one body and one community. Here the imagery of the macro-body
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reveals a different side of Locke’s corporeal politics. In Locke’s political theory, the
body is associated with inviolable property; the rights of the individual are a barrier to
arbitrary government and tyranny. In this passage, however, the body is a symbol of
force and power, even of domination; thus, it allows us to uncover a fundamental tension,
located at the very heart of Locke’s body politics. Is there an incompatibility between the
freedom of one body, and the force of the other? There is no necessary antithesis; the
subjects who initially consented to the formation of a political society are motivated (at
least according to Locke) by the desire to guarantee property rights. It is conceivable,
therefore, that the community’s power is oriented towards the protection of individual
freedom. The last sentence I cited, however, complicates this response; recall that Locke
wrote the following: “every Man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politick
under one Government, puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society, to
submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it”. This language is
considerably less hospitable to the defense of individual liberty; indeed, if anything it
appears that it underscores the necessity of submitting to the will of the majority, which is
obviously capable of reaching decisions opposed to the preservation of autonomy.151
In the two passages I mentioned above, we can recognize the contours of Zizek’s
“fundamental ideological fantasy”, which emphasizes univocity, homogeneity and
singularity, while excluding difference, heterogeneity and multiplicity. How is the unity
of the body politic achieved? Here I will return to the categories of power which I cited
151
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above, and examine the presence of exclusionary/inclusionary logics in the texts of
Locke. Exclusion operates in two ways: (a) the exclusion of agents who are incapable of
recognizing the normative force of laws, and (b) the exclusion of criminals, a surgical
removal (here my language is, surprisingly enough, similar to Locke’s) which protects
the body politic from degeneration.
(a) The first exclusion is defended in the following passage from the Second Treatise:
But if through defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of Nature, any
one comes not to such a degree of Reason, wherein he might be supposed capable
of knowing the Law, and so living within the Rules of it, he is never capable of
being a Free Man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his own Will (because
he knows no Bounds to it, has not Understanding, its Proper Guide) but is
continued under the Tuition and Government of others, all the time his own
Understanding is incapable of that charge. And so Lunaticks and Idiots are never
set free from the government of their parents; Children, who are not as yet come
unto those years whereat they may have; and Innocents which are excluded by a
natural defect from ever having; Thirdly, Madmen, which for the present cannot
possibly have the use of right Reason to guide themselves, have for their Guide,
the Reason that guide the other men which are tutors for them.152
In other words, if agents lack reason, they are incapable of understanding the law, and it
is legitimate to exclude them from the political order. Uday Singh Mehta, however, has
argued that Locke’s exclusion of ‘madmen’ is problematic, since his conception of
‘madness’ is imprecisely defined.153 In order to appreciate the salience of Mehta’s point,
then, we must take a detour, albeit briefly, into Locke’s epistemology.
According to Locke’s theory of knowledge, our mental ideas originate in one of
two ways: either through sensation (the perception of “External, material things”) or
reflection (i.e. the “Perception of the Operations of our own Minds”).154 Ideas, in turn,
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are divided into two categories: simple (the ideas we initially receive either through
sensation or reflection) and complex (the combination of discrete simple ideas.)155
Certain mental faculties perform operations, or series of operations, in relation to ideas.
The faculty of “Discernment” is the mind’s capacity for “distinguishing between the
several Ideas it has”156, and the ‘madman’ has lost the capacity for differentiating
between reality and its simulacra; he confuses the two orders, and arrives at false
conclusions. He writes that “mad men…do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of
Reasoning, but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for
Truths; and they err as Men do, that argue right from wrong principles. For by the
violence of their Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they make right
deductions from them.”157 As Mehta notes in commenting on a similar passage from
Locke’s journals, however, “[m]adness, far from being a condition of discursive
deficiency, is a state in which the mind is consumed in an overexcited frenzy of
activity…Nor is the mind’s logical capacity impaired and, if the mad are unreasonable,
they are so only because they appear distracted by their own cogitating excesses.”158
Locke examines two figures of madness, which had previously appeared in Descartes’
Meditations: the “distracted Man fancying himself a King” (who then correctly infers that
his/her subjects owe him/her obedience) as well as the glass man who is excessively
brittle and fragile, terrified that he will shatter into a thousand pieces (once again, making
‘reasonable’ inferences).159
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“madness” is the process of making correct inferences on the basis of false premises. In
that case, a “rational” person is equally capable of becoming “mad”, as Locke himself
writes in the following passage from chapter thirty-three of the Essay:

“this flaw

[madness] has its original in very sober and rational minds…and there is scarce a Man
free from it, but that if he should always on all occasions argue or do as in some cases he
does, would not be thought fitter for Bedlam, than Civil Conversation.”160 Indeed, he
argues “if this be a weakness to which all Men are so liable; if this be a taint which so
universally infects Mankind, the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due
Name, thereby to excite the greater care in its Prevention and Cure.”161
If that’s the case, however (i.e. if even ‘rational’ agents are subject to flights of
imagination which border on insanity), then is there actually a viable criteria for
differentiating ‘reasonable’ individuals from the ‘mad’? And even if we assume that the
terms are clearly defined, Locke never designates a tribunal or judge who is competent to
identify madness. Is the selection of a competent authority legitimated by a second
contractual decision? If so, does it generate an infinite regress (such that the second
decision procedure requires a third, etc.)?
How does this question relate to the imagery of the body politic? As Jeremy
Waldron has noted, it is tempting to interpret the passage concerning the irresistible force
of the unified body politic (located in section ninety-six of the Two Treatises, and cited
above) as a factual statement about political aggregates: when a majority favors X, their
strength carries the day.162 He is correct, however, to resist this interpretation, and to
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insist on the normative component of the analogy; he suggests that “the claim is that the
only thing which properly moves a political body is the consent of the individuals who
compose it.”163 If Waldron is right, the legitimacy of Locke’s newly-constituted body
politic is tenuous at best; the exclusion of certain parties, justified by inadequatelydefined criteria, severely tests the normative appeal to individual consent, or at least
requires important qualifications, since the defense for marginalizing ‘irrational’ agents
presupposes concepts which are, in turn, unserviceable (or demand clarification).
(b) The second moment of exclusion is the elimination of the social body’s political
enemies. The criminal or the dissident is likened to a diseased part of the body; s/he is a
site of pathology, which threatens to destroy its collective vitality and health.

My

description, appearances to the contrary, is not hyperbolic; as Locke notes, political
power is “a Power to make Laws, and annex such Penalties to them, as may tend to the
preservation of the whole, by cutting off those Parts, and those only, which are so
corrupt, that they threaten the sound and healthy, without which no severity is lawful.”164
Similarly, in one of the earliest passages in the Second Treatise political power is
explicitly defined as the right to kill:
Political Power then I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties of Death,
and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property,
and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and
in the defense of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for
the Publick Good.165
The illuminating feature of this passage is the equation of political power with “making
Laws with Penalties of Death”; if we recall that the social contract originates from the
desire for self-preservation, then the right of property (which, in a fundamental way, is
163
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the right to life) is guaranteed precisely by the threat of death. We will have occasion to
return to this imagery in later chapters; suffice to say that the image of a social body
struggling to repel, even to exterminate, the ‘degenerative’ other is hardly an innocent
turn of phrase.166
We have examined two motifs of exclusion in Locke, i.e. the exclusion of ‘irrational’
agents as well as the elimination of criminals and dissidents. In addition, however,
‘inclusive’ technologies of power appear in Locke’s work

‘Inclusive’ power, as I

outlined in the introduction, is disciplinary; it tries to create docile bodies and governable
subjects who contribute to the material and ideological reproduction of the body politic.
One of its strategies is to transform the self into an ‘autonomous’ agent who is capable of
policing his or her desires.

In this section of the chapter, I want to examine the

application of disciplinary power in two contexts: the breeding of ‘gentlemen’ and the
control of ‘indigents’. While it is possible to uncover disciplinary logics in other areas of
Locke’s research, the two examples I will highlight below demonstrate that ‘inclusive’
technologies of power are generalized, operating throughout the social body (or Locke’s
conception of the body politic).
Locke’s “Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman”
divides political philosophy into two areas. First of all, it carries out a genealogical
investigation of the origins of political regimes. Secondly, it examines technologies and
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practices for “the governing of men in society.”167 His educational treatises are examples
of the second form of discourse; they try to cultivate subjects who are capable of acting
‘autonomously’, which obviously has implications for political questions. As Nathan
Tarcov writes, “at a number of key points he [Locke] explicitly states that that the method
of governing children he recommends…apply equally and in some cases even more to
the government of men or to human nature.”168
The most important text for understanding Locke’s educational theory is Some
Thoughts Concerning Education, which was compiled from a series of letters Locke had
written to Edward Clarke, an acquaintance who had solicited advice concerning the
“education” of his child. For Locke, “education” is an expansive concept which includes
a wide array of topics; it deals, in a general way, with the instruction of youth, which
includes both their intellectual and moral development.

More specifically, Some

Thoughts is an example of a genre which has virtually disappeared in modern democratic
societies; it is a source book for the training of ‘gentlemen’, the children of wealthy
families who were destined to become political leaders.

In his “Epistle Dedicatory” to

Clarke, Locke emphasizes that the ‘education’ of young people impacts the vitality of the
social body; he writes that “[t]he well educating of their Children is so much the Duty
and the Concern of Parents, and the Welfare and Prosperity of the Nation so much
depends on it, that I would have everyone lay it to Heart.” Furthermore, he underscores
the importance of “training up youth” so that they are capable of excelling in their chosen
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profession(s).169

Parenting, therefore, effects the “welfare” and “prosperity” of the

nation, which explains Locke’s interest vis-à-vis the question of education (and also
indicates that the so-called ‘private sphere’ has undeniable political importance).
The “education” of a gentleman tries to ‘improve’, to shape and transform, both
the body and soul; Locke argues, for example, that a “Sound Mind in a Sound Body, is a
short, but full Description of a Happy State in this World.”170 A ‘Sound Mind’ in an
‘unsound body’ leads to powerlessness or an inability to execute the designs of the will;
an ‘unsound’ mind in a ‘sound’ body, however, produces an equally dangerous
imbalance; the body has the ability to perform tasks, but the mind is no longer in control.
In this regard, the body resembles a ship without a captain.171 How, then, can we
strengthen the body? According to Locke, we must expose the child to nature’s cruelty,
so that he can endure future hardships; to cite two examples, he isn’t allowed to cover his
head in winter172 and he is forced to wash his feet in cold water.173 In addition, the
‘gentleman’ in training has to wear shoes which are “so thin, that they might leak and let
in Water, when ever he comes near it”.174 While Locke admits that “I shall have the
Mistriss and Maids…against me”, it is necessary to resist the heart’s tug of compassion,
since one of the most serious obstacles to discipline is the parent’s tendency to engage in
“Cockering and Tenderness”.175
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If it is important to train the body, however, it is equally (if not more) important to
condition the ‘soul’. The child must learn how to control his desires; he has to renounce
the passions, which threaten the agent’s rationality.176 Locke’s educational theory
produces a subject who is capable of exercising self-discipline. Indeed, Locke argues that
if “the strength of the Body lies chiefly in being able to endure Hardships, so also does
that of the Mind. And the great Principle and Foundation of all Vertue and Worth, is
placed in this, That a Man is able to deny himself his own Desires, cross his own
Inclinations, and purely follow what Reason directs as best, tho’ the appetite lean the
other way.”177 In section thirty-six, Locke reiterates this point: the problem “lies not in
having or not having Appetites, but in the Power to govern, and deny our selves in
them.”178 The capacity for self-renunciation, which is the cornerstone of ‘happiness’, is
formed by refusing to grant the child’s wishes,179 and when he misbehaves, Locke
advises the parents to make him feel guilty, so that he develops negative associations
towards inappropriate actions.180

If prohibited forms of conduct are habitually

reprimanded, repetition leads the child to assume that harmful consequences necessarily
follow. Therefore, parents must avoid the postulation of rules as disciplinary guidelines,
and focus on the development of incentives/punishments.181
Locke opposes, at least as a general rule, corporal punishment, since it appeals to
sensations, and in particular the capacity for experiencing pleasure and pain (recall that
this is precisely the cycle which the parents are trying to disrupt; the preferable route, of
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course, is to encourage the denial of pleasures).182 There is, however, one notable
exception, and it reinforces my argument concerning the political context of Locke’s
work on education. Beatings are only permissible when the child becomes obstinately
‘rebellious’ (to use Locke’s terminology); he writes that “Beating, by constant
Observation, is found to do little good, where the Smart of it is all the Punishment is
feared, or felt in it, for the influence of that quickly wears out, with the memory of it. But
yet there is one, and but one Fault, for which I think, Children should be Beaten, and that
is Obstinacy or Rebellion.”183 But why, precisely, is it important to guard against
‘Rebellion’? At least one feasible explanation is that Locke believes childhood rebellion
leads to other, more dangerous challenges to authority, such as political dissent. In any
case, it is clear that discipline is the final guard on the ramparts, militantly protecting the
nation’s heroism and virtues; as Locke writes in section seventy, “it is impossible to find
an instance of any Nation, however renowned for their Valor, who ever kept their Credit
in Arms…after Corruption had once broke through, and dissolv’d the restraint of
Discipline”.184 Indeed, what if the ‘obstinate’ child becomes a ‘rebellious’ adult? Would
it endanger the social contract, or the health and stability of the body politic?185
But how are the virtues and discipline of a nation corrupted? Locke’s discussion of
education has already directed us toward one possibility: it occurs due to a failure of
restraint, which is the result of improper methods of education or parenting. Yet there is
another site of pathology, located in what Locke refers to as the ‘working poor’ (or at
182

Ibid., 48.
Ibid., 78.
184
Ibid., 70.
185
Such a reading of Locke’s educational methodology, and its apparent ends, would also force us to reevaluate the standard picture of Locke as a defender of the right of rebellion. While a certain interpretation
of the Second Treatise clearly legitimizes this argument, factoring in Locke’s educational proposals would
force us to admit certain tensions or complications which the traditional reading needs to cope with.
183

69
other times, simply ‘idle vagabonds’). In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, for
example, Locke contends that “[t]he great danger therefore I apprehend, is only from
Servants, and other ill-ordered Children, or such other vicious or foolish People, who
spoil Children” (classifying “Servants” as “vicious or foolish People”, apparently).186 It
is necessary, therefore, to effectively govern the indigent and laborers. Locke outlined
his technologies of control in an (in)famous legislative proposal entitled “Draft of a
Representation, Containing [a] Scheme of Methods for the Employment of the Poor”
(also referred to as the essay on the working schools).
The working schools essay is a series of reform proposals written in 1697, during
Locke’s tenure as a commissioner on the Board of Trade. It was based, at least in part,
on the ‘philanthropic’ poverty relief ideas of a Bristol merchant named John Cary,187 and
presented on September 28th to the committee188 as a (friendly) amendment to the
Elizabethean Poor Laws, which addressed the “problem” of “idleness” in the working
class.189 The first three paragraphs of the essay introduce the tone of the piece, which is
both excoriating and paternalistically “compassionate”. He begins with a question: Why
has poverty dramatically increased during the reigns of Charles II and James II? He
considers, and rapidly dismisses, two possibilities: the scarcity of provisions, and lack of
employment. Rather, “the growth of the poor must…have some other cause, and it can
be nothing else but the relaxation and corruption of manners; virtue and industry being as
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constant companions on the one side as vice and idleness on the other.”190 If it is the
case, however, that the rise in poverty is a result of the “corruption of manners”, how can
we restore virtue to the body politic? We must enforce the laws that already exist relating
to the excessive “debauchery” of the poor, especially “the suppressing of superfluous
brandy shops and unnecessary alehouses.”191
Locke expresses concern about two different elements of society. First of all,
Locke examines what he calls ‘vagabonds’ (i.e. persons who “have numerous families of
children whom they cannot, or pretend they cannot, support by their labour, or those who
pretend they cannot work, and so live only by begging, or worse.”192). He offers two
recommendations for eliminating the problem of (again citing Locke) “begging drones”.
First of all, any male between fourteen and fifty who is caught begging without a pass193
in the coastal area is subject to automatic conscription; they are forced to serve in the
navy for three years, with subsistence money “being deducted from their victuals on
board” (males who were captured in non-coastal areas under similar circumstances were
assigned to hard labor in a “house of correction”).194 Secondly, if anyone counterfeits a
pass, Locke says that he “shall lose his ears for the forgery the first time that he is found
guilty thereof, and the second time…he shall be transported to the plantations, as in the
case of felony.”195 Women and children guilty of the same violation, meanwhile, are also
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harshly punished; women over fourteen are returned to their home county and a sum is
deducted from their parish allowance (a second offense requires three months of hard
labor in the workhouse), while children are sent to the nearest working school, “there to
be soundly whipped, and kept at work till evening.”196
The other group examined in Locke’s report is the children of the “working poor”.
They are “maintain[ed] in idleness” between the ages of two and fourteen; consequently,
the nation is denied access to their labor.197 As a corrective remedy he advocates the
establishment of “working schools”; attendance for children between the ages of three
and fourteen is mandatory, and they are generally employed in textile production (Locke
suggested “spinning or knitting, or some other part of the woolen manufacture”).198
Locke emphasizes the advantages of his proposal for society: the mother’s newly created
free-time is converted into labor, while the children were “from infancy…inured to
work.”199 The second result is especially beneficial, since (in Locke’s mind) the working
poor are irresistibly drawn towards corruption and vice; indeed, Locke argued that the
children should be
obliged to come to church every Sunday, along with their schoolmasters or
dames, whereby they can be brought into some sense of religion; whereas
ordinarily now, in their idle and loose way of breeding up, they are as utter
strangers both to religion and morality as they are to industry.200
Is it the case that Locke’s proposals concerning the working class compromise, or at least
complicate, his defense of freedom?

The answer, unfortunately, is yes; this text

demonstrates Locke’s adherence to, in the words of C.B. Macpherson, a “differential
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rationality.” In The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, an examination of
bourgeois ideology in Hobbes, Harrington and Locke, Macpherson contends that Locke
“justifies, as natural, a class differential in rights and irrationality, and by so doing
provides a positive moral basis for capitalist society.”201 He argues that (for Locke) “the
members of the laboring class do not and cannot live a fully rational life.”202 More
precisely, this entails “[t]he assumption that members of the laboring class are in too low
a position to be capable of a rational life—that is, capable of regulating their lives by
those moral principles Locke supposed were given by reason.”203 The important
connection here is the implicit relationship between rationality and autonomy; autonomy
requires mastery of the desires, which in turn produces industriousness. According to
Locke, however, the working class lacks industriousness; therefore, it must also lack the
first two properties—an agonizingly bad argument, for obvious reasons.204 To cite one
difficulty, it presupposes that rationality and autonomy are necessary conditions of
‘industriousness’. Yet if we understand ‘industriousness’ as productivity, there is no
necessary connection between a worker’s ‘rationality’ or ‘autonomy’ and his or her
efficiency; if we think about a factory laborer in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, for example, exactly the opposite is the case: a worker who tried to think
critically about his or her coglike position in the assembly line, or asserted his or her
autonomy by challenging the social structures which organized his/her oppression, was,
in all probability, less likely to maximize his or her productive capacities than docile
201
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subjects who were willing to passively accept the sub-human conditions imposed in the
workplace and perform their assigned tasks; presumably, they were more productive than
the laborer who, quite rightly, was alienated and demanded better conditions, or even
tried to form a union.
John Dunn has responded to Macpherson by noting that Locke condemned
idleness tout court (within the wealthy as well as poorer classes), and that in actuality his
contempt for “shiftlessness” was a reflection of his Puritan ideology.205 As Weber has
reminded us, of course, bourgeois ideology and Puritanism are compatible worldviews;
nevertheless, it is sufficient to note that Locke’s characterization of the children of the
working poor is based on their membership in a specific class. It is true that Locke
excoriates idleness, but he never argues that the wealthy are idle qua their membership in
a particular sociological category. If Locke’s description is contingent, rather than
essential, meaning that the poor are capable of transforming their “idleness” into
productivity thanks to the beneficent ‘invisible hand’ of state oversight, then we are
escorted back into the realm of disciplinary power; we can transform “lawless” and
“promiscuous” subjects into autonomous liberal citizens, but only if we subject their
bodies and souls to moral and physical conditioning. It’s conceivable (though highly
doubtful) that Locke was as willing to attack aristocratic or bourgeois “idleness” (idleness
within the aristocracy? Perish the thought!) as the mythical “shiftlessness” of the working
class, but I have failed to locate any evidence in support of this hypothesis.
In any event, Locke’s own theory prohibits the draconian anti-solicitation laws; how,
after all, is the “vagrant” harming anyone when s/he is attempting to fulfill the basic right

205

Cf. John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1969), pp. 203-67.

74
of self-preservation? Locke already grants the right of self-subsistence in the Second
Treatise; he writes that: “natural Reason…tells us, that Men, once being born, have a
right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and Drink, and such other things, as
Nature affords for their Subsistence” (a basic subsistence, of course, representing a means
to the end of self-preservation).206 Likewise, forcing the children of the working poor to
attend church violates Locke’s normative commitments to religious tolerance and
freedom (which are outlined in The Letter Concerning Toleration), especially his
argument that
the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate is concerned only with these civil goods
[i.e. “life, liberty, bodily health and freedom from pain”], and that all the right and
dominion of the civil power is bounded and confined solely to the care and
advancement of these goods; and that it neither can nor ought in any way to be
extended to the salvation of souls.207
If it is the case that Locke imposes strict limitations on the power of government to
advocate a theological position/practice, it presumably follows that the same limitations
apply to every citizen, regardless of their class background.
Is it possible, more generally, to reconcile the inescapability of disciplinary power
in Locke with libertarian interpretations/appropriations of his work? Here is one strategy:
if it’s the case that the agents in the state of nature consented to transfer their right of selfdefense to an executive sovereign power, then they concomitantly agreed to obey the
laws of the sovereign, as well as surrendering their right to protest unjust principles. This
argument wouldn’t fit, however, with Locke’s defense of the subject’s right to challenge
illegitimate rulers. Certain parties, moreover, are excluded from the initial decision
207
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procedure, utilizing highly suspect, and inadequately defined, criteria (as I demonstrated
above); thus, there is a question about the legitimacy of the contract itself. A second
possibility is to concede that there is a contradiction between Locke’s normative
principles, on the one hand, and his disciplinary strategies on the other, arguing that we
can eliminate the difficulty by separating Locke’s ‘occasional pieces’, such as his
educational works or his reports written as a government functionary, from his more
‘substantive’ theoretical offerings. The problem now, however, is that Locke himself
recognizes that his educational theory is an important complement to his political theory,
and even if we believe that Locke misunderstands his own position, we need a criteria
which allows us to differentiate between ‘occasional’ and ‘substantive’ contributions. To
my knowledge, no such criteria exist, at least at the date of this writing.
Alex Neill, more perceptively than the liberal disciples of Locke, has
acknowledged a tension between the logics of disciplinary power and autonomy. He
argues that the tension is only apparent; he notes that this self-mastery is the precondition
(at least in Locke) of autonomy, and the end of self-mastery “can be achieved only with
the help of others.”208 There is, undoubtedly, a role for education in the formation of
‘autonomous’ selves; this does, however, force us to complicate the standard liberal
picture of a self-made agent with an inviolable right to non-interference. Indeed, Locke
himself recognizes that ‘autonomy’ emerges from discipline and punishment; therefore,
the conditions of liberal agency are grounded in the political technologies of control
examined by Nietzsche and Foucault, a theme which I will return to in the next chapter
(and throughout the essay).
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The Fundamental Ideological Fantasy in Rousseau
Criticisms of Locke’s individualistic version of social-contract theory have emerged from
the right, but also from the left; in the latter case, they are formulated by theorists who are
interested in reviving principles of solidarity and civic responsibility. Indeed, advocates
of republicanism and social democracy criticize atomistic views of subjectivity from
within the liberal tradition. At both ends of the political spectrum, however, there is a
recognition that Rousseau is an important figure in the emergence of a ‘radical
democratic’ alternative to Lockean individualism; Benjamin Barber, for example,
identifies the political theory of Rousseau as a predecessor to what he calls “strong
democracy”, which he contrasts with “liberal democracy”. According to Barber, classical
liberalism is oriented towards “individualistic and private ends”,209 whereas “[f]ollowing
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, strong democrats prefer the language of legitimate willing”;
indeed, “[s]trong democracy understands decision-making to be a facet of man as maker
and as creator and consequently focuses on public willing.” (Barber, of course, sides with
the latter).210 Likewise, Jürgen Habermas has argued that “a democratically enlightened
liberalism must hold on to Rousseau’s intention” (i.e. recognizing the importance of
popular will formation or democratic self-legislation).211 As for neoconservatives, Allan
Bloom contends that Rousseau extends the liberal project in more progressive directions;
he notes that “Rousseau’s reflections had the effect of outflanking the [American]
Framers on the Left, where they thought they were invulnerable…Rousseau walks arm in
209
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arm with his liberal predecessors and contemporaries.

He does not reject the new

principles, but he radicalizes them by thinking them through form the broadest
perspective”212
There is a widespread recognition, therefore, that Rousseau’s work is a
continuation of the liberal/social contractarian tradition. In this part of the chapter, I will
continue my discussion of the body politic in liberalism by examining the imagery of
social body in Rousseau. Is it the case that a republican formulation of the social contract
allows us to exit from biopolitics? Does Rousseau’s political theory escape from the
‘fundamental ideological fantasy’? I will argue that the answer to both questions is ‘no’;
while there are clearly important philosophical and/or normative differences between the
projects of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, I will demonstrate that, at least in terms of
practice and the governance of society, Rousseau continues to exhibit a desire for unity
and the effacement of pluralism (indeed, it’s even possible to argue that the fantasy is
intensified). While I agree with Habermas and Bloom that Rousseau is a liberal, I also
think it’s important to highlight the quasi-totalitarian aspects of Rousseau’s political
theory. Here there are a number of elements we could point to, but the most interesting,
and disturbing, commonality is the logic of biopower.
In this regard, a new interpretation of Rousseau which focuses on the imagery of
the body politic has two advantages over the standard approaches. First of all, it has the
potential to open up new hermeneutic avenues, allowing us to move beyond the typical
debates concerning justification of governmental authority (i.e. how does transferring
sovereignty to the general will allow the individual, at the same time, to retain his or her
212
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freedom?213). Secondly, it illuminates the reason(s) why theorists have encountered
difficulties classifying Rousseau’s political philosophy. As I indicated above, Rousseau
has been characterized as a liberal, yet he also, according to other accounts, is
responsible, at least indirectly, for Jacobin extremism and the Reign of Terror. Benjamin
Constant, for example, called Rousseau “the most terrible auxiliary of every kind of
despotism.”214 Likewise, J.L. Talmon (in a text I will return to later) condemns Rousseau
as a proto-totalitarian theorist; according to Talmon, in Rousseau’ political philosophy
“[a] fixed, rigid and universal pattern of feeling and behaviour was to be imposed in
order to create man of one piece, without contradiction, without centrifugal and antisocial urges. The task was to create citizens who would will only what the general will
does.”215 But how can we account for the wildly divergent interpretations I highlighted
above? Is Rousseau a liberal? Is he the father of modern totalitarianism? Or is he is a
neoconservative?216 At least one possibility is that commentators have overlooked the
importance of biopower in texts such as The Social Contract. I would like to fill in the
gap, or at least point towards way(s) of filling in the gap, by outlining the parameters of a
reading which emphasizes the importance of biopower as a strategy for governing the
population in the interests of strengthening the body politic. My reading highlights, in
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short, unsettling parallels between liberalism and its historical other(s) which I have
alluded to in the introduction. As I mentioned above, I can only suggest the parameters
for such a re-reading, but I will nonetheless provide a series of markers which could
allow us to re-situate Rousseau in the Western canon. As with Hobbes and Locke, I will
highlight both exclusionary and inclusionary aspects of power in Rousseau. I will begin
with exclusionary power.
The imagery of the body politic, which is important for the argument of The
Social Contract, initially appeared in an article by Rousseau from Diderot and
D’Alembert’s Encyclopedia, entitled “Discourse on Political Economy”. Here Rousseau
compares (although he admits the analogy is imprecise) the “body politic” (le corps
politique) to a human body:
The body politic, taken by itself, can be looked upon as an organized body, alive,
and similar to man’s. The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and
customs are the brain, the principle of the nerves and the seat of the
understanding, of the will, and of the senses, of which the judges and magistrates
are the organs; commerce, industry and agriculture are the mouth and stomach
which prepare the common subsistence; public finances are the blood which a
wise economy, performing the functions of the heart, sends out to distribute
nourishment and life throughout the entire body; the citizens are the body and the
members that make the machine move, live and work, and no part of which can
be hurt without the painful impression of it being straightaway conveyed on the
brain, if the animal is in a state of health.217
In this passage, Rousseau demonstrates the logic of biopower more clearly than either
Hobbes or Locke; the social body is a living organism, with essential biological
functions, such as circulation.
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industry and agriculture. Public finances are the life-blood and the essence of vitality,
which nourish the collective subject, and the citizens allow the body to move and
function properly. The totality is, like the human body itself, a well-calibrated “machine”
which is subject to disruption; therefore, it is important to guard against ‘injuries’ to the
social body. Judith Shklar interprets the comparison straightforwardly; she argues that it
represents a well-ordered society and is also, at least implicitly, a justification for
government authority.218 Lemos, however, gestures towards the biopolitical reading of
this image I will offer in the following pages; he writes that it “illustrates the fact that the
body politic may reasonably be looked upon as an organism whose members are
organically related to one another and to the whole in such a way that the health and
proper functioning of the whole and of each of its members depends upon the health and
proper functioning of the other members.”219
Rousseau’s argument in The Social Contract begins with the premise that humans
encounter barriers to self-preservation in the state of nature; as a result, they are forced to
enter into schemes of cooperation, forming a political society.220 Yet it is also the case
that the subject wants to retain a measure of autonomy, even in the context of political
arrangements. It is important, therefore, that the solution to the problem of human frailty

218

Cf. Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1969), 197-214, and especially 202.
219
See Ramon M. Lemos, Rousseau’s Political Philosophy: An Exposition and Interpretation (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1977), 134.
220
Cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social in Oeuvres Complètes, Volume III, eds. Bernard
Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Pléiade, 1964) 360; translated as Of the Social Contract in The
Social Contract and other later political writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1997), 49. When citing the works of Rousseau, I will refer to the English title, followed by the pagination
of the French edition and an English translation, in that order.

81
does not compromise the liberty Rousseau associates with the state of nature.221 The
fundamental problem for Rousseau, then, is the search for a type of association which
guarantees social cooperation while at the same time preserving human freedom.222
Rousseau’s solution is articulated in the idea of the social contract. We create the general
will by “alienating” our rights in the community (l’aliénation totale de chaque associé
avec tous ses droits à toute la communauté). He writes that “[e]ach of us puts his person
and his full power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a
body we receive each member as a part of the whole.”223 The concept of the body politic
is an amplification of, or is importantly related to, the theme of the general will:
At once, in place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of
association produces a moral and collective body made up of as many members as
the assembly has voices, and which receives by this same act its unity, its
common self, its life and it will. The public person thus formed by the union of
all the others formerly assumed the name City and now assumes that of Republic
or body politic (corps politique) which its members call State when it is passive,
Sovereign when active, Power when comparing it to similar bodies. As for the
associates, they collectively assume the name people and individually call
themselves Citizens as participants in the sovereign authority, and Subjects as
subjected to the laws of the State.224
Here the implicit connection between the body politic and the people is explicated; the
new collective subject is a self, with a “life” and “will”, and the unified social body
becomes, at the same time, a “people”. The new self also replaces “the private person of
each contracting party”, almost as if the individual body is submerged in the general will
221
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(it is useful to invoke the imagery of Hobbes’s Leviathan at this point).225 Indeed,
Rousseau argues that any sign of opposition to the body politic represents an attack
against the republic.226 The first moment of exclusion is represented by the ostracism of
‘criminals’.

The criminal his/herself is viewed as a pathology which threatens to

undermine the stability of the social body. He describes the heterogeneous particular will
as conflicted, since it is schizophrenically divided against itself qua “Citizen” who
consented to the formation of a general will (it is therefore the bearer, simultaneously, of
a particular will and a general will, which find themselves at war); he writes that
“whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire
body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced to be free.”227
Rousseau develops this argument in a passage which returns to the imagery of the
social body; he argues that the body politic is a “moral person” and “the most important
of its cares is the care for self-preservation”. Since an individual in the state of nature has
the right to use all of his/her “members” (membres) in the battle for survival, the new
body politic (which is a collective person) has a similar “absolute power over all its
members.”228 An “absolute” power, however, encompasses life itself, and the sovereign
can execute citizens of the state if they threaten its existence. As Rousseau notes in the
following passage,
The social treaty has the preservation of the contracting parties as its end.
Whoever wills the end, also wills the means, and these means are inseparable
from certain risks and even certain losses. Whoever wants to preserve his life at
225
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the expense of others ought also to give it up for them whenever necessary. Now,
the Citizen is no longer judge of the danger the law wills him to risk, and when
the Prince has said to him, it is expedient to the State that you die, he ought to die;
since it is only on this condition that he has lived in security until then, and his life
is no longer only a bounty of nature, but a conditional gift of the State.229
This paragraph, which exhibits the biopolitical logic in an exemplary fashion, is marked
by a fundamental tension: in order to guarantee the continuation of the body politic, the
ruler is entitled to demand the life of the subject, who had originally consented to the
terms of the social contract on the assumption that it insures his or her self-preservation.
While Rousseau notes that “[e]veryone has the right to risk his live in order to save it”,230
the obvious rejoinder is that it is one thing to risk a person’s life, and quite another to
surrender it unconditionally to the demands of the sovereign. In any case, this excerpt
highlights the conjunction of sovereignty and biopower which both Foucault and
Agamben have examined in detail. The citizen is obligated to surrender his or her life for
the survival of the body politic, yet this obligation emerges as a result of the tie which
binds the life of the subject to sovereign will. Indeed, the second half of the last sentence
is especially illuminating in this regard: Rousseau explicitly concedes that his argument
is regulated by a biopolitical logic when he insists that the contracting agent’s security is
contingent on the will of the Prince, and “his life is no longer only a bounty of nature, but
a conditional gift of the State” (my emphasis). The very survival of the person is
conditional; life itself is now a gift, withdrawn from the economy of existence and
reproduction when the life of the social body is endangered.
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Rousseau’s discussion of the “Lawgiver” (Législateur) solidifies the connection
between the problematics of biopower and sovereignty.231 Rousseau argues that the
general will formulates principles which regulate public life, allowing the people to
establish a community; he calls the newly instituted statutes “laws.”232 There is an initial
obstacle, however; as Rousseau writes, “How will a blind multitude, which often does not
know what it wills because it rarely knows what is good for it, carry out an undertaking
as great, as difficult as a system of legislation? By itself the people always wills the
good, but by itself it does not always see it.”233 The body politic requires the guidance of
a superior intellect (which Rousseau characterizes as a “genius”) in order to direct its
sentiment towards the appropriate end; the general will, therefore, benefits from the
genius of a sagelike figure known as the “Lawgiver.”234
The Lawgiver is “in every respect an extraordinary man in the State. While he must
be so by his genius, he is no less so by his office.”235 The responsibilities of the
Lawgiver are monumental; not only is s/he assigned the task of writing (and then
implementing) a constitution, s/he is also obligated to, in Rousseau’s words, transform
human nature; according to Rousseau,
Anyone who dares to institute a people must feel capable of, so to speak,
changing human nature; of transforming each individual who by himself is a
perfect and solitary whole into part of a larger whole from which that individual
would as it were receive his life and his being; of weakening man’s constitution in
231
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order to strengthen it; of substituting a partial and moral existence for the
independent and physical existence we have all received from nature. In a word,
he must take from man his own forces in order to give him forces which are
foreign to him and of which he cannot make use without the help of others. The
more these natural forces are dead and destroyed, the greater and more lasting are
the acquired ones, and the more solid and lasting also is the institution.236
Here we encounter key elements of the ‘fundamental ideological fantasy’; a unified body
politic, individuals who affirm their identity by submerging themselves in the social
body, the systematic attempt to control human life in order to instrumentally harness it
and re-create “human nature”. In any case, the Lawgiver, a mysterious figure capable of
articulating the “true desires” of the general will, destroys the singularity of each
individual and re-engineers the desires of the self until the subject identifies his/her “life
and being” with the survival of the body politic (indeed, Rousseau’s formulation is even
stronger; he argues that the subject receives his or her “life and being” from the social
body; this once again introduces the language of conditional “giving” into the
discussion).

The “natural” existence of the self (which Rousseau associates with

“independence”) is “weakened”, and the people re-surface from the embers of “dead and
destroyed” forces as a moral community, a species-body, which acts with the forceful
singularity of a “general will.”237
The Lawgiver, however, is effectively excluded from the collective body of the
people; Rousseau insists that s/he is prohibited from occupying a position within the
governmental framework s/he has established, and that s/he is unable to communicate
effectively with the masses because “[t]he wise who would speak to the vulgar (vulgaire)
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in their own language rather than in the vulgar language will not be understood by
them.”238 Since the Lawgiver is denied the power of executive force, and the “vulgarity”
of the population limits the effectiveness of rhetorical persuasion, s/he is forced to resort
to the “authority” of religious principles so that the people will “freely obey the yoke of
public felicity, and bear it with docility.”239 The entire passage is worth quoting;
Rousseau argues that
[A]s the lawgiver can…employ neither force nor argument, he must have recourse
to an authority of another order, one which can compel without violence and
persuade without convincing. It is this which has obliged the founders of nations
throughout history to appeal to divine authority and to attribute their own wisdom
to the Gods; for then the people, feeling subject to the laws of the State as they are
to those of nature, and detecting the same hand in the creation of both man and
the nation, obey freely and bear with docility the yoke of the public welfare. This
sublime reasoning, which soars above the heads of the common people, is used by
the lawgiver when he puts his own decisions into the mouth of the immortals, thus
compelling by divine authority persons who cannot be moved by human
prudence. But it is not for everyone to make the Gods speak, or to gain credence
if he pretends to be an interpreter of the divine word. The lawgiver’s great soul is
the true miracle which must vindicate his mission.240
The importance of religion in Rousseau is undeniable; he argues, for example, that “no
State has ever been founded without Religion serving as its base.”241 I will simply
bracket the question of whether or not he is correct; rather, this sentence highlights the
importance of political theology in Rousseau’s social contract. While Rousseau expresses
contempt for aspects of traditional theology, he nevertheless proposes an alternative
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called “civil religion” that emphasizes the subject’s moral obligations to his/her fellow
citizens and the state. He insists, for example, that Christianity is an unacceptable
theological doctrine in republican societies.

While republicanism presupposes a

heightened sense of civic responsibility and an opposition to tyranny, Christianity
encourages “servility” by valorizing a supernatural afterlife; believers stoically endure the
oppression of this world, since temporal existence is only a prelude to immortality.242
Rousseau argues that the sovereign must establish a new public religion, since “it
certainly matters to the State that each Citizen have a Religion which makes him love his
duties; but the dogmas of this Religion are only of concern to the State or to its members
insofar as the dogmas bear on morality, and on the duties which anyone who professes it
is bound to fulfill towards others.”243

This dogma, however, is purely secular; as

Rousseau notes, the sovereign’s juridical competence is limited to the present world,
since the afterlife transcends the boundaries of political rule.244 Therefore, it is, strictly
speaking incorrect to call it a “religion”; it is better characterized as the “sentiments of
sociability, without which it is impossible either to be a good Citizen or a loyal Subject”
(although Rousseau continues to refer to as a “la Religion civile”).245
A second moment of exclusion emerges vis-à-vis the question of political theology.
Rousseau argues that the sovereign has the right to enforce the conventions of “civil
religion” with legal statutes; although the Sovereign lacks the ability to “oblige” anyone
to accept the provisions of the new civic “theology”, s/he is permitted to “banish from the
State anyone who does not believe them; it may banish him, not as impious but as
242
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unsociable, as incapable of sincerely loving the laws, justice and, if need be of sacrificing
his life to his duty.”246 Likewise, the retribution for professing false belief in the statues
is exceedingly cruel; Rousseau argues that “he has committed the greatest of crimes, he
has lied before the laws”, which is punishable by death.247
The actual provisions of the religion are limited to a characterization of the new deity,
a sanctification of the republic and dire warnings for subjects who transgress the laws of
the state; they stipulate that there is a “powerful, intelligent, beneficent, prescient, and
provident Divinity, the life to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of the
wicked, the sanctity of the social Contract and the Laws; these are the positive Dogmas
[dogmas which require the affirmation of the citizen].”248 This is what Rousseau calls the
positive thesis of the dogma; its negative thesis, however, borders on the paradoxical.
There is, as a matter of fact, only one “negative” principle, and it is an unabashed
rejection of certain forms of intolerance (I say “certain” because the thesis is supported
by its own intolerant stringency); Rousseau writes the following:
Now that there no longer is and no longer can be an exclusive national Religion,
one must tolerate all those which tolerate the others insofar as their dogmas
contain nothing contrary to the duties of the Citizen. But whoever dares say, no
Salvation outside the Church, has to be driven out of the State…Such a dogma is
good only in a Theocratic Government, in any other it is pernicious.249
Rousseau therefore establishes a positive “function” for civil theology, i.e. the
engendering and reinforcement of a patriotic sensibility which understands that honoring
moral obligations stabilizes the foundations of a republican society, as well as a
veneration of the laws of State (Rousseau’s utilization of the term “sanctity” (sainteté) is
246
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interesting in this context; it hearkens back to the political theology of the medieval
period discussed by Kantotorwicz). This also, however, begins to clarify what Rousseau
means when he suggests that the religion established by the Lawgiver conditions the
people to “freely obey the yoke of public felicity, and bear it with docility”; a key aspect
of the civic religion is an unquestioning submission to the time-tested principles of the
social contract, as well as, presumably, the figure of the Lawgiver his/herself (Rousseau
lists Moses, for example, as a great “Législateur”). Indeed, Christianity is unsuitable in
this role precisely because it refuses to sanctify the political community (although on this
count Rousseau was surely incorrect), and for that reason the Lawgiver must develop a
substitute religion which performs the task of binding members of the commonwealth
together.
The so-called “negative” functions are equally intriguing, however; they reiterate a
familiar, but nonetheless serious, problem for liberalism: Will it tolerate the intolerant, or
intolerantly banish the intolerant? Rousseau opts for the latter solution; no doubt my
formulation states the difficulty too crudely, yet there is an important tension here which
repeatedly emerges in the history of the liberal canon. This is, by now, a standard
objection to liberalism, and there have been various attempts to circumvent the apparent
contradiction (some of which I will return to in Chapter Three); nevertheless, the fact that
liberals continue to wrestle with this near-paradox seems to highlight its intractable
character.
Religion, therefore, is important for governing the masses; the Lawgiver must
lead his/her people to believe that legislation comes from a divine source. Likewise, a
‘civic religion’ of ‘sociability’ further integrates subjects into the body politic.

In
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addition, however, education contributes to the ‘reproduction of the body politic. Here
we can examine aspects of inclusionary power in Rousseau. In remarks addressed to
Count Wiehlhorski, a member of the Polish Confederates of Bar who wrote to him
concerning reforms within Polish society and government,250 Rousseau argued that “it is
education that must give souls the national form, and so direct their tastes and opinions
that they will be patriotic by inclination, passion, necessity.”251

The template for

Rousseau’s educational theory is outlined in Emile, where he fictionally adopts an
“imaginary pupil” named Emile, with the express purpose of educating him to become
(or more accurately, remain) a so-called “natural man” who is able to resist the corrupting
influences of society.252 The difficulty of performing this task, which relies more on
passivity than action, is emphasized by Rousseau: “To form this rare man, what do we
have to do? Very much, doubtless. What must be done is to prevent anything from being
done.”253 Natural ‘authenticity’ is realized through constant supervision from the tutor;
s/he is forced to exercise discipline, which s/he must conceal, in order to guard the child,
who is ‘pure and innocent’, from the vices of modernity.
According to Rousseau, the teacher must formulate educational goals which
correspond to developmental stages.

One of the common threads which unifies

Rousseau’s theory, however, is the idea of granting an illusory freedom to children; they
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must believe they are free, because it allows the tutor to extend his/her control over the
child more effectively, and “the will itself is made captive” (or as Rousseau comments,
“there is no subjection so perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom”).254
When Emile enters adolescence, for example, the master conspires to frustrate his sexual
desires by enticing him with the image of an “ideal” woman who is destined, in
Rousseau’s words, to “make him disgusted with those [women] that could tempt him; it
suffices that he everywhere find comparisons which make him prefer his chimera to the
real objects that strike his eye.”255

He ascribes qualities to “Sophie” (as Rousseau

decides to name her) which excite the imagination of Emile, yet he also attributes
“defects in his beloved as to suit him [Emile], as to please him, and to serve to correct his
own.”256 In this example, fantasy is used to more effectively control the passions; in
addition, it establishes the conditions for an objectification of the feminine in Emile’s
psyche. Rousseau’s strategy tries, paradoxically enough, to incite desire in order to more
effectively repress it; he characterizes this double movement in political terms: “How
limited one must be to see only an obstacle to the lessons of reason in the nascent desires
of a young man! I see in them the true means of rendering him docile. One has a hold on
the passions only by means of the passions. It is by their empire that their tyranny must
be combated; and it is always from nature itself that the proper instruments to regulate
nature must be drawn.”257
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Another aspect of inclusionary power in Rousseau concerns the role of women
vis-à-vis the social body.

Returning, at least momentarily, to the Social Contract,

Rousseau argues that the body politic suffers from diseases and illnesses. The breakdown
and death of the body politic is inevitable; the embers of its mortality glow within the
social body: “The body politic, just like the body of man, begins to die as soon as it is
born and carries within itself the causes of its destruction.”258 If it is impossible to
guarantee the eternal survival of a social body; it is, however, feasible to suggest that we
can prolong the life of the State.259 Although in this particular section (Book III, Chapter
II, entitled “The Death of the Body Politic”) Rousseau argues that the sign of a State’s
vitality is “the legislative power”260 (in a well-ordered State laws become more honored
with the passage of time, “whereas wherever the laws grow weaker as they grow older it
is proof that there is no longer any legislative power, and that the State is no longer
alive”261), in another section he offers a more biological characterization of the life and
death of the body politic. According to Chapter III of Book IX, the end of political
association is “the preservation and prosperity of its members.”262 Accordingly, “what is
the surest sign that they are preserving themselves and prospering? It is their number and
their population”263 (or as Rousseau argues elsewhere in The Social Contract, “the
Government under which the Citizens…populate and multiply is without fail the best:
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that under which a people dwindles and wastes away is the worst”264). In this regard,
there is an undeniable biopolitical component at the heart of Rousseau’s normative
project: the reduction of political ends to the necessities of biological survival, or ‘bare
life’, is a critical sign that, in Rousseau’s political theory, we have already crossed what
Giorgio Agamben calls the “threshold of modernity”, in which the transition from
eudaemonism to biopolitics is completed.
But how can we guarantee the reproduction of the social body? A corollary of
demographic politics in Rousseau is the patriarchal oppression of women; in his
Considerations on the Government of Poland (Emile was published in 1762; the
Considerations were written in 1772), Rousseau suggests that
Upon opening his eyes, a child should see the fatherland,265 and see only it until
his dying day. Every true republican drank love of fatherland, that is to say love
of the laws and of freedom, with his mother’s milk. This love makes up his whole
existence; he sees only his fatherland; he lives only for it; when he is alone, he is
nothing; when he no longer has a fatherland, he no longer is, and if he is not dead,
he is worse than dead.266
The natural role of women, therefore, is to safeguard the domestic sphere. She must
insure that children are provided with a “good constitution”267 and faithfully execute the
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tasks assigned to her by the husband (and, presumably, la patrie).268 She is expected to
reproduce both the population, as well as the ideology, of the nation-state. In this passage,
for example, the child imbibes the values of la patrie (a French term which beautifully
captures the ambiguous ties between political and patriarchal power) along with the
mother’s nourishment. The woman acts as the guarantor of her husband’s happiness; in
the fifth book of Emile, for example, Rousseau finally introduces the reader to Sophie,
Emile’s eventual wife. When she turns fifteen, her father informs her that “[t]he
happiness of a decent girl lies in causing the happiness of a decent man. You must
therefore think about getting married. You must think about it early, for the destiny of
life depends on marriage, and there is never too much time to think about it.”269 Indeed,
Rousseau argues that “the whole education of women ought to relate to men”. 270
If we combine the technologies of power together, therefore, we can re-construct
Rousseau’s strategy for guaranteeing the unity of the body politic; as in other
formulations of contract theory, they complement one another, with exclusionary power
eliminating the ‘criminal’ enemies of the state and inclusionary power focusing on the
creation of ‘patriotic citizens’.

Between a new political theology, the oppressive

consignment of women to domesticity, a ‘civic education’ which teaches self-denial and
the rhetoric of the Legislator, who speaks ‘on behalf of the gods’, Rousseau outlines a
model for governing the social body via a biopolitical process of inclusion/exclusion.
Rousseau’s concept of ‘participatory democracy’, which is often contrasted with
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technocratic proceduralism, relies, in actuality, not on collective participation and selfdetermination, at least in the final analysis; rather, the people need guidance from a sage.
Indeed, since they lack the high standards of virtue demanded by a republican society,
they require moral training, which is the purpose (or at least one of the purposes) of an
intolerant civic religion. Rousseau’s theory of education, meanwhile, emphasizes the
importance of deception and intrigue; the master (who is in this regard strikingly
resembles the Lawgiver) manipulates the fantasies of his student, using the passions as a
weapon against themselves. Finally, the foundation of the social contract is the woman,
whose role is determined in very specific, and problematic, ways. She is responsible for
guaranteeing the health of the body politic by vigilantly guarding (and promoting) the
“virtues” of her children. Likewise, the strength of the nation, which is measured in,
most significantly, population, requires “docile” females who are willing to participate in
the critical task of social reproduction (and here we could interpret this phrase in two
ways: as an ideological reproducer of patriotic morality, as well as the literal reproducer
of the social body).
As I have alluded to above, one of the classic debates in the secondary literature on
Rousseau concerns his political orientation: is he a liberal, or a proto-totalitarian? J.L.
Talmon argues that Rousseau’s political theory is an example of “totalitarian
democracy”, which he contrasts with “liberal democracy.” While the latter “assumes
politics to be a matter of trial and error, and regards political systems as pragmatic
contrivances of human ingenuity and spontaneity”, the former “is based on the
assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics…It widens the scope of politics to
embrace the whole of human existence…and the final purpose of politics is only
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achieved when this philosophy reigns supreme over all fields of life” (the biopolitical
scope of Talmon’s definition is especially interesting).271 Talmon insists that Rousseau’s
theory (at least in part) establishes the theoretical framework for the Jacobin Reign of
Terror.272 This reading has been challenged by Andrew Levine, who contends that
Talmon’s reading is “entirely mistaken.”273 He argues that Rousseau’s theory of the
general will is an “illiberal” construct274 which has “liberal implications.”275 While
Levine’s interpretation of the general will examines the connection between individual
liberty and sovereign power, his formulation nicely captures the problematic relationship
which I have tried to highlight in the first chapter: rather than seeing liberalism as
opposed to biopower, we should recognize the importance of discipline in the formation
of ‘liberal’ subjects. Likewise, liberal regimes are forced to resort to the exclusion of
society’s ‘enemies’; in Rousseau’s ‘civic religion’, for example, toleration is enforced
through ostracism, or even death. Indeed, it is, strictly speaking, incorrect to characterize
biopower as an ‘illiberal’ construct which has ‘liberal’ implications, since it is the
condition, in Rousseau’s political theory, of agents who are capable of exercising their
freedom. This is, it seems to me, yet another way of formulating the same basic tension
that we discover at the heart of modern liberalism: a political theory which relies on
coercion and disciplinary power as a mechanism for steering the comportment of

271

Talmon, 1-2.
Indeed, he quotes a passage from Heine to this effect, who suggested that “Maximilien Robespierre war
Nichts als die Hand von Jean-Jacques Rousseau” (after which he adds “die blutige Hand”) (16).
273
Cf. The Politics of Autonomy (Amherst: Massachusetts UP, 1976), 72.
274
In the sense that it is opposed to “the tendency in political thought that affords a central place to the
principled defense of individual and minority rights against the claims of the state and broader society.”
(Levine, 72)
275
Ibid., 72-73.
272

97
subjects, and (even more dramatically) which guarantees the preservation of life through
the symbolic (and actual) power of death.

Classical Liberalism and the Fundamental Ideological Fantasy
In this chapter, I have examined the imagery of the body politic in Hobbes, Locke and
Rousseau, arguing that if we re-read the language of the social body from Foucault’s
interpretive perspective (or more precisely, vis-à-vis an interpretive perspective informed
by Foucault’s work on biopower) we uncover what Zizek calls ‘the fundamental
ideological fantasy’, which is the desire for a unified, ‘organic’ community without
divisions or antagonism. The body politic is united by excluding ‘irrational’, ‘criminal’
or ‘unhealthy’ agents from the social contract (i.e. ‘exclusionary’ power), and
‘normalizing’ agents who contribute to the reproduction of the nation-state (or
‘inclusionary’ power).

I have shown how exclusionary and inclusionary power, in

combination, produce the ‘singular will’ of the social contract’s body politic; by
eliminating agents who differ from prevailing conceptions of ‘health’ and ‘rationality’
(such as ‘madmen’), and by disciplining subjects and transforming individuals into
citizens who legitimate the political order, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau try to establish
the conditions for societies which have transcended antagonism, but they achieve
‘harmony’ through colonizing the public and private spheres. The key to understanding
the importance of power in social contract theory, therefore, is to abandon, or at least
develop alternatives to, the traditional reading of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, which
interprets corporeal imagery, almost exclusively, as relating to the question of legitimacy
and governmental authority.
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It is important, of course, to avoid the following temptation: we must not assimilate
the theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau into a single, overarching narrative
concerning the unity of the body politic. Despite their common interest in the social
body, they propose different strategies of control, and rely on different technologies of
power. I do, however, believe that one point of similarity emerges from my discussion:
if we examine the imagery of the body politic from a Foucaultian standpoint, we are
forced to re-evaluate standard views concerning, for example, the political theory of
Locke, specifically in terms of the question of embodiment. The Hobbesian agent, for
example, is no longer a disembodied, hyper-rational game theorist; s/he is situated in an
elaborate network of disciplinary power and ideological directives, and his or her docile
obedience to the ‘Leviathan’ is guaranteed not, as we are often led to believe, through
calculations of utility, but via political technologies of control. As for Locke, who is
generally regarded as the ‘father’ of modern liberalism, a new attention to the politics of
embodiment reveals that the conditions of governance are, as in Hobbes, realized by
disciplinary power.

Finally, in Rousseau, who is read as the visionary prophet of

democratic revolution, we see that the citizen is, in actuality, a subject who is conditioned
to regard the body politic as his/her patrie, and s/he must submit to the laws of the state,
accept its religious principles and “humbly” assume his/her role as citizen. In each case,
a biopolitical interpretation reveals previously neglected hermeneutic possibilities, and
alternatives to canonical textual approaches. It also, however, shows us that the major
philosophical figures in the liberal/social contract tradition, unlike contemporary liberal
authors, understood that ‘autonomous’ subjects are the product of culture and influence;
they don’t pretend that individuals simply materialize, ab initio, as economic agents who
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make political decisions through a rational calculus. Rather, the liberal self in Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau has a history, and genealogical research can uncover its past.
In this sense, at least, classical liberalism is more insightful than its contemporary
variations. Indeed, one of the more prominent criticisms of figures such as Rawls is that
they neglect the fact that agents have values and belong to communities. Thus, they
abstract the self from its body and culture, failing to recognize our intersubjective
connection to other persons and the importance of relationships in the formation of
identity. While the typical response to this argument is that contemporary liberalism tries
to eliminate the attributes of the self precisely in order to avoid the dangers of racism,
sexism, classism and homophobia, it fails to recognize that the coherence of tolerance
and equality presuppose that agents are embodied: they need a history and embodied
relationship with others in order to appreciate why, exactly, we value social justice. In
the next chapter, therefore, I will offer an examination of John Rawls, focusing on the
question of embodiment in his work. More specifically, I examine the question of agency
in A Theory of Justice, arguing that Nietzsche reveals the origins of the subject in the
original position; in addition, I highlight the role of exclusion in Rawls’s later theory,
especially Political Liberalism.
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CHAPTER 2: THE PRESENT-ABSENCE OF THE BODY IN
CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM
At the end of Chapter 1, I argued that classical liberalism recognizes the importance of
culture and discipline vis-à-vis the formation of identity and governable subjects. In this
regard, at least, it is more self-aware than contemporary liberalism, which generally
presents us with a disembodied view of the self. In figures such as Gauthier and Rawls,
for example, the subject emerges ex nihilo as a hyper-rational utility maximizing agent;
there is no account given of the corporeal networks and histories which inform the selfunderstanding of individuals.

It is also convenient, because it allows modern liberalism

to avoid the complicated genealogies which are necessary in order to fathom the birth of
political subjects who are capable of asserting their ‘autonomy’. In the previous chapter,
I tried to hint at the direction a genealogy of the liberal self would pursue; it would return
to the ‘marginal’ texts of social contract theory, such as Locke’s essay on the ‘working
schools’, in addition to the ‘peripheral’ aspects of canonical works, such as Hobbes’s
interest in the function of civic education or Rousseau’s attempts to develop a new
political theology. In any case, the classical liberal tradition was attentive to the question
of embodiment, both in terms of the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ bodies of society, even if
traditional interpretations have failed to accord this interest its proper place. When we
turn to contemporary liberalism, on the other hand, the imagery of the ‘body politic’ is
generally non-existent in the writing of major authors; Anglo-American liberalism in
particular is dominated by the analytic penchant for direct argumentation, clarity and
precision which are, in their own ways, philosophical virtues, but this style of thinking
tends to view metaphors, symbols and figurative language as diversions from the
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essential intellectual task of bringing to light, and then evaluating, normative
assumptions.
In this chapter, I will examine the question of embodiment in Rawls. If my
characterization of Anglo-American political philosophy is correct, however, at least in a
general way, then my interpretive approach to contemporary liberalism seems
unpromising. How can I expect to gain any critical traction by focusing on the imagery
of the body politic vis-à-vis the work of Rawls? To cite an obvious difficulty, the agent
in Rawls’s original position is a prime example of the disembodied approach to selfhood
I mentioned above, and at the end of Chapter 1; s/he is unaware of race, sex, religious
orientation, class background, etc. In response to this objection, however, two comments
are in order. First of all, I will argue that Rawls cannot ‘disembody’ the agent, if by
‘disembody’ we mean strip away their sense of history and belonging to a
culture/tradition, or their identity, without simultaneously undermining the very
principles which render certain choices in the original position defensible and coherent.
Secondly, I will argue that even if the imagery of the body politic no longer appears in
Rawls (although there is one important exception which I will focus on in my
discussion), his work continues to exhibit elements of the ‘fundamental ideological
fantasy’, or desire for a unified social body. In this regard, the logics of
inclusion/exclusion still operate in Rawls, although their presence is more subtle and
diffused than in classical liberalism.
I begin with the question of disciplinary inclusion, focusing on A Theory of
Justice. As I noted above, Rawls’s conception of agency in the original position is
minimalist, in the sense that s/he (i.e. the agent) doesn’t have any knowledge of his/her
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gender, race, class or conception of the good. I argue, following Michael Sandel, that the
individual wouldn’t choose, for example, the difference principle, unless s/he had a
conception of the good which emphasized solidarity.

But how does the individual

acquire a conception of the good? In order to answer this question, I turn to Nietzsche’s
genealogy of the moral/political self, arguing that we become governable subjects
through disciplinary regimes of power and habituation.

In addition to examining

‘inclusionary’ logics, however, I will also highlight exclusionary aspects of Rawls’s
theory. I argue that despite his rhetoric of pluralism and tolerance, Rawls is forced to
exclude ‘illiberal’ agents/worldviews from his re-worked theory (i.e. in Political
Liberalism). Before I turn to the work of Rawls, however, I want to contextualize the set
of problems he addresses by highlighting recent developments in liberal political theory.

The Diversity and Unity of Contemporary Liberalism(s)
Which problems and issues, therefore, motivate contemporary liberalism? It has two
major concerns: it emphasizes the importance of personal autonomy and recognizes the
diversity of cultural assumptions and moral beliefs. Thus, there are two core principles
advanced by modern liberalism: freedom and tolerance. John Gray, for example, argues
that liberalism has “two faces”; “[i]n the first, liberalism is a prescription for a universal
regime [and] [i]n the second, it is a project of coexistence that can be pursued in many
regimes.”276 The first “face” of liberalism sees “liberal institutions as applications of
universal principles”; according to the second, they are “a means to peaceful
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coexistence.”277

Joseph Raz, meanwhile, defends perfectionism against anti-

perfectionism (the former challenges the anti-perfectionist insistence that liberalism is a
value-neutral doctrine, recognizing its affirmation of a specific conception of the
good).278

Michael Walzer, commenting on an important essay by Charles Taylor,

proposes a distinction between Liberalism 1, which is committed to the individual
freedom, safety and welfare of its citizens, and Liberalism 2, which protects the basic
rights of its members but is also dedicated to preserving minority cultures, nations or
religions.279
The political theory of John Rawls is motivated by similar questions and issues.
He emphasizes the differences between liberalisms based on comprehensive doctrines
(i.e. ‘comprehensive liberalisms’) and his own theory of ‘political liberalism’.

A

comprehensive doctrine “includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well
as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical
conduct” (and he further subdivides the category into ‘full’ and ‘partial’ comprehensive
doctrines; the distinction, however, is unimportant here).280 Comprehensive liberalism,
therefore, privileges specifically liberal conceptions of the good and assumes that the
totality, or at least an overwhelming majority, of the citizenry will endorse its
comprehensive doctrine.281
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pluralism of heterogeneous comprehensive doctrines in modern democratic societies,282
and rather than advocating, for example, a liberal conception of the good it tries to
establish what Rawls labels an ‘overlapping consensus’ between reasonable
comprehensive theories.283
While there are theoretical differences within contemporary liberalism, therefore,
the similarities between orientations are important; they are grounded in the fundamental
liberal concerns with toleration and pluralism (otherwise, how could we identify them
under the shared conceptual framework of ‘liberalisms’?). There are commonalities, for
example, between Raz’s definition of ‘anti-perfectionism’ and Gray’s universalist
liberalism; likewise, the value-neutrality of anti-perfectionist liberalism and Walzer’s
‘Liberalism 1’ is evident. Indeed, the one problematic which unifies the variations is the
question of liberalism’s relationship to pluralism (i.e. is liberalism value-neutral, or does
it implicitly affirm a conception of the good? If so, does it undermine the conceptual
basis of liberalism? How should liberalism relate to non-liberal comprehensive doctrines,
both within, as well as external to, liberal regimes?). In this chapter, I propose to
examine the problems of exclusion/inclusion in contemporary liberalism by highlighting
the work of John Rawls, who has, by his own admission, embraced varieties of
comprehensive, as well as political, liberalism. While it is important to highlight the
theoretical diversity of contemporary liberalism, I want to argue that Rawls’s oeuvre is
differentiated and nuanced enough to permit access to the series of questions highlighted
above (i.e. questions about liberalism and value pluralism), as well as questions about the
nature of the self presupposed, either implicitly or explicitly, in contemporary liberal
282
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discourse.

More importantly, I want to argue that Rawls’ political theory continues to

exhibit the traces of exclusion which we have encountered in earlier social contract
projects such as Hobbes’s, Locke’s and Rousseau’s. In short, we are still dealing with the
question of the body politic, and the politics of the body, albeit in a less obvious way.
I confess that my claim appears implausible. We know, for example, that the
agent in the original position lacks knowledge of his/her race, gender, social status and
conception of the good. S/he is clearly an example of disembodied subjectivity; in this
regard, it is tempting to ask, along with Robert Nozick, whether there is any “coherent
conception of a person” left after we have eliminated the “talents, assets, abilities and
special traits” which provide us with a sense of uniqueness?284 Or as Michael Sandel
writes, “since the veil of ignorance has the effect of depriving the parties, qua parties to
the original position, of all distinguishing characteristics, it becomes difficult to see what
their plurality could possibly consist in.”285 But if that’s the case, isn’t it mistaken to
include a chapter dedicated to examining the problematic of the body in Rawlsian
liberalism?
As the title of the chapter suggests, however, the body’s presence in contemporary
liberalism is demonstrated all the more glaringly by its absence and elision. Indeed, Iris
Marion Young has argued that Rawls’s ‘original position’ is dominated by a
‘monological’ conception of reasoning, a conception which excludes, for example, the
introduction of feelings and desires into the process of deliberation.286

At this point,

however, I simply want to indicate that the question of embodiment is hardly irrelevant to
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a study of Rawls’s political theory; rather, it takes us to the very heart of certain problems
encountered by justice as fairness. Likewise, there are other forms of exclusion which
continue to haunt Rawls’s social contractarianism (just as they haunted traditional social
contractarian arguments), such as the exclusion of ideals or conceptions of the good
which are incompatible with liberalism. Here, then, we once again uncover the body
politic’s desire to achieve a kind of homogeneity.
More specifically, I want to continue with a narrative thread which runs
throughout the dissertation, namely the attempt to demonstrate that liberalism relies on
practices of exclusion, as well as what I have called, following Foucault, ‘disciplinary
inclusion’, in order to guarantee the unity and stability of the body politic. In the context
of my discussion of Rawls, I would like to highlight the two motifs in relation to Rawls’s
major theoretical works, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. Theory is an
example of ‘comprehensive liberalism’, while Political Liberalism represents the second
category in Rawls’s schema (indeed, Rawls is generally credited with having developed
the idea of ‘political liberalism’, although he concedes that Charles Larmore and Judith
Shklar each formulated it, or at least very similar theories, independently of his own
work287). I will proceed chronologically, by focusing on the earlier text (Theory) first,
emphasizing certain ways in which Rawls’s early contractarianism is still haunted by
questions of marginalization. I will argue that Rawls’s early liberalism, which pretends
to value-neutrality, actually is forced to privilege certain conceptions of the good over
others (indeed, it would exclude ideals which are explicitly opposed to liberal principles).
I will also highlight the presuppositions of Rawls’ account of agency in the original
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position, drawing on communitarian authors (as well as Nietzsche) in order to highlight
difficulties which his apparently innocuous sketch of subjectivity presents for his theory
as a whole. I then shift my focus to the later work (Political Liberalism), where I once
again offer criticisms which depart from the antagonism, or at least uncomfortable
relationship, between inclusion and exclusion in his efforts to articulate a coherent form
of political liberalism.

The Question of ‘Neutrality’ in A Theory of Justice
In A Theory of Justice (initially published in 1971), Rawls develops (as the title
implies) a theory of justice for social institutions. He explicitly situates his work in the
social contract tradition, emphasizing that
My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a
higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as it is found,
say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant. In order to do this we are not to think of the
original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form
of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the
basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the
principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms
of their association.288
Rawls’s theory, which he calls ‘justice as fairness’, models the initial choice situation in
traditional social contract arguments by setting up a hypothetical scenario (what Rawls
labels ‘the original position’) in which the agents lack any knowledge of their status in
society (i.e. they have no knowledge of their income, level of social prestige, etc.), their
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intellectual/physical capabilities or their particular conceptions of the good.289 In other
words, the parties are located behind (to once again cite Rawls’s terminology) a “veil of
ignorance”.290 He also assumes that the subjects in the original position are “rational and
mutually disinterested”291 (although Rawls insists that they are not egoistic, both in A
Theory of Justice292 as well as Political Liberalism293), and that given the constraints
imposed by the veil of ignorance, they would unanimously choose two principles as the
fundamental ordering rules of social institutions:

(1) equality in assigning basic

rights/duties294 (although Rawls eventually re-formulates (1) as “Each person is to have
an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all”295) and (2) social and economic inequalities are
organized so that they benefit the “least advantaged members of society” (Rawls
identifies (2) as the “difference principle”)296, with (1) accorded lexical priority over (2)
insofar as departures from the principle of equal liberty are not justified by appeals to, for
example, “greater social and economic advantages.”297 It is evident, therefore, that the
hypothetical contract situation occupies an important (even central) position in Rawls’s
argument. The legitimacy of the two principles, as is the case in traditional contract
theory, resides in the initial consent given by agents located behind the veil of ignorance.
First of all, then, I want to direct my criticisms of Rawls’s Theory of Justice towards
aspects of the original position which, against Rawls’s intentions, undermine the
289
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possibility of liberal neutrality (or more exactly, problematize Rawls’s assertions that his
theory is neutral between conceptions of the good).
I have already sketched out the basic components of Rawls’ original position above,
but it is important to examine the idea more closely in order to highlight aspects of the
initial choice situation which are relevant for my argument.

Specifically, I want to re-

construct Rawls’s arguments concerning the self in the original position and his/her
relationship to comprehensive doctrines.

As I noted above, the agents have no

knowledge of their particular conception of the good. Rawls assumes that if we knew our
conception of the good, our choice of principles in the original position would reflect
contingent interests, and Rawls is trying to eliminate, or at least “nullify”, the importance
of morally arbitrary features (such as race, class, sex, etc.).298 Each agent does, however,
have a “rational plan of life”, with the caveat that s/he “does not know the details of this
plan, the particular ends and interests it is calculated to promote.”299 Given the two
conditions (i.e. that agents have no knowledge of their conceptions of the good, while
exhibiting a “rational plan of life”), an obvious question arises:

In the absence of

teleological conceptions, how can they select principles of justice (i.e. if I didn’t know
my conception of he good, why should I opt for Rawls’s two principles rather than, say,
the average principle of utility)?

Rawls’s answer introduces the notion of what he calls

“primary goods”.
According to Rawls, primary goods are “things that every rational man is presumed to
want.”300 He offers examples of “social primary goods” (such as “rights and liberties,
powers and opportunities, income and wealth”) and “natural primary goods” (i.e. “health
298
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and vigor, intelligence and imagination”)301 (although Rawls insists that self-respect is an
important, if not the most important, primary good.)302 Primary goods are necessary
conditions for realizing a given set of ends; without ‘intelligence’, for example (which I
put in scare quotes because Rawls never defines the term) it is difficult to contemplate an
end, and in the absence of opportunity it is inconceivable that we could realize the
principle(s) in question.303 Rawls argues that even if the agents in the original position
don’t know their conception of the good, they are still interested in receiving the
maximum number of primary goods via appropriately regulated distributive schemes
(thus whether I am a socialist, neoconservative, Rawlsian liberal, religious
fundamentalist, etc. I presumably want more of primary good X rather than less).304
The subjects are capable, therefore, of rational decision-making; their criteria,
however, is the importance of primary goods, rather than ‘thicker’ comprehensive ideas.
In short, the agents exhibit a thin, rather than thick or full, theory of the good. According
to Rawls, “it’s [the thin conception’s] purpose is to secure the premises about primary
goods required to arrive at the principles of justice.”305 Once the initial principles are
agreed to for the regulation of social institutions, we are able to utilize the two principles
in developing a ‘full’ theory of the good,306 which allows us to offer substantive
judgments concerning, for example, a person’s moral worth.307
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Bearing in mind Rawls’s attitude towards conceptions of the good, and
specifically the elimination of thick conceptions of the good in the original position, I
will highlight the first difficulty with his argument, a difficulty which relates to the
question of exclusion. I will begin by noting a criticism initially formulated by Thomas
Nagel, relating to the problem of neutrality. As Nagel emphasizes, Rawls excludes
conceptions of the good because they are, like race, sex, class, etc., “morally
irrelevant”.308 Yet if a conception reflects the ‘good’, it is presumably a good which
applies to everyone; Nagel writes that the agent “will not be seeking special advantages
for himself so long as he does not know who in the society he is. Rather he will be
opting for principles that advance the good for everyone” (and Nagel assumes that a
conception of good is different from, say, aesthetic preferences).309 If this is the case,
however, it is difficult to see why conceptions of the good reflect morally arbitrary
features of the self (which a person’s race or sex clearly do). It is inappropriate, for
example, to suggest that (1) I deserve more primary goods because I am white, male, etc.,
but what if (2) I am a socialist who genuinely believes that an equitable distribution of
primary goods creates a more just society than a hierarchical, inegalitarian distribution?
Surely the two rationales are different (indeed, (1) isn’t a rationale at all, or at least not a
good one; (2) is clearly different because in promoting my conception of the good I
promote a generalizable, non-particularistic good—or so I believe).

While it is

conceivable that a chauvinist white supremacist genuinely believes that distributing more
primary goods to ‘Aryan’ males will benefit society in toto, it is difficult for him to
defend the position against the counterarguments of rational interlocutors, in the way that
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we could defend (2). A distribution according to (1) would heighten division and
resentment in society; a distribution according to (2) would lower it.
In addition, Rawls argues that conceptions of good threaten to subvert the
possibility of unanimous agreement, since if the agent knew his/her conception of the
good s/he would engage in divisive, self-interested bargaining.

In order to avoid

interminable conflict, therefore, we eliminate ‘particular’ conceptions of the good and
privilege the idea of ‘primary goods’, which reflects generalizable interests (i.e. interests
that appeal to agents in general, no matter which conceptions of the good they adhere to).
The idea of ‘primary goods’ offers, on Rawls’s interpretation, a basis of neutrality, since
the necessary conditions for realizing a particular conception of the good are health,
safety, liberty, etc. (a neutrality which is unavailable to heterogeneous comprehensive
doctrines). Yet Nagel offers a powerful critique of Rawls’s neutrality assumption; he
writes that
Any hypothetical choice situation which requires agreement among the parties
will have to impose strong restrictions on the grounds of choice, and these
restrictions can be justified only in terms of a conception of the good. It is one of
those cases in which there is no neutrality to be had, because neutrality needs as
much justification as any other position.310
Nagel’s counterargument extends further, however; on his reading, the original position
ends up affirming an “individualistic” conception of the good. He suggests that “Rawls’
minimal conception of the good does not amount to a weak assumption…The refusal to
rank particular conceptions of the good implies a very marked tolerance for individual
inclinations.”311 It privileges ways of life which emphasize individual autonomy rather
than solidarity, a conclusion reinforced by Rawls’s insistence that the parties are mutually
310
311
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disinterested.312 In short, “[t]he original position seems to presuppose not just a neutral
theory of the good, but a liberal, individualistic conception according to which the best
that can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own path, provided it
does not interfere with the rights of others.”313
In “Fairness to Goodness”, Rawls addresses, at least implicitly, Nagel’s charges,
specifically focusing on the question of individualistic conceptions in the original
position. Is it the case that justice as fairness is biased in favor of atomistic theories of
the good, to the detriment of communitarian principles? He offers three arguments
against the claim. (1) Since primary goods are necessary conditions for realizing any
conception of the good, the agent’s desire to acquire primary goods is not a reflection of,
for example, bourgeois liberal ideology.314 As Will Kymlicka notes in defending Rawls
against the charge of bias, the actualization of our productive essence in a socialist
regimes presupposes health, welfare, etc.; in short, primary goods.315 (2) After agents
have exited from the original position, their level of wealth is calculated in terms of
public, as well as private, holdings (i.e. agents exercise control over public, as well as
private wealth).316 (3) While the agent tries to maximize his/her share of primary goods
(which once again are necessary conditions for realizing the good), they are not interested
in excessive accumulation; indeed, Rawls insists that they are not motivated by envy “and
have no concern for their relative place in the distribution of wealth.”317
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Are Rawls’s counterarguments sufficient to answer the criticisms highlighted by
Nagel? To my mind, at least, response (1) hits the mark, since primary goods are
important in any society. Even an ascetically oriented spiritual community (presumably
one of the least susceptible to charges of possessive individualism) requires basic
necessities (hence, to once again cite Kymlicka, monks belong to orders that own land
and buildings, orders moreover that generally have a constant revenue stream318).
Privileging a thin theory of the good, then, is not sufficient to vindicate the charge of
individualism. Response (2) is, for the sake of our discussion, beside the point; it deals
with agents after they’ve left the original position, and we’re focusing on the hypothetical
situation itself.

Response (3), like (1), is an effective rejoinder, since we expect

possessive individualists to maximize personal wealth; they are interested in
accumulating primary goods even at the expense of others, which Rawls’s agents are not.
Indeed, Rawls fails to mention one of the most obvious counterexamples, which is his
assumption that the parties are “heads of families, and therefore as having a desire to
further the welfare of their nearest descendents.”319

While Rawls insists that the

motivational assumption of the agents vis-à-vis concern for others is not benevolence (for
a number of complex reasons)320, it nevertheless represents an important counterexample
to the charge of individualistic bias.

theory”, but “[t]he special assumption I make is that a rational individual does not suffer from envy…He is
not downcast by the knowledge or perception that others have a larger index of primary goods.” (143/124)
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There is, however, a deeper and more powerful critique hinted at in Nagel’s argument,
namely the idea that Rawls’s pursuit of neutrality is chimerical. We can separate the
most damaging aspects of Nagel’s argument from the objections concerning Rawls’s
hyper-individualism; even if the attacks on Rawls’s ‘atomistic’ view of the self ultimately
misfire, Nagel is still correct to insist that “neutrality needs as much justification as any
other position.”321 In other words, the privileging of neutrality is not, in itself, a neutral
decision; it presupposes, for example, the moral value of tolerance (specifically, the
toleration of different conceptions of the good). Yet toleration is a limited, rather than
absolute, good (or if it is an absolute good, it is not evident); intolerant comprehensive
doctrines, for example, are incompatible with a ‘neutral’, tolerant regime. If it is the case
that an intolerant conception threatens the survival of a liberal, pluralistic regime, the
imperative of self-preservation becomes, presumably, a greater good than the value of
tolerance, given the context of existential crisis (since tolerance is destroyed if the regime
ceases to exist and is replaced with an intolerant society). In short, the state is forced to
defend itself, to adopt a non-neutral stance towards its opponent.
Charles Taylor highlights the difficulty with insisting on a “thin theory of the good”
(as Rawls does); echoing Nagel, he recognizes that if we articulate the presuppositions of
Rawls’s ‘thin’ theory, we discover an implicit reliance on ‘thick’ conceptions of the
good:

“as he himself [Rawls] agrees, we recognize that these are indeed accepted

principles of justice because they fit in with our intuitions.”322 (I presume that Taylor is
referring to Rawls’s notion of ‘reflective equilibrium’, the idea that the principles of
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justice chosen should, to quote Rawls, “match our considered convictions of justice or
extend them in a suitable way”.323) Taylor continues:
If we were to articulate what underlies these intuitions we would start spelling out
a very ‘thick’ conception of the good…We don’t actually spell it out [i.e. in the
original position], but we have to draw on the sense of the good that we have here
in order to decide what are adequate principles of justice. The theory of justice
turns out to be a theory which keeps its most basic insights inarticulate.324
While Taylor does not mention specific features of the ‘thick’ good concealed beneath
Rawls’s privileging of a ‘thin’ theory, it is not difficult to guess which ‘thick’
characteristics he has in mind: principles such as rationality, tolerance, equality and
liberty, ideas which are, to greater or lesser degrees, non-neutral.

Indeed, the

deontological project which animates Rawls’s argument is highly controversial within
moral theory (think, for example, of the critical responses by utilitarians,325 virtue
ethicists,326 and feminists327 to important aspects of deontological, or deontologically
inspired, moral discourse).

While controversy is not, in and of itself, sufficient to

undermine the presumption of neutrality, it provides strong evidence that the theory in
question is incapable of offering a neutral basis of adjudication between conflicting views
(since its validity as a fair arbitrator is one of the contested issues). In any case, Taylor’s
point clarifies Nagel’s argument concerning the difficulty of neutrality; specifically, it
helps us to see the obstacles encountered by any attempt to construct a ‘neutral’ approach
to the initial contract scenario. William A. Galston has offered similar comments, and
decides that contemporary liberalism presupposes a substantive theory of the good
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(despite its protests) which he calls ‘rational humanism’, a theory of the good which
privileges reason and human purposiveness.328
Interestingly enough, Rawls concedes the point in “Fairness to Goodness”. He admits
that the original position “is certainly not neutral in the sense that its descriptions use no
moral concepts”329 (it privileges ideas such as generality, publicity, finality, etc.).330 A
critical shift in Rawls’s interpretation, however, is that he understands the veil of
ignorance, or more specifically the constraints placed on agents behind the veil of
ignorance, as a non-neutral device.331 Likewise, the original position does not permit
equality between conceptions of the good, since the principles of justice favor adopting
certain comprehensive doctrines rather than others.332 Rawls, in effect, is forced to
recognize the difficulty of maintaining neutrality, a difficulty which complicates the
liberal project in important ways.

Indeed, neutrality is a historical cornerstone of

liberalism, but if it necessarily selects particular conceptions of good, or more exactly, if
the initial contract situation which legitimizes the liberal state privileges (implicitly or
explicitly) a comprehensive doctrine (or doctrines), its claim to impartiality is
questionable, at best.

Communitarianism, Liberalism and Agency
While I will return to the problem of value-neutrality and comprehensive doctrines in my
discussion of Political Liberalism, I would like to shift the focus of my argument in order
328
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to highlight a second difficulty with Rawls’s argument, this time concerning forms of
exclusion which operate vis-à-vis political agents in the original position. Earlier I had
sketched out the basic characteristics attributed to subjects in the original position: the
agents lack information concerning their social status, natural endowments, conception of
the good, psychology, level of economic/political development obtained in their society
and which generation they belong to.333

They are, on the other hand, mutually

disinterested and rational (defined as following “the plan which will satisfy more of his
desires rather than less, and which has the greater chance of being successfully
executed”334), aware of “the circumstances of justice” (which Rawls discusses in section
twenty-two; they include “objective circumstances” such as scarcity and competition as
well as “subjective circumstances” relating to the parties’ diverse interests, which in turn
reflects heterogeneous conceptions of the good335) and “general facts about human
society” (as candidates Rawls mentions “the principles of economic theory” in addition to
“the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology”).336
The picture which emerges is, in short, of a disembodied agent.

As I had

mentioned earlier in the chapter, both Nozick and Sandel wonder if there is any coherent
subject left after his/her ‘contingent’ features are eliminated. While Rawls admits the
difficulties of envisioning subjects in the original position, he emphasizes that it is a
purely hypothetical notion, and that we are capable of entering, or simulating, the
conditions of the initial contract scenario by reasoning in accordance with its
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constraints.337 There are important questions concerning the status of a hypothetical
contract; here, however, I am more interested in examining criticisms which thematize
the importance of Rawls’s deontological assumptions vis-à-vis agents in the original
position.
I have already highlighted Nagel’s objection to at least one aspect of Rawls’s
thought experiment concerning the self (i.e. the objection that conceptions of the good
have a different moral status than, say, racial or gender traits). The most influential
critique of Rawls’s picture of the subject, however, is Michael Sandel’s Liberalism and
the Limits of Justice338 (and its companion piece, “The Procedural Republic and the
Unencumbered Self”339).

Sandel’s essays develop the communitarian argument that

Rawls’s Kantian vision of the subject fails to recognize the importance of shared moral
frameworks, specifically the moral frameworks of communities, as a constitutive
foundation of our identity. Sandel notes that Rawls’s liberalism, which is heavily
indebted (by the latter’s own admission) to Kant’s moral and political theory,340
prioritizes the right over the good.341 According to Sandel, the priority of right entails
two things: first, that individual rights are not subsumable under, or secondary to, the
general good and, secondly, that rights are not indexed to a particular conception of the
good.342

Our previous discussions in this chapter have already emphasized the
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difficulties Rawls faces in terms of the second entailment, but as Sandel correctly notes
liberalism assumes that “[s]ociety is best arranged when it is governed by principles that
do not presuppose any particular conception of the good, for any other arrangement
would fail to respect persons as being capable of choice; it would treat them as objects
rather than subjects, as means rather than ends in themselves.”343
Sandel argues that Rawlsian liberalism presupposes a theory of agency which he
calls the “unencumbered self.” It is a self “understood as prior to and independent of
ends and purposes”344 (indeed, Sandel cites a passage from Rawls which—almost
verbatim—confirms his reading; Rawls notes that “the self is prior to the ends which are
affirmed by it”345). Sandel interprets Rawls as arguing that we should prioritize the
subject’s capacity to choose ends/purposes, rather than emphasizing the ends we
choose.346 In other words, Rawls valorizes the freedom of the agent rather than his or her
attachment to constitutive ends; the right, therefore, (here understood as the agent’s
liberty to reject certain conceptions of good and affirm others) is prior to the good.
Drawing on his reconstruction of the assumptions behind Rawls’s theory of
agency in the original position, Sandel reiterates the charge that Rawls’s argument is
biased against communitarian frameworks; he notes that “[o]n Rawls’ view, a sense of
community describes a possible aim of antecedently individuated selves, not an
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ingredient or constituent of their identity as such.

This guarantees its subordinate

status.”347 A communitarian project, therefore, “find its virtue as one contender among
others within the framework defined by justice, not as a rival account of the framework
itself.”348 I won’t recite Rawls’s objections to this argument, which I mentioned earlier in
the chapter. Indeed, I think he has successfully addressed the charge of individualistic
bias. There is, however, another difficulty which Sandel’s criticisms highlight, and it
relates to the coherence of Rawls’s theory of the self vis-à-vis the principles s/he would
select in the original position. Given that the subject in the original position does not
know his/her conception of the good, it is unclear why s/he would choose the second
principle of justice, or why s/he would exhibit any concern with intergenerational justice.
In other words, the problem is not individualistic bias; it is a more fundamental difficulty,
namely the question of whether or not Rawls’s argument is coherent if the selves are
detached from a constitutive framework.

My concern here overlaps with elements of

Taylor’s argument, presented earlier in the chapter: if it is the case that we lack a thick
conception of the good, why would we value X rather than Y? And how could we
understand commitments to others within our generation, much less future members of
the community? In order to flesh out my objections, I want to look at one more piece of
Sandel’s discussion, this time turning to his questions concerning Rawls’s second
principle of justice, the so-called “difference principle”.
As I had mentioned in the reconstruction of Rawls’s original position, the agents
would choose two principles of justice in the original position.

The first principle

guarantees equal liberty, while the second principle states that “[s]ocial and economic
347
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inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”349 I want to leave
aside the more abstract points of consideration (i.e. what does Rawls mean by the just
savings principle, or what is ‘fair equality of opportunity’) in order to emphasize the
criteria of distribution implied by the difference principle (specifically, then, the (a)
section of Rawls’s formulation.) The basic idea is that we only permit inequalities
(arising, say, from natural and social contingencies) to the extent that they improve the
situation of the “least advantaged” members of society. Rawls defines the term “least
advantaged” ambiguously; it could either include a reference to membership in a given
social class (the candidate he offers is “the unskilled worker”),350 while a second
possibility is to understand it in terms of relative income and wealth, “with no reference
to social position” (although it is difficult to see how a person’s “relative income and
wealth” would not have implications for his/her “social position”).351 There is, of course,
an inevitable arbitrariness to any criteria we choose (as Rawls himself admits352), but it is
clearly necessary to define the term, if only approximately.
Rawls argues that it is morally capricious to allow either social or natural
contingencies to operate as distributive mechanisms; it is unfair, for example, when child
A is able to maximize his/her natural talents because s/he was born into an affluent
household where his/her parents are able to afford the tuition at an exclusive private
school, while child B is forced to attend an inadequately funded public school with
349
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underpaid teachers, dated textbooks, etc. It is also, however, inappropriate for persons to
benefit from what Rawls dubs “the natural lottery” (i.e. the talents I happen to acquire
genetically).353 Since our natural advantages are the consequence of fortune rather than
merit Rawls argues that we should view them as “common assets”, and the difference
principle codifies this perspective by requiring that any inequalities which result from
natural differences are organized so that they benefit the “least well off”; he writes that
the two principles (and the difference principle specifically) represent “an undertaking to
regard the distribution of natural abilities in some respects as a collective asset so that the
more fortunate are to benefit only in ways that help those who have lost out.”354 Indeed,
the difference principle, or a principle similar to it, would follow from the idea that “in
justice as fairness men agree to share one another’s fate”355 (although this sentence is
reformulated in the revised edition, where it reads “[i]n justice as fairness men agree to
avail themselves of the accidents of nature and circumstance only when doing so is for
the common benefit”356).
In any case, whether we refer to a shared fate or “the common benefit”, there are
critical problems with Rawls’s argument. As both Nozick and Sandel ask, is there any
coherent idea of the subject left after we have stripped away its talents, aptitudes and
abilities?357 Even assuming there is, however, we encounter another difficulty with
Rawls’s move from the assertion that we don’t have a right to benefit from our attributes,
because they are contingent features of the self, to the stronger claim that my talents are
“collective assets”. As Sandel notes, it is one thing to say that I don’t have a “privileged
353
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claim” on my assets; it is altogether different to say that my talents are therefore
commonly shared (or at least, ought to be commonly shared).358 In short, it appears to
represent an unwarranted inference.

Sandel clearly articulates the dilemma in the

following passage:
What the difference principle requires, but cannot provide, is some way of
identifying those among whom the assets I bear are properly regarded as
common, some way of seeing ourselves as mutually indebted and morally
engaged to begin with. But as we have seen, the constitutive attachments that
would save and situate the difference principle are precisely the ones denied to the
liberal self; the moral encumbrances and antecedent obligations they imply would
undercut the priority of right.359
In other words, it is difficult reconstruct the logic of the agents’ choices in the original
position without attributing to them a conception of the good, a substantive end, which
allows us to move from premise (1) (that I don’t have a privileged claim on my talents) to
premise (2) (that they are therefore collective assets, and other agents have a valid claim
to them). If we have a ‘thick’ conception of the good which emphasizes the importance
of sharing, fair distribution, and commitment to others, the transition is plausible (or at
least looks more plausible); indeed, if we had a thick conception of the good which
promoted solidarity with fellow members of our society, we could understand the way(s)
in which our talents were not privileged but were, in fact, ‘collective assets’, assets which
should be used to benefit others. Yet Rawls explicitly states that the agents lack a
conception of the good (or more specifically, a thick conception of the good); the agents
are interested in accumulating primary goods for themselves and their descendents.
While the Rawlsian proviso concerning our intergenerational commitment (recall that
Rawls describes the agents as “heads of families” who also take the interests of their
358
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descendents into account) appears to provide a sense of the agents’ commitment to
others, it is a narrowly tailored sense of obligation (i.e. an obligation to my immediate
family) which hardly provides the framework for understanding the generalized sense of
solidarity presupposed by the difference principle.
As Steven Hendley has noted, however, it is incorrect to assume that Sandel rejects the
difference principle, given his criticisms of Rawls’s argument; instead, it is more
plausible to believe that he is trying to demonstrate that we can’t defend Rawls’s
conclusion unless a missing premise is supplied, namely the premise of a communitarian
ethos (or at least a conception of the good which highlights our connectedness to
others).360 Indeed, we can recognize an overlap with Taylor’s/Nagel’s idea concerning
the difficulty of neutrality; as I noted earlier in the chapter, they argue that Rawls tacitly
assumes a thick conception of the good. Sandel also demonstrates, however, that in order
to make sense of the agent’s commitment to others in the original position (specifically,
in terms of the difference principle), Rawls once again imports a hidden assumption into
the discussion, namely the implicit presupposition of a thicker, more extensive
conception of the good than the veil of ignorance allows.
Is it possible that we could understand the broader commitments while staying
within the parameters of a thin conception of the good? If that’s true, then Sandel’s
argument collapses; the insistence that we need a thick conception of the good is no
longer valid, because we can move from the premise that our talents are unowned to the
argument that they are collective assets without difficulty (or at least, without the
difficulties we have indicated). While Rawls does provide arguments for the difference
360
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principle itself, he doesn’t (to my knowledge) offer any justification of the shift from lack
of privileged claims on assets to generalized claims. As Hendley writes, “[t]o get to the
difference principle I need also to believe that other people are entitled to have an equal
say in the development of my assets and the distribution of what I have been able to make
of them, that they are ‘common assets’ in that sense.”361 Indeed, if the criticisms of
Nagel, Taylor and Sandel are on target, it is difficult (if not impossible) for Rawls to
coherently argue that the agents would choose the difference principle in the absence of a
thick conception of the good.
Assuming, therefore, that Sandel’s objection is valid, we are confronted with two
possibilities: either (1) Rawls abandons the idea that the agents’ choice of the difference
principle is comprehensible given the limitations of a thin theory (for exactly the reasons
articulated by Sandel) or (2) he retains the difference principle, but he recognizes that we
need a thick theory of the good in order to understand why the agents consent to a
principle of redistribution which is intended to benefit the least advantaged. On my
reading, Rawls implicitly endorses (2) (although he never, to my knowledge, offers an
explicit endorsement of (2)).

There is more than one example which demonstrates

Rawls’s implicit reliance on a thick(er) conception of the good than his premises allow,
but I will limit myself to briefly highlighting the arguments Rawls offers in favor of the
two principles. If we can demonstrate that Rawls admits (2), albeit indirectly, into the
justificatory premises of his theory, we will show that, at least within the parameters of
his own arguments, he presupposes ‘thick’ assumptions of the good. This saves him from
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the charge of incoherence, but it forces him to lift the prohibition on substantive
conceptions of the good in the original position.
According to Rawls, there are at least three reasons why the agents would choose
the two principles (I will label them as R1, 2 and 3). According to (R1) the agents “have
a capacity for justice”, which entails that they trust other agents will honor the contractual
agreement. But if others honor the agreement, then so should I. Therefore, the agent
won’t select principles unless s/he believes that s/he is able to comply with the
arrangement(s).362 As for (R2), it postulates that everyone’s conception of the good is
respected in a society governed by the two principles, and given its tolerance for differing
frameworks the regime is self-sustaining.363 Finally, (R3) states that “the public
recognition of the two principles gives greater support to men’s self-respect and this in
turn increases the effectiveness of social cooperation.”364
Bracketing the question as to whether or not Rawls offers compelling arguments in
favor of the two principles (or more precisely, the selection of the two principles), there
are two elements of Rawls’s defense which presuppose agents with a thick conception of
the good. The first is the “sense of justice”, invoked by Rawls in argument (R1). He
defines it as “an effective desire to comply with existing rules and to give one another
that to which they are entitled.”365 There are two components of the agent’s ‘sense of
justice’ which imply a thick conception of the good; he argues that the subjects have “an
effective desire to” (a) comply with existing rules and (b) distribute goods fairly. In
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either case, it is difficult to account for ‘sense of justice’ within the constraints imposed
by a thin theory of good.
Recall that a thin theory limits the scope of the agent’s motivation to
accumulating primary goods, understood in either social (i.e. “rights and liberties, powers
and opportunities, income and wealth”366, with self-respect representing an important, if
not the most important, example367) or natural (i.e. “health and vigor, intelligence and
imagination”)368 terms. Yet it is hard to extract either a desire to comply with rules, or a
theory of just deserts/entitlements, from the minimalist criteria of accumulating primary
goods. Even if we argue that generally honoring agreements works to the advantage of
agents by securing the conditions in which they can accumulate more, rather than fewer,
primary goods (so that if everyone complied with the terms of our agreement society
would be more stable, therefore allowing greater prosperity), establishing prudential
grounds for fidelity, it is difficult to characterize prudential compliance as an ‘effective
desire’. Indeed, ‘effective desire’ implies a stronger identification with the terms of
agreement, the kind of commitment which

is only decipherable given the agent’s

belonging to a community that s/he feels integrally linked to. Likewise, there are selfinterested reasons for desiring the establishment of a fair system of entitlement
distribution, but self-interested reasons will not convince us to select the difference
principle (why not, for example, opt for a meritocracy? It is true that I’m unsure whether
or not I will benefit from a meritocracy—because I’m situated behind the veil of
ignorance—but why not take the risk if there is the possibility of accumulating a larger
share of primary goods than I would receive under the difference principle?).
366
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But I had indicated that Rawls’s arguments presuppose a thick conception of the
good in another way besides its emphasis on “a sense of justice”; it also relies on the
concept of “self-respect” (I am thinking especially of R3, which asserts that the subjects
would choose the two principles because they “give greater support to men’s selfrespect”).

His definition of “self-respect” (or “self-esteem”; he uses the terms

interchangeably) contains two aspects: (1) “it includes a person’s sense of his own value,
his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, is worth carrying
out”369 and (2) it “implies a confidence in one’s own ability, so far as it is within one’s
power, to fulfill one’s intentions.”370 While Rawls lists “self-esteem” as a primary good
(and recall that, according to the parameters of a thin theory of the good, the agents try to
maximize the number of primary goods they acquire—therefore, they opt for principles
which guarantee their self-respect), it is difficult to understand how the subjects
articulate, or even develop, a concept of “self-respect” without the framework of a thick
conception of the good, or at least a sense of identity (which normally presupposes a
thick conception of the good). Indeed, to say that a person has “self-respect” is to
recognize that s/he strongly affirms his/her sense of identity.

While an agent’s

understanding of his/her identity is articulated in different and complex ways, the point of
my argument is straightforward: however the self’s identity is composed and/or
interpreted, it is clear that “self-respect” presupposes an identity, which in turn is formed,
at least in part, through the affirmation of a ‘thick conception of the good’. Even the
rebelling individualist’s challenge to community standards implicitly presupposes a thick
conception of the good; the challenge will either emerge because (to cite only two
369
370
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possibilities) (1) the community has violated its own moral traditions (for example, when
a conscientious objector in Western society invokes Augustinian just-war theory as a
justification for his/her refusal to participate in the community’s military conflict) or (2)
the member of a minority community with a conception of the good which differs
substantially from the society s/he lives in feels marginalized or isolated, and invokes
his/her thick conception as a challenge to the thick conception of the larger society. To
say that the agent chooses the two principles because they support his/her sense of selfesteem, therefore, already presupposes a thick conception of the good; otherwise, how
could s/he value self-respect? Or more precisely, if “self-respect” means, at least in part,
possessing a “sense of [our own] value”, how can we articulate self-worth, or even
understand why the self has value, in the absence of a thick conception of the good?
In short, then, Sandel’s position vis-à-vis the inescapability of substantive
frameworks is correct; we can only appreciate why an agent desires justice or selfrespect, or why s/he would choose the two principles (and specifically the difference
principle), if we abandon the limitations imposed by a thin theory of the good and
recognize that Rawls implicitly presupposes a thick theory of the good. The price of not
accepting this conclusion is borderline incoherence. A self which was cut off from its
constitutive foundations would have difficulty recognizing the importance of justice or
self-respect, thereby undermining the basic assumptions of Rawls’s argument. Up to this
point, therefore, I agree with the standard communitarian challenges to Rawls’s picture of
agency (or more specifically, the challenge that we can’t account for the agent’s
commitments without presupposing substantive frameworks). Now, however, I want to
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add a Nietzschean twist to the argument which highlights difficulties with both the liberal
and communitarian pictures of the self.

Excurses on Nietzsche: Towards a Genealogy of the Political Agent
Communitarians emphasize the importance of tradition and history in the formation of
moral/political agents. Yet they adopt an excessively deferential attitude towards the
values of society. By focusing on the homogeneity of community traditions/standards,
they fail to recognize the presence of antagonism, exclusion and hierarchy as constitutive
factors of identity. While liberalism overlooks the inescapability of moral frameworks,
therefore, communitarianism fails to acknowledge the violence of culture. In this section,
I will highlight Nietzsche’s genealogy of the political subject, which complicates both the
liberal and communitarian views of the self.

Against the liberal view of agency,

Nietzsche carries out a genealogy in order to reveal the origins of the capacity for
‘governance’, which is located in processes of habituation and discipline, but in
opposition to the communitarian picture of selfhood he emphasizes the brutality and
cruelty of ‘moral instruction’.
The key, or at least one of the keys, to Nietzsche’s discussion is the concept of
‘breeding’ (heranzuzüchten). In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche contrasts the
faculties of forgetting and memory. On the one hand, humans rely on forgetting, indeed
active forgetting, in order to experience the present;371 on the other, there is a “counter-
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device, memory, with the help of which forgetfulness can be suspended in certain
cases—namely, when a promise is made.”372 ‘Memory’ isn’t a passive phenomenon;
rather, it is an “active desire not to rid oneself” 373 (in the case of a promise, for example,
the intention to fulfill the terms of X’s original agreement, or as Deleuze writes vis-à-vis
Nietzsche’s argument, “[r]emembering the promise that has been made is not recalling
that it was made at a particular past moment, but that one must hold it at a future
moment”374). Likewise, remembrance assists, at least indirectly, the redemption of speech
acts (“I promise that…”); without memory, there is no bridge to the past—our connection
is destroyed by the flux of time.375 In addition, the utterance of a promise assumes the
ability to calculate, to control our environment (leaving aside the possibility of intentional
deception for purposes of self-enrichment, why would I make a promise unless I assumed
I could fulfill its conditions? ); “and before he can do this, man himself will really have to
become reliable, regular, automatic [notwendig]…so that he, as someone making a
promise is, is answerable for his own future!”376 Indeed, “the particular task of breeding
an animal which has the right to make a promise includes, as we have already
understood, as precondition and preparation, the more immediate task of first making
man to a certain degree undeviating [notwendig], uniform, a peer amongst peers, orderly
and consequently predictable.”377
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But how did we become ‘orderly’? Here Nietzsche refers to Daybreak (published
six years earlier, in 1881), where he described the “morality of custom” as obedience to
traditional

principles;

historically,

morality

was

understandings which regulated social behavior.378

represented

by

conventional

We learn moral laws from the

community, and by following normative commands, we become ‘regular’ and
‘calculable’.379

Morality is oriented towards the stability and preservation of the

community;380 it reflects a system of ordering which expresses the needs or priorities of
what Nietzsche calls the “herd” (Heerde).381 Nietzsche argues that ‘individualism’ was
viewed as a challenge to tradition and the collective ‘herd’ morality of society; ‘evil’ was
synonymous with freedom, capriciousness, the uncanny; in short, the “incalculable”382.
Indeed, before we could attribute ‘responsibility’ to humans, it was necessary to ‘breed’ a
docile subject (to use Foucault’s term), a moral/political agent who was obedient to the
law (and therefore ‘predictable’).383 The process of ‘breeding’, however, was tortuous;
Nietzsche characterizes it as a “technique of mnemonics.”384 A law is remembered more
effectively if the mark of its transgression is seared into the flesh; accordingly, “[w]hen
man decided he had to make a memory for himself, it never happened without blood,
torments and sacrifices”385 (i.e. killing the firstborn, castration, public executions, etc.)
He continues, noting that “[w]ith the aid of such images and procedures, man was

378

Cf. Morgenröthe in KGe Abt. 5, Bd. 1; trans. as Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality by
R.J. Hollingdale, eds. Maudemarie Clarke and Brian Leiter (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), I, 9.
379
Genealogy, II, 2.
380
Cf. Jenseits von Gut und Böse in KGe, Abt. 6, Bd. 2; trans. as Beyond Good and Evil by Marion Faber
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), V, 201.
381
In Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, in KGe, Abt. 5, Bd. 2; trans. as The Gay Science by Josefine Nauckhoff
and Adrian del Caro, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), III, 116.
382
Daybreak, I, 9.
383
Genealogy, II, 2.
384
Ibid., II, 3.
385
Ibid.

134
eventually able to retain five or six ‘I don’t want to’s’ in his memory, in connection with
which a promise has been made, in order to enjoy the advantages of society”.386 He tries,
in short, to summarize the historical process of becoming ‘moral’ in a concise formula:
“all the means by which humanity was meant to have been made moral so far were
fundamentally immoral.”387
The community, therefore, encourages the formation of ‘docile bodies’, obedient
subjects who are ‘orderly’ and ‘predictable’; they are capable, in short, of making (and
keeping) their promises. Yet what is produced at the end of the lengthy historical
disciplinary process? Is it only a servile agent who yields to the demands of moral law,
demands which are couched in the language of beneficence, virtue or categorical
imperatives but are actually strategies for communal self-preservation?

Nietzsche

answers the question in the following passage:
The immense amount of labour involved in what I have called the ‘morality of
custom’, the actual labour of man on himself during the longest epoch of the
human race, his whole labour before history, is explained and justified on a grand
scale, in spite of the hardness, tyranny, stupidity and idiocy it also contained, by
this fact: with the help of the morality of custom and the social straitjacket, man
was made truly predictable. Let us place ourselves, on the other hand, at the end
of this immense process where the tree actually bears fruit, where society and its
morality of custom finally reveal what they were simply the means to: we then
find the sovereign individual as the ripest fruit on its tree, like only to itself,
having freed itself from custom, an autonomous, supra-ethical individual.388
In other words, through agonizing rituals of punishment and torture, the “the morality of
custom” (which Nietzsche characterizes as ‘tyranny’ [Tyrannei], ‘stupidity’ [Stumpfsinn]
and ‘idiocy’ [Idiotismus]), conditions the subject to obey the law. The self therefore
becomes ‘orderly’ and ‘predictable’ insofar as s/he will consistently recognize, and
386
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comply with, moral/legal prohibitions.

But Nietzsche adds an unexpected twist to the

argument: the agent who emerges at the end of the historical process is liberated from
custom; s/he has become an “autonomous, supra-ethical individual”. Thus, the morality
of tradition leads to its own renunciation. As Keith Ansell-Pearson writes, “the process
by which man’s existence becomes moralized is one in which, in its beginnings, operates
by coercion and violence; but once the human animal has become disciplined it is, at least
potentially, capable of living beyond morality (Sittlichkeit) and autonomously.”389
In moral/political theory, there is generally a failure to understand the complex ways
in which ‘freedom’ is related to disciplinary strategies, or is a residue of historical
circumstances; there is no recognition of the dense networks of power which condition
the behavior of citizens, which transform them into ‘regular’ or ‘calculable’ agents who
will honor the contract (and who know, furthermore, that the other agents will also honor
their agreement, because they too are ‘calculable’). If Nietzsche’s analysis is correct,
however, then the liberal, as well as the communitarian, pictures of the self demand
revision.

Nietzsche’s genealogy of the political agent highlights the fact that the

‘autonomous’ subject who is capable of entering into (and honoring) contracts (i.e. the
‘free’ subject, responsible for his/her destiny) is him or herself the product of a lengthy
historical process, a process in which the subject becomes predictable, calculable, regular
and at the same time ‘autonomous’. As Keith Ansell-Pearson has emphasized, Nietzsche
highlights the communitarian point that rational and ‘free’ political agents emerge from a
history, from a process of socialization, while at the same time recognizing that the self’s
identification with (or at least sharing of) the community’s ethos reflects a contingent
389
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membership390, a classic liberal insight; in addition, he shares the liberal desire for
escaping from parochial norms that are imposed on the subject by custom and
tradition.391

Indeed, Nietzsche’s suspicion vis-à-vis the constraints of provincialism

(notice the way that he describes the ‘morality of custom’, and more specifically the
‘labor’ it carries out in the name of creating a ‘predictable’ subject: it is ‘tyranny’
[Tyrannei], ‘stupidity’ [Stumpfsinn] and ‘idiocy’ [Idiotismus]) exhibits traces of liberal
modernity’s distrust towards communitarian frameworks; he valorizes the ‘autonomous’
subject who towers over his/her future at the end of custom’s ‘civilizing’ process, yet he
executes a genealogical investigation which, once again, reveals the disciplinary origins
of liberal freedom, the ignonimous birth of agents who are able to keep their promises.
Thus, in order to understand, or at least characterize, the subject behind the veil of
ignorance, the person who is willing to enter into, and honor, his or her contracts, it is
necessary to return to the violent history of political animals, a history which is shrouded
in forgetfulness (or more precisely, oblivion) behind the veil of ignorance.

It is a

narrative of ‘tyranny’ and ‘stupidity’, but an important, indeed unavoidable, history for
liberal political theory, which prioritizes freedom as the telos of social organization.
Liberalism must confront its subject’s genealogy; it must confront the ambiguity of the
contract’s stability, a stability which is located, at least in part, in the rituals of obedience
and memory which contributed, paradoxically enough, towards freedom. Once again,
therefore, we see the mutually reinforcing architectonic in which the macro-body of
society is supported and stabilized by micro-bodies who ‘legitimize’ it through the social
390
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contract, but this legitimation conceals the intervention of disciplinary mechanisms which
produce subjects who are capable of exercising the kinds of self-regulation necessary for
becoming ‘autonomous’ and ‘free’. If Nietzsche is right, then, we can offer a different
account of why the original position marginalizes embodiment: the body carries traces of
history, and the genealogy of ‘autonomous’ subjects, as I tried to indicate above, reveals
the violence and coercion which marks the political agent; the veil of ignorance obscures
a narrative of disciplinary power which is hidden behind its abstraction.

On this

interpretation, the original position actually represses, or is simply oblivious to, the
memory of liberalism’s foundations; in either case, a genealogical approach forces us to
critically examine Rawls’s account, since it reminds us that the subjects who arrive at a
consensus based on ‘non-coercive’ deliberation are, in actually, intertwined with an
elaborate history of force and power.
social contract theories re-emerge:

Likewise, the by now familiar problems with
while they pretend to inclusivity, they actually

exclude certain conceptions of the good (in Rawls’s case, we exclude theories which are
incompatible with principles of tolerance, pluralism, etc.) and they emphasize freedom
while remaining oblivious to the complicated genealogy of political agents.
If the Nietzschean analysis I am proposing is correct, however, it intersects with
other critical perspectives, especially Iris Marion Young’s argument that the original
position marginalizes what she calls “the particularity of bodily being.”392 The veil of
ignorance effaces the desires and passions of a concretely situated agent; in describing
persons as hyper-rational subjects who try to maximize the number of goods distributed
to the parties they represent via a bargaining process, they “are not moved by
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affection.”393 In other words, they are disembodied, spectral entities, cut off from their
constitutive histories and the emotional bonds and desires which characterize human
sociality. Rawls defends the limitations imposed by the veil of ignorance by noting that
features such as race, class and gender (or more broadly conceptions of the good) are
morally irrelevant features of rational agents which threaten to bias deliberation.394 Yet
even from a liberal perspective the necessity of bracketing complex histories of
socialization (which include, presumably, the moral assumptions that are a part of
cultural systems) is questioned; Jürgen Habermas, for example, argues that it is possible
to operationalize the requirements of moral neutrality without eliminating the histories
and worldviews of moral agents by instituting the procedural mechanisms outlined in his
discourse ethics.395
Where Rawls aims for generality, therefore, I have tried to highlight the ways in
which his theory continues to rely on the particular; where he defends the procedural
neutrality of his approach, I have countered that he implicitly presupposes controversial
assumptions which are themselves in need of defense (and therefore hardly suitable for
impartially regulating disputes between conceptions of the good). In short, I have tried to
demonstrate that Rawls’s attempts to construct a liberal theory which is suitably neutral
393
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vis-à-vis the different comprehensive doctrines in a pluralist society fails, since he can’t
escape the constraints of a thick theory of the good, as well as arguing that his theory of
agency in the original position fails to recognize the complicated genealogy of
‘sovereign’ political agents. In both cases, I have contested Rawls’s pretensions to
generality; with regard to my questions vis-à-vis neutrality, I have challenged the idea
that justice as fairness is capable of acting as a neutral arbitrator between conceptions of
the good, since it is premised on a specific.

Exclusion in Political Liberalism
Yet Rawls himself begins to recognize, or at least emphasize, the political contingency of
justice as fairness. Indeed, the recognition of its specificity becomes the departure point
for Rawls’s attempts, beginning in the early eighties, to transform his interpretation of
justice as fairness.

I will now turn, then, to the arguments outlined in Rawls’s other

major work, Political Liberalism, in order to highlight the ways in which exclusion
continues to operate, even in his later work (which is supposedly more congenial to
pluralism). In “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” he formulates a new
reading of his project. According to Rawls, his earlier work (especially A Theory of
Justice) failed to highlight the idea that justice as fairness is not intended as a matrix for
regulating political conceptions in general, nor is it the practical application of a given set
of moral principles to the basic structure of society (although he is open to the possibility
that justice as fairness is applicable to non-democratic regimes).396 Rather, it is tailored
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to the exigencies of “modern constitutional democracies”.397 It articulates a framework
for ordering “the political, social, and economic institutions” of democratic societies,398
and it tries to “draw solely upon intuitive ideas that are embedded in the political
institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the public traditions of their
interpretation.”399 Rawls’s theory of justice, therefore, is now understood as a conception
which specifically applies to contemporary liberal democracies.
How is the reinterpreted project different from earlier versions of justice as
fairness?

In Political Liberalism (published in 1993), where Rawls develops the

implications of his new trajectory, he characterizes the transition as a shift from
“comprehensive” to “political” doctrines.

As I had mentioned in my discussion of

contemporary liberalism’s topography, Rawls defines comprehensive doctrines as moral
theories which address questions such as the worth of human life, the nature of virtue,
ideals of friendship and principles of association.400 In short, it offers guidance for the
conduct of life.401 Political doctrines, on the other hand, deal with how we should
organize the basic structure of society (rather than the totality of human existence).402 As
Rawls notes, it “involves, so far as possible, no wider commitment to any other
doctrine.”403

As an example of the difference, he mentions the contrast between

utilitarianism, which is a generalizable moral conception that cuts across the
public/private distinction (since at least in theory the principle of utility regulates nonpolitical conduct in addition to questions of the public good), and the more limited aims
397
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of a political theory, which addresses questions pertaining to the organization of
economic and social institutions.404
Rawls’s new interpretation of justice as fairness hinges on the distinction between
comprehensive and political doctrines, and more specifically their relation the question of
‘stability’. In order to appreciate the importance of ‘stability’ for Rawls’s argument,
however, it is important to return, at least momentarily, to A Theory of Justice. In
Theory, Rawls was primarily concerned with offering a rationale for why the parties in
the original position would choose the two principles of justice. But Rawls also insisted
on the importance of the relative “stability” offered by a given conception of justice. He
defines “stability” vis-à-vis “schemes of social cooperation”, arguing that a scheme
exhibits stability insofar as it is “more or less regularly complied with and its basic rules
willingly acted upon; and when infractions occur, stabilizing forces should exist that
prevent further violations and tend to restore the arrangement”.405 A conception of
justice is “defective” if it is unable to generate its own support (i.e. if “it fails to engender
in human beings the requisite desire to act on it”).406
While Theory argued that justice as fairness established the conditions for a
stable, well-ordered regime, Political Liberalism offers a negative reappraisal of the
earlier claims regarding justice as fairness’s ability to generate wide-ranging solidarity.
Rawls now describes Theory’s argument as presupposing a comprehensive doctrine, and
he characterizes his inability to recognize its comprehensive nature as producing
“unrealistic” expectations concerning the idea of a well-ordered society. He elaborates in
the following passage: “An essential feature of a well-ordered society associated with
404

Ibid., 12-13.
Cf. A Theory of Justice 6/6.
406
Ibid., 455/398.
405

142
justice as fairness is that all of its citizens endorse this conception on the basis of what I
now call a comprehensive philosophical doctrine. They accept, as rooted in this doctrine,
its two principles.”407
The difficulty, however, is that contemporary liberal democracies are pluralistic
(i.e. they include a multiplicity of comprehensive doctrines), and they contain
incommensurable (while at the same time reasonable) theories.408 According to Rawls, A
Theory of Justice failed to take the problem of incommensurability into account. His new
theory, which he calls “political liberalism”, tries to address the unavoidable facticity of
difference.409 He characterizes political liberalism’s attitude towards pluralism in the
following way: “Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise
of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional
democratic regime.”410 Again, there is an important contrast between political liberalism
and the ‘comprehensive liberalisms’ of Kant and Mill (as well as Rawls’s own earlier
formulations of justice as fairness) since they prioritize the value of autonomy in a way
which transcends the political sphere (while at the same time privileging the value of
autonomy in the public sphere); as Rawls notes, there are reasonable conceptions of the
good which reject the strong liberal defense of freedom (for example, reasonable
theological conceptions)411. Given that their justifications for liberalism are grounded in
controversial ideas of the good, and are therefore not shared by every member of a
407
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democratic society (or not even a majority of citizens), “[t]hey are not a practicable
public basis of a political conception of justice, and I [Rawls] suspect the same is true of
many liberalisms besides those of Kant and Mill.”412
In order to avoid the difficulties associated with imposing a comprehensive
doctrine on a pluralistic democratic society, therefore, Rawls argues that we need a
theory which provides a basis for social unity without relying on the strong assumptions
of a comprehensive doctrine.

In opposition to comprehensive liberalisms, political

liberalism (which as I had mentioned above begins with the recognition of irreducible
pluralism) offers a foundation for constitutional democracies which is no longer
grounded in, for example, controversial assumptions concerning the superiority of
Millian autonomy; rather, it searches for what Rawls labels an “overlapping consensus”
between “reasonable comprehensive doctrines”.413 While Theory was primarily
concerned with defending the original position (and the two principles chosen in the
hypothetical scenario), Political Liberalism shifts the argumentative focus to the question
of stability. But now we encounter a new series of questions: what is a “reasonable
comprehensive doctrine”? And why is an “overlapping consensus” vis-à-vis reasonable
comprehensive doctrines important? Here it is useful to examine Rawls’s terminology,
which will also assist us in understanding the differences between comprehensive and
political liberalisms.
As a preface to defining the conceptual scope of “reasonable comprehensive
doctrines”, it is first of all necessary to highlight Rawls’s discussion of “reasonableness”
as it applies to persons, since his definition of “reasonable comprehensive doctrines”, and
412
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the role it plays in political liberalism, is closely related to the reasonableness of agents.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls explicitly privileges what he calls a ‘political’ conception
of the person. The ‘political’ conception of persons matches the democratic basis of
justice as fairness (which, as I noted earlier, is indexed to the specific requirements of
constitutional democratic regimes). Thus, a person is an agent “who can be a citizen, that
is, a normal and fully cooperating member of society over a complete life.”414 Citizens
are understood in addition as “free and equal persons” with two moral powers, namely “a
capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good” (once again expressing,
or trying to express, intuitive assumptions of democratic culture).415 According to Rawls,
“reasonableness” is a moral virtue or character trait exhibited by persons (although, as we
will see shortly, he also identifies comprehensive doctrines as “reasonable” or
“unreasonable”), and it consists of two basic aspects: (1) Agents are reasonable when
they are willing to offer (as well as honor) fair principles regulating social cooperation
(assuming that other agents are also willing to honor the principles in question)416 and (2)
they recognize what Rawls labels the “burdens of judgment” and the role they play in the
legitimation of political power.417 I will now examine the two aspects in turn.
First of all, agents are willing to propose (and accept) fair terms of social
cooperation. By “fair” terms we mean rules which are generally applicable, and that the
agent believes it would be reasonable for other parties in society to accept. They are
willing to defend (presumably via discursive argumentation) their own candidates for fair
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terms of cooperation, in addition to examining the candidates offered by other parties.418
Conversely, persons are unreasonable insofar as they benefit, or at least intend to benefit,
from schemes of cooperation without honoring principles governing the fair terms of
cooperation (except, as Rawls notes, “as a necessary public pretense” for continuing to
exploit the principles they are, in actuality, unwilling to honor).419
Secondly, agents are willing to recognize the burdens of judgment, as well as the
consequences they entail for the legitimation of public power. There are, then, two
components of (2): (2a) the burdens of judgment and (2b) the entailments of their
acceptance for the exercise of power. As for (2a), Rawls defines the burdens of judgment
as “the sources, or causes, of disagreement between reasonable persons”.420 Examples of
‘burdens of judgment’ include evidence which is ambiguous, and therefore subject to
multiple interpretations, disagreements about which considerations are relevant in
decision-making procedures, indeterminate concepts, different frameworks for assessing
evidence, conflicting normative assumptions and the necessity of choosing between
equally important moral/political values.421

While Rawls admits that self-interest or

prejudice also lead to disagreements, he classifies them as “unreasonable” sources of
disagreement “which stand in marked contrast to everyone’s being reasonable.”422 (2b)
encompasses the agent’s capacity for recognizing that even under ideal conditions of
discussion, in which the interlocutors are fully rational and conscientiously seeking the
truth (and with minimal constraints imposed on the parameters of dialogue) it is still
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impossible in certain instances to reach a shared conclusion.423 The recognition of this
fact leads reasonable persons to affirm the importance of tolerance for differing
comprehensive doctrines in a pluralistic democratic society; more specifically, they
believe that “liberty of conscience and freedom of thought” should be extended to other
citizens, assuming they are also reasonable424 and that it is “unreasonable for us to use
political power, should we possess it, or share it with others, to repress comprehensive
views that are not unreasonable.”425
Now that we have discussed Rawls’s definition of reasonableness as it applies to
persons, we can turn to his examination of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. He
begins by assuming that reasonable persons necessarily affirm comprehensive
doctrines.426

A reasonable comprehensive doctrine exhibits, in turn, three primary

characteristics: (1) “it covers the major religious, philosophical and moral aspects of
human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner”,427 (2) it attributes
overarching importance to certain values, and it is capable of balancing out equally
important values when they conflict428 and (3) it generally references, or at least
presupposes, a shared tradition of thought and value.429
Once again, political liberalism acknowledges the fact that there are incommensurable,
yet reasonable, comprehensive doctrines in democratic regimes. How, then, does it
propose to establish a basis for social unity and stability?

In order to answer that

question, we need to introduce Rawls’s idea of an “overlapping consensus.”
423
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“overlapping consensus” is arrived at when a set of reasonable comprehensive doctrines
agree on political conceptions of justice to order a given society.430 The formation of an
overlapping consensus indicates that reasonable persons agree to conduct their
discussions of public matters in terms which are “acceptable to their common human
reason”431; thus, “[o]nly a political conception of justice that all citizens might be
reasonably expected to endorse can serve as a basis for public reason and justification.”432
The domain of the political, furthermore, is separated from what Rawls labels voluntary
“associational” relationships (which are institutions within civil society: an obvious
example is membership in a church), since we enter political society at birth and exit it at
death,433 as well as the “personal and familial, which are affectional…in ways the
political is not”434; therefore, it exhibits an autonomy in relation to other, non-political
spheres. It “is a formulation of highly significant (moral) values that properly apply to
basic political institutions; it gives a specification of certain special features of the
political relationship, as distinct from other relationships.”435
Rawls highlights two important points concerning an “overlapping consensus”. First
of all, he distinguishes between “reasonable pluralism” and the empirical fact of
pluralism.

The first term pertains to the diversity of heterogeneous but reasonable

comprehensive

doctrines,

while

the

comprehensive doctrines actually exist.
430

latter

simply

emphasizes

that

differing

To be more precise, the fact of pluralism
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encompasses reasonable as well as unreasonable doctrines (i.e. it recognizes that both
reasonable and unreasonable doctrines are part of contemporary liberal societies) while
“reasonable pluralism” is a category which, by definition, excludes unreasonable
theories.436 An overlapping consensus includes reasonable comprehensive doctrines, but
excludes

unreasonable

ones

(since

on

Rawls’s

interpretation,

unreasonable

comprehensive doctrines “reject one or more democratic freedoms”437, which is—
unsurprisingly—a necessary condition for participating in the liberal democratic regime
Rawls is arguing for).438 Secondly, a political conception of justice is “freestanding”
insofar as it isn’t derived from a particular comprehensive doctrine.439 While it is true
that we can justify Rawls’s political conception from the standpoint of any reasonable
comprehensive doctrine (or so he argues), it is not the case that a defense of justice as
fairness relies on, for example, a Millian or Kantian comprehensive doctrine which
privileges autonomy. Rather,
the political conception is a module, an essential constituent part, that fits into and
can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in
the society regulated by it. This means that it can be presented without saying, or
knowing, or hazarding a conjecture about, what such doctrines it may belong to,
or be supported by.440
While Rawls offers different examples of how the argument works concretely, there is
one which is worth mentioning since it illustrates the application especially well. He
contrasts the utilitarian’s attachment to a comprehensive doctrine regulated by, obviously,
the principle of maximizing utility, which applies to a variety of relationships, with the
political conception of justice’s attempt to formulate an argument which applies only to
436

Ibid., 36.
Ibid., 64.
438
Ibid., 144.
439
Ibid., 12.
440
Ibid.
437

149
the basic structure of society (and does not, at least according to Rawls, presuppose
controversial ethical theories in order to justify its reasoning).441
Now that we have examined the key components of Rawls’s argument(s) concerning
political liberalism’s efforts to articulate a basis for stability in pluralistic democracies, I
want to highlight the ways in which exclusionary logics continue to operate as
mechanisms for producing a unified social body. Recall that citizens agree to conduct
political discourse in terms of “common human reason”, or what Rawls also christens
“public reason.” Rawls notes that “in a democratic society public reason is the reason of
equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over
one another in enacting laws and in amending the constitution” (my italics).442 Thus,
persons who affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines form an overlapping consensus
around core principles of liberal tolerance, a consensus which is legitimated, at last in
part, through the shared discursive framework of “public reason”. Reasonable citizens
form a collective body which exercises “final political and coercive power” in order to
maintain the stability, and more importantly unity, of society.
In wielding sovereign power, however, it is important to ask who, precisely, they
are wielding it against. Rawls says that it is “over one another”, and surely that is true
(since agreeing to the terms of the social contract means consenting to the authority of the
newly formed political body). Yet we can also presume that coercive power is directed
against the persons who affirm “unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines. In an essay
dealing with the question of unreasonable persons in Rawls’s re-worked version of justice
as fairness, Marilyn Friedman highlights an interesting footnote which has, to my
441
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knowledge, received no attention in the secondary literature, but undoubtedly deserves
closer scrutiny. The context of the remark is Rawls’s examination of the difference
between “reasonable” pluralism and the fact of pluralism as such; in conceding that
democratic societies always contain persons with unreasonable comprehensive doctrines,
he directs the reader’s attention to a footnote in which he writes the following: “That
there are doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself a permanent fact
of life. This gives us the practical task of containing them—like war or disease—so that
they do not overturn political justice” (my italics).443
Friedman is, quite appropriately, concerned about Rawls’s language, and wonders
how one “contains” a worldview.

As she correctly observes, the typical strategies

include extensive regulation of the media in which ideas are transmitted, as well as
prohibiting, or severely curtailing, the right to express one’s ideas.444

Indeed, the

language Rawls uses forces us to agree with Friedman’s assessment that “supporters of
certain unreasonable doctrines, in particular those that reject democratic freedoms, will
be treated like the bearers of a pestilence.”445 While it would be tempting to dismiss
Friedman’s characterization as hyperbolic, Rawls’s own terminology lends credence to
her interpretation. Here we see an example of the body politic re-emerging, this time in
the context of a project which is explicitly dedicated to respecting pluralism in
contemporary democratic societies. And we encounter, as in the canonical texts of
liberalism, a desire to purge and cleanse the social body (Rawls’s term is “collective
body”), to eliminate the traces of difference, which are signs of disease (although, to be
443
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fair to Rawls, he argues we should “contain” them: returning briefly to Foucault, I am
tempted to wonder if the leprosarium is a potential model.)

What is even more

remarkable is the presence of such discourse, i.e. the discourse of expurgation, in the text
of a liberal with ‘impeccable’ credentials (arguably the most important liberal theorist of
the twentieth century) who is, at least ostensibly, interested in defending principles of
tolerance.
On a charitable interpretation, Rawls’s language is unnecessarily provocative, but
it should not be interpreted literally. It is certainly feasible to argue that he is only
drawing an analogy, suggesting that the ‘task’ of ‘containing’ unreasonable doctrines is
similar to procedures for containing war or disease.

Yet even if Rawls’s own

terminology is ‘simply’ rhetorical, with an excessive flourish of condemnation leveled
against the enemies of democracy, there is still the legitimate question as to whether or
not his exclusionary terminology reveals a deeper, more problematic logic of
marginalization.

According to Friedman, there are two difficulties with Rawls’s

argument for excluding “unreasonable people/doctrines”.

First of all, he bars

unreasonable agents/doctrines from participating in the overlapping consensus which
legitimates constitutional rule. One of the key criteria for determining a doctrine’s
unreasonableness, however, is its willingness (or lack thereof) to affirm democratic
freedoms. Therefore, the argument exhibits a vicious, question-begging circularity.446
Secondly, political liberalism marginalizes unreasonable doctrines because they threaten
to seize state power and wield it coercively against ‘reasonable’ persons. Interestingly
enough, however, Rawls defends the same machinery of coercion in order to guarantee
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the stability of his ‘well-ordered society’.447 Thus, political liberalism’s strategy for
‘containing’ the dangers represented by unreasonable persons/doctrines violates, or at
least appears to violate, the normative principles which supposedly justify the act of
exclusion.
While Friedman’s criticisms are powerful, Rawls anticipates the first charge, or
at least a similar objection, in Political Liberalism. One of the arguments against justice
as fairness is that it is arbitrarily biased against non-liberal conceptions of the good.
Rawls admits that identifying certain conceptions of the good as ‘permissible’ inevitably
requires us to exclude the doctrines which are classified as ‘impermissible’, and he
highlights two reasons why comprehensive doctrines are excluded: (1) their “associated
ways of life may be in direct conflict with principles of justice” or (2) “they may be
admissible but fail to gain adherents under the political and social conditions of a just
constitutional regime.”448 As an example of (1) Rawls mentions the case of racial or
ethnic oppression which is justified by appeals to perfectionist arguments (such as the
institution of slavery in Athens or the antebellum American South).449 He illustrates (2),
meanwhile, with the example of an intolerant religious conception of the good which is
only capable of surviving in a regime if it is able to control state power and direct the
coercive force of government against non-believers.450 In a well-ordered liberal society
which is regulated by the affirmation of reasonable pluralism, such comprehensive
doctrines will presumably, to quote Rawls, “cease to exist.”451

While he argues,

following Isaiah Berlin, that the finite social space of political liberalism is a regrettable
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fact of democratic societies (since it leads to the disintegration of non-liberal conceptions
of the good452), he contends that, in and of itself, the empirical observation concerning
necessary exclusions fails to establish that political liberalism is arbitrarily biased or
unjust. We have to argue, in addition, that political liberalism fails to provide a just basic
structure, such that it prohibits, or effectively discourages, the replication of
“permissible” comprehensive doctrines across generations.453
Yet it is unclear how Rawls’s argument challenges the criticism of Friedman,
which relates to the problem of circularity. Even if we conditionally assume that political
liberalism allows, indeed encourages, the reproduction of “permissible” forms of life,
Rawls still fails to provide a justification for why, precisely, we offer an initial priority to
‘reasonable’ comprehensive doctrines (which, it is important to recall, are defined very
specifically as affirming “democratic freedoms”). In other words, if Rawls is correct to
assert that political liberalism isn’t arbitrarily biased or unjust, it is only because his
conceptions of ‘bias’ and ‘injustice’ are defined within the parameters of political
liberalism itself. Thus, Friedman is correct to highlight the argument’s circularity. While
the charge of circularity is less damaging for a political theory which openly recognizes
its historical contingency (as is the case, for example, with left or right
communitarianisms) and the impossibility of achieving an Archimedean point of conflict
resolution, it represents a significant problem for liberalism, which celebrates its ability to
provide a neutral framework for adjudicating disputes.
The other difficulty indicated by Friedman concerns political liberalism’s
willingness to appropriate the machinery of state coercion against non-liberal theories.
452
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The significance of Friedman’s argument is not, however, the fact that it exposes a selfcontradiction in Rawls’s argument (which is her interpretation of the criticism454); rather,
Rawls’s defense of using coercion against ‘unreasonable’ persons/comprehensive
doctrines highlights the necessity of addressing questions of power, even for a political
theory which is dedicated to consensus-building, dialogue and tolerance. As Friedman
notes, Rawls performs a sleight of hand by characterizing the opponents of political
liberalism as ‘unreasonable’, an epithet which “masks the fundamentally political and
contested nature of the notion.”455 If the persons/doctrines that reject political liberalism
are ‘unreasonable’, then the implication, or at least one potential implication, is that
political liberalism is rationally justified in marginalizing ‘irrational’ forces which
threaten to undermine the liberal consensus. But the conclusion hardly follows; another
interpretation is that Rawls pretends to substitute the tribunal of rationality, which is a
‘neutral’ arbitrator, for an exclusion which is actually political in nature. Chantal Mouffe
makes the same essential point; she notes that, according to Rawls, ‘reasonable’ persons
are persons “who have realized their two moral powers to a degree sufficient to be free
and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who have an enduring desire to honor
fair terms of cooperation and to be fully cooperating members of society.”456 When the
unreasonable parties are marginalized, then, it appears that the exclusions fulfill the
demands of political morality. Once again, however, invoking the language of morality
conceals the way(s) in which the exclusions are political in character; as Mouffe
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observes, “it allows Rawls to present as a moral exigency what is really a political
decision.”457
An even more damaging form of exclusion, however, is the bracketing of
comprehensive doctrines required in order to enter into the overlapping consensus.
Robert B. Talisse, for example, offers the following case458: assume that a utilitarian
believes that the state (or more generally political institutions) should be organized
according to the Greatest Happiness Principle, and that its justice (or lack thereof) resides
in the public sector’s ability to maximize happiness. In order for the utilitarian to
demonstrate his or her ‘reasonableness’ and join the overlapping consensus, however,
s/he must bracket the norms of his or her comprehensive doctrine and agree to abide by
the political morality of liberalism. Thus, the ‘reasonable utilitarian’ we have constructed
believes (1) that the state is just if and only if it maximizes happiness, but (2) s/he must
suspend his or her beliefs qua utilitarian in the political sphere, since they represent a
comprehensive doctrine.459

This leaves the ‘reasonable utilitarian’ in the difficult

position of affirming that the state is legitimate, even though it is not just (except, as
Talisse notes, when policies accidentally maximize utility460). As Talisse writes, “Rawls
is demanding that the utilitarian revise his position in light of the ‘fact’ of reasonable
pluralism such that the utilitarian would be able to pursue justice—the greatest
happiness—only within a non-‘political’ sphere that leaves out all government policy.
But it is not clear…why the utilitarian should hesitate to enforce utilitarianism.”461
Clearly the point applies to other comprehensive doctrines; indeed, it is interesting to
457
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speculate on whether or not the early, comprehensively-inclined Rawls would be
regarded as ‘unreasonable’ by the later Rawls’s overlapping consensus. In any case, if
the fit between utilitarianism and liberalism is awkward, it is easy to imagine the
borderline incoherence of asking, say, a socialist or neoconservative to embrace the
overlapping consensus.462
Not only is it problematic to ask a citizen to bracket his/her comprehensive views
when they enter into an overlapping consensus, however; it’s also unclear that we can
appeal to a single conception of public reason, since (as James Bohman notes) in a truly
diverse society there are heterogeneous conceptions of what constitutes the public sphere
(corresponding to the pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, cultural assumptions, etc.)463
In addition, it is important to highlight the difficulty of maintaining a rigorous
demarcation between the public and private spheres.

I have already indicated the

difficulties with sociological distinctions between the public and private spheres in
previous chapters, yet we can also highlight ways in which the problematic status of the
sociological distinctions affects Rawls’s normative arguments; as Susan Moller Okin
reminds us, for example, there are religions which systematically undermine the equality
of women by promoting a hierarchical model of gender relations. Is it actually feasible,
she wonders, to argue that women can become fully valued and recognized participants in
the political sphere when significant percentages of the citizenry hold private beliefs
which systematically erode the very ideals political liberalism supposedly defends?464
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In the final analysis, of course, any political theory will exclude persons or
comprehensive doctrines which are incompatible with the system in question. As Carl
Schmitt notes, even the concept “humanity” has a political meaning; indeed, the wars
which are fought for “humanitarian” purposes are often the most violent and
destructive.465

The problem for liberalism, however, is that it pretends to radical

pluralism and inclusivity, to value-neutrality, when it employs the same (or at least
formally similar) political mechanisms of exclusion as other theoretical approaches.
There is, then, more than a measure of disingenuousness to Rawls’s argument. We
should recognize, therefore, the necessity of certain exclusions, but also characterize
them honestly as political decisions (a fact which is concealed by retreating into
discourses of impartiality, rationality, deontology, etc.). At the same time, we should
exercise caution in defending political exclusions. Categories such as ‘reason’ were used
to exclude women, non-Caucasians, the poor and the ‘mad’ from legitimation pools (as
we saw, for example, in the political theory of Locke); indeed, ‘rational’ scientific
discourses were mobilized against ‘inferior’ groups to justify their political
marginalization. Such an observation is not, of course, an indictment of reason tout
court; as Foucault notes, there are multiple rationalities, which intersect and diverge in
complicated ways.466 It is, however, a reminder that supposedly value-neutral concepts
have a complicated, and highly politicized, history.
In the next chapter, I want to examine the question of exclusion/inclusion, and
more specifically the politics of exclusion/inclusion, in greater detail. Throughout the
465
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dissertation, I have criticized liberalism’s assumptions about its neutrality, focusing on
the way(s) in which the unity of the body politic is preserved through a theoretical
defense of exclusionary logics, as well as the subtle (and not so subtle) emphasis on
technologies of ‘disciplinary inclusion’, which shape docile bodies into ‘autonomous’
subjects. In short, I have underscored liberalism’s reliance on exclusion/inclusion in
order to form a ‘unified’ social body, and the disconcerting resonances between certain
aspects of liberal political theory and the rhetoric/practices of its authoritarian enemies.
In the final chapter, I will offer a different way of thinking about exclusion/inclusion
which abandons the chimerical search for ‘neutrality’ by openly thematizing the question
of power’s deployment in contemporary societies. In trying to construct a theory which
avoids a direct confrontation (albeit in the interests of discovering the conditions for an
undistorted consensus) with the dynamics of power and the conditions of social
interaction, modern liberalism is, at the very least, naïve and at worst ignores the complex
ways in which social institutions operate, a blindness which obscures the existence of
conflict in the body politic. In the next chapter, I will argue that emphasizing the
question of power requires us to deal honestly with the necessity of exclusions and the
continuing presence of antagonistic differences in political theory/praxis, but that
abandoning the monological perspective of classical and modern liberalism may allow us
to more adequately recognize and address the dangers of what Zizek calls “the
fundamental ideological fantasy”

Liberalism as Praxis: Introducing Foucault and the Biopolitical
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Up to this point in the dissertation, I have focused on biopolitical elements in theoretical
texts from the liberal tradition, including Hobbes’s Leviathan, Locke’s Two Treatises and
Rousseau’s The Social Contract. If we remain at the level of textual analysis, however,
limiting our discussion to political technologies of control examined in the social contract
tradition, there is an obvious objection: even if we can demonstrate that liberal authors
argued for the importance of biopower in theoretical contexts, it doesn’t follow that
liberalism as a practice of government was influenced by Locke’s essay on the ‘working
schools’, for example, or Rousseau’s attempt to develop a new political theology.
Likewise, while the imagery of the body politic also appears in Rawls, there is no reason
to believe that contemporary liberalism will begin treating non-democratic conceptions of
the good as forms of disease or pestilence.
In other words, we have to deal with the familiar liberal appeal to normativity. I can
anticipate two different versions of the ‘normativity’ objection. First of all, the liberal
can argue that freedom, non-coercion and cooperation are elements of the social contract
tradition, and if Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau betray the emancipatory aspects of
liberalism, their philosophy also contains the resources for identifying, and challenging,
oppressive forms of rule. Thus, we can read Locke (1) who defends a subject’s right to
challenge illegitimate rule against Locke (2) who forces ‘vagabonds’ into conscription, or
Rousseau’s praise of virtue, honesty and self-determination against the deceptions of the
Lawgiver, and so forth. I have already noted the difficulty with this response: the very
conceptions of autonomy which liberalism appeals to as a defense against coercion is
related in complicated ways to disciplinary technologies; it is problematic, therefore, to
set up ‘freedom’ in opposition to ‘oppression’. Liberty itself is an artifact of history and
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culture, in more ways than one; not only because it represents the expression of a specific
place, time, etc., but also because it is hard to imagine how an ‘autonomous’ subject
emerges without the subject’s relationship to other members of society. Thus, the very
norm which the liberal invokes is itself the expression of contingent assumptions, and to
the extent that autonomy materializes it is only through a set of cultural practices.
Certain forms of liberalism recognize the contingency of values like ‘autonomy’ (I’m
thinking especially of Richard Rorty’s postmodern version467, although Rawls himself
also moved in this direction), but they don’t believe it represents a serious problem from
a philosophical standpoint.

This argument is perfectly acceptable, but it means

abandoning the pretense to universality.
Even if we accept that riposte, however, there is still the difficult question of how the
liberal addresses the fact that the lived autonomy or the practice of freedom has a
genealogy, which Nietzsche has outlined and I discussed earlier in the chapter. This
brings us to the second major objection:

political philosophy deals with the ideal

arrangement of society; it has no business examining historical transitions or ephemeral
cultures. According to this argument, we must leave the examination of practice to the
political scientist or the social activist; the philosopher will reflect on, and ultimately
dispense, the Truth. The difficulty with this objection is that political philosophy is
differentiated from, say, epistemological concerns about how to define knowledge or
metaphysical questions vis-à-vis the relationship between universal and particulars by the
fact that it is intended, at least presumably, for real-world applications. In other words,
Rawls composed his major treatises with the belief that they could shape, if only at the
467
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peripheries, the way we think about our society. In this regard, Marx’s eleventh thesis on
Feuerbach, elegant in its simplicity but earth-shattering in its profundity, is only partially
correct;468 it is indeed true that, at least in the West, the majority of philosophers (and
most specializations in philosophy) have only interpreted the world, but this is surely not
the case in terms of political philosophy. Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke and Marx
all advanced programs or theories concerning the just society, but they are not simply
exercises in abstract thinking; rather, they articulate a vision of how we should organize
the polis.
In this regard, of course, it’s ultimately impossible for political philosophy to
completely evade the demands of normativity; in any case, even if it were possible, it’s
unclear that it’s desirable. Nevertheless, it’s important to recall that all of the figures I
mentioned above dealt with education, civic institutions, the habits of citizens, the role of
the passions; they were interested in the ideal, but they realized that, at least for political
philosophy, there was no way to leave practice behind.

This is a lesson which

contemporary liberalism has forgotten; it has forgotten embodiment and the
inescapability of our history, as well as—why not?—power itself. If political philosophy
is interested in transforming the world, however, we can’t afford to remain at the abstract
level of ideal speech situations. We have to think about questions of embodiment,
practice and the political technologies which structure our lifeworld. It is here, I think,
that the work of Foucault is important; turning away from the rarefied atmosphere of
idealized speech situations, conditions of hypothetical agreement and interpretations of
rational behavior, he examines the logics of governmentality which characterized
468
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particular regimes and social formations. In the next chapter, therefore, I will highlight
Foucault’s work on liberalism, examining the connections between liberalism as a theory
of governmentality and biopower as a strategy of rule, arguing that liberalism tries to
achieve a unified social body by formulating, and applying, technologies of power vis-àvis the macro and micro bodies of society. In short, I will argue that the imagery of the
body politic is not just a theoretical construct which deals with the problem of
governmental legitimacy; it is also, in more literal fashion, the name for processes of
struggle, contestation, antagonism and division which characterize the politics of
embodiment.
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CHAPTER 3: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE GOVERNANCE OF MICROBODIES
In the first two chapters, I examined the imagery of the body politic in classical liberalism
and the importance of embodiment in Rawls’s political philosophy. I’ve tried to show
that liberalism, despite its rhetorical emphasis on tolerance, pluralism and inclusion, is an
example of what Zizek has called the fundamental ideological fantasy. Like the Old
Regime which it displaced, it emphasizes the importance of a unified body politic. How
does it propose to achieve a unified social body? As we saw in our reading of Hobbes,
Locke and Rousseau, the founders of modern liberalism turn to exclusion and power in
order to eliminate ‘undesirable’ elements from the social contract, and they formulate
disciplinary strategies which will train the ‘included’ subjects to conduct themselves
‘rationally’ and exercise control over their desires. Thus, we have the two faces of power
that I mentioned in the introduction, and which have returned in various iterations
throughout the first two chapters: exclusionary and inclusionary political technologies.
At least one response available to liberals, however, is to highlight the fact that the
references to exclusion and force in classical liberalism are located in theoretical
contexts. While it’s true that Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau propose ‘eliminating’ the
enemies of society, and develop strategies for ‘policing’ the members of the body politic,
their arguments are primarily rareified exercises in social engineering (at least according
to this rejoinder). The reality of liberal governance is closer to the normative project of
defending pluralism and heterogeneous conceptions of the good; unlike its historical
predecessor, the Old Regime, as well as its major rival in the twentieth century, the
totalitarian state, liberalism has guarded, at least as a practical matter, the rights of the
individual and affirmed the value of diversity by celebrating multiculturalism. This
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criticism, however, fails to recognize two problems.

First of all, the practices of

governance which have characterized liberalism are, in actuality, a combination of
strategies which try to direct the conduct of individuals, albeit in more subtle and hidden
ways than authoritarian regimes. Thus, it is incorrect to insist that the application of
liberal theories is more benign than the normative principles of governance sketched out
in canonical liberal authors. Secondly, it overlooks Foucault’s key insight vis-à-vis
liberalism.

In his 1977-78 lecture course at the Collège de France, he argues that

liberalism is a “technology of power.”469 He recognizes that liberalism is a theory of
political legitimacy, but it is also an assemblage of practices which regulate the lifeworld
of subjects. To focus on the problem of justifying political authority, therefore, obscures
another aspect of liberalism which is equally (if not more) important, namely its
application in the public/private spheres.
In this chapter, I want to argue that the practice of liberalism has relied on biopolitical
logics in order to form a unified social body. My primary focus is the reconstruction of
Foucault’s theory of liberalism, which represents an alternative to the standard accounts.
While they treat liberalism as a theory of political legitimacy, Foucault’s approach shifts
the discussion towards questions of governance and power. It also demonstrates the
overriding importance of the body politic in liberalism, but it shows that the problem of
the social body’s homogeneity wasn’t an abstract problem of justifying political rule;
rather, it was an existential question of survival, of life and death, taken up at the level of
praxis. The unity of the body politic, its collective health, was defended through the
exclusion of ‘degenerate’ subjects and the production of citizens. In previous chapters I

469

Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 50.

165
examined the operation of this exclusion/inclusion in the context of classical liberal
theory; now I want to determine how the unity was effected concretely, at the level of
societal reproduction.

Liberalism and Governmentality
According to Foucault, liberalism is a form of government. How, then, does he define
“government”? In “The Subject and Power”, he argues that power influences the conduct
of others; it is a way of ‘leading’ subjects and directing their behavior.470 “Government”
is “the conduct of conducts” and “a management of possibilities”; as he writes in the
following passage:
Basically, power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or their mutual
engagement than a question of ‘government’. This word must be allowed the
very broad meaning it had in the sixteenth century. ‘Government’ did not refer
only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it designated the
way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups must be directed—the
government of children, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick. It
covered not only the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic
subjection but also modes of action, more or less considered and calculated, that
were destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in
this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others.471
There are two important features of Foucault’s description. First of all, as Givanni
Procacci has noted, the sixteenth century conception of government appropriated by
Foucault isn’t reducible to the operation of sovereignty or political institutions.472 While
traditional analyses of government focus on the distribution of power within, for
example, bureaucracies, or the complicated power dynamics which regulate conflicts
between the legislative and executive branches, Foucault’s model widens the scope of
investigation. Secondly, it is diffused throughout the body politic; in homes, schools,
470
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factories, clinics and prisons, the capillaries of social interaction transmit the flux of
power from one subject to the next. As Procacci writes, the two points are related;
governmentality “links together the different forms power relations may assume—the
government of souls, of the home, and of the State—in contrast to the tendency of the
theory of sovereignty to separate out political power”.473
To the extent that “government” is a method of “leading” the conduct of others,
it is also what Foucault characterizes as a “technology of the self.” In this regard, it is
helpful examine the introductory remarks of a lecture he delivered at the University of
Vermont in October 1982, entitled, fittingly enough, “Technologies of the Self”.
Foucault’s work, or at least one aspect of his work, examined how truth is constituted in
relation to discursive spheres.

As he notes in the lecture, published shortly before his

death, his essays and articles tried to investigate the ways in which human beings develop
the epistemological conditions required for self-understanding (in the fields of
economics, biology, psychiatry, etc.).474 He describes “these so-called sciences as very
specific ‘truth-games’ related to specific techniques that human beings use to understand
themselves.”475

There are four major techniques or “technologies”, namely (1)

technologies of production (i.e. our methods of producing or modifying objects), (2)
technologies of sign systems, which deal with our strategies of communication, (3)
technologies of power, the methods of controlling or influencing the behavior of
individuals, which Foucault identifies as an “objectivizing of the subject” and (4)
technologies of the self, or the methods of self-transformation appropriated by subjects in
order to achieve a degree of “happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality.”476
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Foucault’s work from the 1970’s, especially studies such as Discipline and
Punish, The History of Sexuality and his lectures courses at the Collège de France are
oriented towards the third axis (i.e. technologies of power), although there are clearly
elements of the other three technologies in each of the works mentioned above. While
Foucault suggests that he has focused too heavily on dimensions of control and
domination (once again, the text was published in the early 1980’s, when Foucault began
to study the history of technologies of the self in the West), I will privilege the third axis
in this chapter (which does not imply that the other axes are unimportant).
In the same lecture, he characterizes “governmentality” as the “encounter between
technologies of domination of others and those of the self.”477 Thus, we’re back to the
idea of governmentality as a collection of strategies for modifying the behavior of
individuals. In any case, the essential idea is that government is exercised throughout
society, in public institutions as well as the private sphere, and it is a “technology of the
self” which examines methods for influencing the conduct of subjects. Returning to our
original problem, then, which was the relationship between liberalism and
governmentality, we can view liberalism, qua form of government, as a set of practices
which attempt to direct the lives of others. Since there are others forms of government,
however, this definition isn’t specific enough; therefore, we have to turn to the logics
which regulated the thought and application of liberalism in concrete experience.
In reading liberalism as a political technology, or in trying to examine its history
from the standpoint of concrete practices of discipline, it is first of all important to
recognize that it defined itself as the negation of theories of government which had
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dominated European society for two hundred years. The rhetoric of liberalism (and I
stress ‘rhetoric’, since the reality of its application was more complicated) situated its
theory of limited government in explicit opposition to what Foucault called ‘pastoral
power’. As Foucault notes, there is a tendency to prioritize the centralizing aspects of
political power, yet he suggests that it is also important to highlight a second element of
power which is often neglected, namely its ‘individualizing’ aspect, or “the development
of power techniques oriented towards individuals and intended to rule them in a
continuous and permanent way. If the state is a political form of a centralized and
centralizing power, let us call pastorship the individualizing power.”478
What is ‘pastoral power’? Foucault argues that the pastoral theme emerged in
Middle Eastern societies such as Egypt, Assyria and Judaea, but the imagery and
language of the pastorate was intensified in Hebraic texts.479 The critical element in
pastoral motifs was the characterization of God as a shepherd who led his480 flock
through tribulations and difficulties. There are (to simplify in the extreme) four general
traits which identify a ‘pastoral’ narrative. First of all, the shepherd controls a ‘flock’ of
persons, rather than a specific territory.481 Second, the shepherd is an omnipotent leader
who prevents dissension; indeed, the very existence of the flock is contingent on the
shepherd’s presence, and as soon as he ceases to guide the people their unity vanishes.482
Third, the shepherd exercises a constant vigilance; he watches over each member of the
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flock, and when one of the members strays from the fold he makes sure that they are
returned to the safety of his tireless guardianship.483 Finally, the shepherd’s task is
described less as a ‘duty’ than a ‘devotion’, an act of beneficent kindness, which once
again returns to the question of ‘watchfulness’; Foucault writes that “[t]he theme of
keeping watch is important. It brings out two aspects of the shepherd’s devotedness.
First, he acts, works, puts himself out, for those he nourishes and who are asleep.
Second, he watches over them. He pays attention to them all and scans each one of them.
He’s got to know his flock as a whole, and in detail.”484
The theme of the pastorate played an important role in the development of
Christian theology, although it was transformed significantly vis-à-vis the older Hebraic
treatments of the motif. Foucault (again, oversimplifying immensely) lists four important
changes. First, the shepherd assumes a heightened responsibility for his flock; he not
only guards the people against danger, he is also expected to provide an account for all
their actions (Foucault notes, for example, that the shepherd is answerable for his flock
on the Day of Judgment).485

Secondly, the members of the flock are completely

subservient to the shepherd; they must obey his commands unswervingly, and in the
Christian pastorate obedience becomes an end, a good, in itself—in short, a virtue.486
Christianity posits obedience as a “permanent state.”487 Third, the shepherd strives for an
exhaustive knowledge of his flock, which implies not only a knowledge of the flock in its
totality, but also a specific knowledge, a knowledge of individual needs, a particular
member’s sins, and (to cite one of the most notables divergence from Hebrew pastoral
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themes) his or her progress towards eternal salvation.488 Finally (and Foucault describes
this as possibly the most important transformation) we encounter the struggle for
‘mortification.’ Foucault writes that “All those Christian techniques of examination,
confession, guidance, obedience, have an aim: to get individuals to work for their own
‘mortification’ in this world. Mortification is not death, of course, but it is a renunciation
this world and oneself, a kind of everyday death—a death that is supposed to provide life
in another world.”489
During the Middle Ages, there were traces of pastoral power in the organization
of society; in certain monastic orders, for example, reforms were implemented according
to a pastoral logic. Splinter orders, such as the Dominicans and Franciscans, tried to
establish a pastoral order outside the monastery, in the community of believers.490
Likewise, there were elements inside the population who rebelled against the church
hierarchy in order, as Foucault writes, to “find the shepherd it needed.”491 It is incorrect
to suggest, however, that pastoral power was the central, or even a central, element in the
structuring of political power, for at least three reasons. First, there were economic
factors: pastoral power was generally concentrated in urban, rather than rural, areas;
therefore, the distribution of population in the Middle Ages was incompatible with the
formation of government according to a pastoral logic.492 Secondly, there were cultural
difficulties; pastoral power required a certain level of education, or at least sophistication,
within both the ‘shepherd’ and the ‘flock’ which were lacking during the medieval
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period.493 Finally, there were political barriers; feudalism emphasized the importance of
local, personal ties rather than abstract commitments to the nation-state.494
It was nevertheless the case (as I had emphasized above) that certain aspects of
the pastorate were important in medieval society, especially in terms of ecclesiastical
institutions. The themes of the pastorate, which had originated in antiquity and were
transmitted, albeit with significant modifications, via Christian theology, emerged as a
political motif in the sixteenth century. On the one hand, the themes of the pastorate
intensified in the church, yet there was a similar trajectory in the public sphere.495
Indeed, Foucault suggests that there was a “transfer” of pastoral functions from the
church to the state.496 Accompanying the transfer, we see a new concern with the
question of self-conduct, both in the public and private spheres.497 One of the key
questions which arises relates to the conduct of the sovereign; s/he is now concerned with
taking up certain tasks which were previously considered, at least for the most part,
outside the domain of sovereign power
In a lecture delivered at the University of Vermont in 1982, entitled “The Political
Technology of Individuals”, Foucault examines theoretical and practical dimensions
493

494

Ibid.

Ibid. As Jeremy R. Carrette has noted in Foucault and Religion: Spiritual Corporality and Political
Spirituality (New York: Routledge, 2000), Foucault’s examination of religion suffers from a number of
problems, such as a “selective use of sources”; in addition, he “may have simplistically emphasized the
continuities in sexual ethics between the Greco-Roman period and Christianity, and developed an economy
of austerity.” (134-35) While he admits that “it is easy to challenge the historical material” (131), however,
he also insists that criticisms of Foucault’s historical narratives miss the point of his work on religion
specifically, and his larger project generally, insofar as it fails to recognizes that Foucault was trying to
problematize certain standard assumptions concerning religion. (131-32)
495
For an interesting reading of the influence pastoral power exercised over the formation of modern
educational institutions, see Ian Hunter’s “Assembling the School” in Foucault and Political Reason:
Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government, eds. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and
Nikolas Rose (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1996), 143-66.
496
Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 235.
497
Ibid., 235-36.

172
which characterized the new governmental rationalities dominated by pastoral power.
Beginning in the late sixteenth/early seventeenth century, a new “reason of state”
emerged which criticized models of governance derived from the Middle Ages.498 In the
medieval period, the monarch was expected to orient his/her subjects towards their
natural end or finality, which was eternal bliss in the afterlife.499 Between approximately
1580 and 1660, however, the sovereign’s task was re-formulated in a series of important
political treatises.500 If the task of the ruler in scholastic political theory was to imitate
God’s

beneficent

cosmological

authority,

the

new

governmental

subordinated religious mandates to the expansion of state power.

rationalities

Indeed, Foucault

suggests that the most typical characteristic of the political rationalities developed during
the seventeenth century is that the sole finality or end of power was the aggrandizement
of the state itself.501 Here we can recognize the clearest difference which separated the
reason of state from medieval conceptions of societal organization; while the latter
attempted to mirror the divine laws of God in the context of earthly politics, as well as (in
theory) conducted souls towards eternal bliss in the afterlife, the former was directed
towards explicitly secular ends. The sovereign abandoned the notion of a metaphysical
task, of constructing a quasi-theological political order, in exchange for the project of
constantly expanding the power of his/her secular realm, even if the reason of state was
cloaked in the rhetoric of divine right.
498
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According to Foucault, three important ideas emerged from the seventeenth
century state rationalities. The first is mercantilism, or the economic theory of state
reason, which argued that the public sector needed to enrich itself by accumulating
monetary resources, encouraging the growth of population and remaining militarily
competitive with other nations.502 Secondly, domestic society was organized as a ‘police
state’, an idea which I will return to momentarily.503 Finally, it was important to maintain
a balance of power between Euorpean nation-states, which entailed the formation of
standing armies and a diplomatic corps.504
There is one dimension of state reason which it is important to examine in greater
detail, namely the concept of the ‘police state’.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth

century, the term ‘police’ referred to technologies of power and strategies of political
rule; according to Foucualt, “[w]hen people spoke about police at this moment, they
spoke about the specific techniques by which a government in the framework of the state
was able to govern people as individuals significantly useful for the world”505 (or, to cite
a more specific definition from his March 29, 1978 lecture at the Collège de France, the
‘police’ were understood as “the ensemble of means by which we an increase the forces
of the State while maintaining the good order of the State”506).

If the term has a

pejorative content in certain contemporary political discourses, Pasquale Pasquino
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maintains that it is “difficult to find a negative definition of the tasks of the police before
1770”, since they were associated with the defense of social order.507
The police regime was expansive; it organized economic activities, regulated
educational institutions, distributed welfare provisions, monitored public health and
defended property rights;508 in short, state reason argued that the justifiable scope of
intervention was, in principle, unlimited. There were, however, discourses of right which
co-existed with the police-state, and they allowed critics to test the validity of
government by invoking external criteria of legitimation against the power of absolutist
monarchs.509 Juridical reason, therefore, functioned as a theoretical check on the excesses
of secular rulers, and its normative force was grounded in natural law doctrines.510
Foucault argues that rights discourse placed an external limit on the police state, since the
legitimacy of natural law was derived from sources of authority which transcended the
parameters of state reason.
Beginning in the first half of the eighteenth century, an important modification
occurred in the political technologies and theoretical logics of state reason. The new
governmental rationality was located in discourses of political economy (attributable, at
least in part, to the growing influence of the political the Physiocrats in France511), and it
placed internal, rather than external, limits on power. In what sense, however, were the
limits recognized by political economy ‘internal’, rather than ‘external’, to the operation
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of government? Foucualt lists five ways. First of all, a government which failed to
recognize its proper limits was inept or inefficiently managed.512

Secondly, the

government was expected to impose limits on itself, not react to the demands of
citizens.513 Third, a state which didn’t impose self-limitations would never achieve its
end, which was responsible and effective government.514 Fourth, there was a line drawn
between permissible and impermissible forms of intervention515, and fifth, this line was
demarcated by the quasi-natural laws of political economy.516 There are clearly major
differences, then, between the constraints of rights discourse and the new rationalities
inaugurated by political economy; the primary transformation, however, is that political
economy, unlike rights discourse, wasn’t opposed to state reason. It tried to maximize
efficiency, to enhance and perfect the operation of state reason, rather than challenging its
legitimacy (which is clearly the purpose of the oppositional model of critique developed
in the context of juridical reason).517
Foucault argues that the emphasis on auto-limitation and self-restraint which
characterized the new technologies of power were the template for what we today call
“liberalism”.518 How, then, did liberalism try to achieve the end of optimal government?
It introduced five important transformations into the paradigm of state reason. First of
all, it opposed the police state’s systematic intervention in everyday life; rather, it tried to
create prosperity by allowing the natural mechanisms of economic processes to operate
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without constriction, such as the law of supply and demand.519 Against the artificial
order created by the police state’s bureaucratic omnipresence, therefore, it established
order by allowing so-called ‘natural’ laws of human society to function according to selfstabilizing logics.520 Secondly, it advocated the use of scientific rationalities in the
conduct of government, and more specifically scientific principles which appealed to the
evidence of the newly forming human sciences.521 Third, it began to study the concept of
population as a specific reality, with its own logics of transformation, such as factors
regulating birth and death rates or the movement of the labor force.522 In addition,
individuals and groups interact with one another in spontaneous ways which effectively
escape the regulatory capacities of the state.523 As a consequence, a new series of
scientific discourses and technologies of government emerged to deal with the
interpretation and control of demographic phenomena, focusing on threats to the
collective security of the body politic; in this regard, Foucault mentions the examples of
social medicine and public hygiene.524
There are two more important modifications, however, which require explication.
The fourth transformation is liberalism’s criticism of the police state’s excesses, and its
attitude towards state intervention in civil society. As we have noted above, political
economists argued that there were limits to government’s capacity for effective
intervention, since economic and sociological processes conformed to quasi-natural laws.
Yet this limitation did not signal an end to state power; rather, it opened up a new region
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of interventions within the field of legitimate or permissible oversight. A limit was
created, but it wasn’t simply a negative limit; as Foucault puts it in the April 5th course
from his 1978 lecture series at the Collège de France (i.e. Security, Territory,
Population),
[t]hat is to say, on the one hand, the intervention of state governmentality must be
limited, but this limit…isn’t just a kind of negative boundary (une sorte de borne
negative). A domain of interventions will appear in the delimited field, possible
interventions, necessary interventions, but…[interventions] which will not have
the form of regulatory intervention (l’intervention réglementaire). One must
manipulate, create, facilitate, laisser faire; it will be necessary, in other words, to
manage and no longer regulate (gérer et non plus réglementer).525
What is the difference, however, between ‘management’ and ‘regulation’? Foucault
characterizes the former with terms such as “manipulate”, “create”, “facilitate” and
“laissez-faire”, while he implies that regulation tries to prevent or prohibit specific
results. Therefore, a new question arises: if it’s the case that liberalism tries to ‘manage’
the field of permissible interventions, what are the implications for technologies of
governance? In the same lecture, he offers the following response:
One must, therefore, supervise (encadrer) natural phenomena in such a way that a
maladroit, arbitrary or blind intervention does not make them deviate. That is to
say that it is going to be necessary to put in place mechanisms of security. The
mechanisms of security or intervention…of the state essentially have the function
of assuring the security of these natural phenomena which are the economic
processes or the intrinsic processes of population, [and] this is going to be the
fundamental objective of government.526
Here Foucault returns to a theme he had examined earlier in the lecture series, namely the
relationship between security and population.

He expands the argument, however,

indicating that the so-called ‘natural’, self-regulatory mechanisms of civil society or
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demographic tendencies presuppose a framework of security; paradoxically, then, the
‘natural’ processes are only guaranteed by a regime of management or security.
Interventions are still necessary, but only insofar as they restore the equilibrium of
supposedly auto-corrective processes.
There is one more modification we need to address, which Foucault calls “the
inscription of liberty.”527

The new techniques of government recognized the

indispensability of liberty as a precondition for the efficient operation of (to cite one, and
surely not the least important, example) ‘free markets’. The political economists argued
that government was incapable of functioning properly unless liberties were respected.
The failure to recognize autonomy, whether it was the autonomy of private citizens or the
autonomy of civil society in relation to the state, represented not only a violation of
rights, but also an inability or failure to govern effectively.528 Thus it was a subversion of
legitimacy as well as a lack of efficiency, and in the minds of the economists, the latter
was a more serious transgression of principles of governance than the former. Foucault
suggests that for the critics of the ‘police state’ the greatest evil of government was not
the “wickedness of the prince”, but its ignorance, i.e. its disregard for the rationalities
which governed particular epistemological formations.529
This transformation (i.e. the problem of ‘freedom’s inscription’), escorts us to the
heart of Foucault’s reading of liberalism. In his January 24, 1979 lecture at the Collège
de France, he highlights the connection between the fifth modification introduced by
political economy and the emergence of liberalism as a technology of power. In his reinterpretation of liberalism, he identifies the new assemblage of governmental
527
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technologies as ‘liberal’ insofar as they presupposed the liberty of individuals in order to
function properly. More specifically, they were ‘liberal’, at least in part, because they
operated as ‘consumers’ of liberty.530 In what sense, however, were the new, distinctively
‘liberal’ forms of government ‘consumers’? According to Foucault, they were only
capable of functioning if basic liberties were guaranteed (the liberties he mentions here
are the free market, the freedom of buyers and sellers, property rights and the right of
discussion/self-expression). Yet if they presupposed the existence of liberty as a
condition of their material and ideological survival, they also had to serve as producers
and ‘organizers’ of liberty, given that autonomy was only capable of flourishing in a
context of security, i.e. an environment in which the exchange of goods was encouraged,
property rights were guaranteed and the freedom of movement was protected. Indeed, a
‘free market’ needed buyers and sellers, and the government was able to stimulate
consumption by providing assistance to the poor.531 Anti-monopoly legislation was also
important, in order to protect competition against the hegemony of a single corporate
entity.532

Likewise, it was necessary to establish limitations (or more generally

prohibitions) on the worker’s abilities to collectively organize, since unions or political
parties threatened to disrupt the employer’s control over the means of production.533 In
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short, Foucault argues that security is the condition of liberty (or more precisely, it is the
“calculation of the cost” of liberty).534
What, however, does it mean to say that “security” is the condition of liberty?
Liberalism tries to determine when particular interests, or the interests of individuals,
represent a danger to the ‘public’ good.535 Yet it was also necessary to defend the
interests of private individuals against the interventionist tendencies of centralized public
bureaucracies.536 Thus, it was important to balance, calculate and weigh the respective
interests of society and the individual, with the intention of eliminating, or at least
minimizing, the risks encountered by either the public sector or private subjects.537
Liberalism is confronted, therefore, with the precarious task of advancing the freedom of
subjects while at the same time controlling the environment which establishes the
preconditions for liberty.
There are three major consequences of the new liberal technologies of
governance, technologies which effected major political and sociological transformations
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. First, the number of ‘dangers’ which
represent threats to the body politic are multiplied; liberalism discovers risks everywhere,
in every aspect of quotidian culture.538 As a result, we see the emergence of police
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literature, as well as a journalistic fascination with deviancy and crime, numerous
campaigns on behalf of ‘hygiene’, a general terror of ‘degeneration’ (whether it was the
‘degeneration’ of the individual’s mental health, the stability of the family or the
‘corruption’ of racial purity) and a dissemination of fear into the general public.539
Indeed, Foucault argues that “this stimulation of the fear of danger…is in a certain way
the condition, the internal psychological and cultural correlative, of liberalism. There is
no liberalism without a culture of danger.”540 Secondly, we encounter a “formidable
extension of procedures of control”, procedures which are, not coincidentally,
contemporaneous with the emergence of liberalism as an important governmental theory
(and more critically, set of practices).541

One of the best examples is Bentham’s

development of the Panopticon, an example which I will return to momentarily. The
third consequence is the dialectic we highlighted above between security and freedom,
i.e. the production of liberty through schemas of control and intervention.542

Here

Foucault presents the case of Roosevelt’s New Deal, the birth of the American welfare
state, which guaranteed certain liberties in perilous economic times, such as the liberty to
work, the liberty to consume, etc., through mechanisms of intervention in the private
sector.543 In a moment, I will examine the concrete technologies of power and specific
practices of ‘security’ which emerged in liberal regimes, citing examples from Foucault’s
work which illustrate his thesis. At this point, however, I’d like to examine a test case for
Foucault’s argument: the economic/political theory of Adam Smith.
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Excurses on Adam Smith
According to traditional interpretations, Adam Smith is a libertarian avant la lettre; he is
a defender of limited government and free market economic principles, which are the
foundations of modern Hayekian political theory.

Jacob Viner’s “Adam Smith and

Laissez-Faire”, which was published in 1929, still represents one of the clearest
presentations of the argument that Smith opposes excessive government intervention. He
writes that
Smith’s doctrine that economic phenomena were manifestations of an underlying
order in nature, governed by natural forces, gave to English economics for the
first time a definite trend toward logically consistent synthesis of economic
relationships, toward “system-building.” Smith’s further doctrine that this
underlying natural order required, for its most beneficent operation, a system of
natural liberty, and that in the main public regulation and private monopoly were
corruptions of that natural order, at once gave to economics a bond of union with
the prevailing philosophy and theology, and to economists and statesmen a
program of practical reform.544
On Viner’s interpretation, Smith argues that government regulation is a “corruption” of
the “system of natural liberty”. In this regard, his theory is clearly an example of what
Foucault calls liberal governmentality. According to the typical reading of Smith (and of
classical liberalism more generally), in order to protect “natural liberty” against the
tyranny of arbitrary power it is important to limit the scope of government intervention.
If Foucault is correct, however, we have to re-assess our standard assumptions
concerning the history of classical liberalism’s theoretical (and more importantly
practical) program. He argues that for liberal governmentality, security is the condition
544
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of liberty. Security, however, requires the active intervention of government in civil
society. Foucault’s re-interpretation of liberalism, then, raises two questions for the
standard historical account of Smith’s work.

First, is the typical, crypto-libertarian

interpretation of Smith an accurate representation of his attitudes towards, for example,
the role of government in managing the affairs of civil society? Secondly, if it is fair to
characterize Smith as a defender of liberal governmentality, does his attitude towards the
role of government either confirm or challenge Foucault’s re-configuration of our
theoretical categories?
One of the most important passages in defense of the ‘minimalist’ interpretation
of Smith (i.e. ‘minimalist’ in terms of the role he assigns to government) is a reference at
the end of Book Four of Wealth of Nations to the ‘system of natural liberty’. Smith is
examining capital allocation in particular industries; he argues that governmental policies
which artificially encourage the transfer of capital from one sector to another, in violation
of the law of supply and demand, threaten to disrupt the auto-regulatory mechanisms of
free markets. If governments remove artificial barriers or incentives to the operation of
the market, however, a ‘system of natural liberty’ emerges; he writes (and this is the
reference I alluded to above) that
[a]ll systems either of preference or restraint, therefore, being thus completely
taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of
its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is
left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring forth the
industry and capital into competition with those of any other man, or order of
men.545
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In this passage, we have the key elements of Smith’s minimalism: his emphasis on nonintervention, the spontaneous harmony associated with free market outcomes and the
liberty of subjects to engage in competition (another important element of market
spontaneity, since competition, at least in theory, improves the quality of products and
decreases the price for consumers).

The quasi-naturality which late eighteenth and

nineteenth century political economists attributed to economic processes is emphasized
by Foucault, and in this regard he agrees with an important premise of the traditional
reading of Smith. Indeed, the ‘minimalist’ interpretation is reinforced by the very next
sentence, where he places explicit limitations on the power of the sovereign; according to
Smith, “[t]he sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to
perform which he must always be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper
performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty
of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the
employments most suitable to the interest of society.”546
It is important to recall that Foucault had recognized the political economists’
opposition to governmental intervention. Their antagonism was primarily based on the
inefficiency of the public sector. The sovereign’s capacities for beneficially influencing
the operation of the market are limited by his or her ignorance, which is not a contingent
ignorance that we could correct, for example, with more accurate data; rather, it is
improbable that anyone could accurately predict the oscillations of supply and demand.
There are, however, three duties which the sovereign is expected to perform, even within
Smith’s “system of natural liberty”; s/he is obligated to (1) protect society from foreign
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aggression,547 (2) defend citizens against crime by “establishing an exact administration
of justice”,548 and (3) maintain public institutions which, for a number of reasons, are not
in the interests of private individuals to finance, but are essential to public safety or the
collective good.549
In my reading of Smith, which departs from the new paradigm introduced by Foucault,
I propose to emphasize the intersection of liberty and security. I want to demonstrate that
Foucault’s interpretive framework opens up a range of possible insights which are
foreclosed by the traditional emphasis on free-market principles and non-intervention.
While it is absurd to deny that Smith is an opponent of excessive market regulations, or
that he emphasizes the importance of ‘natural liberty’ as a precondition for the efficient
operation of a capitalist economy, Foucault’s re-reading of liberalism allows us to
complicate familiar historical narratives by retrieving the connections between freedom
and security in liberal governmentality. I will sketch out the contours of a revisionist
interpretation by focusing on the role of the sovereign in Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.
As I had mentioned above, the first obligation of sovereigns is to defend citizens
from the aggression of other “independent societies”.550

Indeed, the stability of

‘civilization’ depends on the maintenance of a well-regulated standing army; otherwise,
the nation is exposed to constant threats from “the invasion of a poor and barborous
neighbor.”551 Likewise, an imposing military presence is necessary in order to establish
the authority of the sovereign in distant territories which are only nominally under his/her
control.
547
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implemented, according to Smith, as a result of the power exerted by the army.552 Thus,
the security guaranteed by a military force is the foundation of ‘civilized’ societies.
Yet Smith also makes an argument that security establishes the conditions of
liberty. In the context of examining the necessity of funding a trained military Smith
mentions that republican political theorists have traditionally exhibited suspicion toward
standing armies, because they represent a potential danger to the freedom of civilians.553
Smith disagrees, however, arguing that when the army is commanded by the sovereign
him/herself and members of the aristocracy serve as officers “a standing army can never
be dangerous to liberty. On the contrary, it may in some cases be favorable to liberty”554
(since the nobility and the sovereign have a vested interest in stability). With a powerful
army at his/her disposal the ruler is less concerned about the potential for unrest; Smith
writes that “[t]he security which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that
troublesome jealousy, which, in some modern republicks, seems to watch over the
minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen.”555 If
the sovereign is weak, s/he obsessively searches for evidence of dissent or rebellion, but
when s/he is supported by a standing military
the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances can give
little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them, and his consciousness of
his own superiority naturally disposes him to do so. That degree of liberty which
approaches to licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries where the
sovereign is secured by a well-regulated standing army. It is in such countries
only, that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power, for
suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious liberty.556
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In this passage, the importance of the connection between security and liberty is clearly
demonstrated. The existence of a powerful military is not a threat to autonomy; rather, it
serves as a defender of freedom, at least indirectly, since the sovereign can adopt a more
lenient attitude towards ‘licentious remonstrances’. And even if Smith’s assumption is
incorrect (indeed, there are too many counterexamples of military dictatorships
terrorizing their citizens), it nevertheless provides an example of Foucault’s point
concerning the conditions of freedom or, to use Smith’s phrase, ‘civilization’; the state’s
monopoly on coercive force guarantees liberty, precisely insofar as it prevents civilians
from challenging the authority of the sovereign.
Foucault’s hypothesis is also illustrated by the second duty of sovereignty, which is
the establishment of judicial institutions. One of the cornerstones of freedom in a liberal
political order is the right to own property (along with its corollary, protection against
theft). The poor represent a threat to property rights; they are “driven by want, and
prompted by envy” to steal from the affluent557 (although they are also motivated by
“love of present ease and enjoyment”).558 It is necessary, therefore, to establish
governments which will protect the ‘hard-earned’ acquisitions of the wealthy.559 In an
illuminating passage, Smith provides a vivid example of the ways in which danger,
security and liberty are inseparably connected in the liberal imagination:
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It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable
property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many
successive generations, can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times
surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never
appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm
of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it. The acquisition of
valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establishment
of civil government.560
The relationship between security and liberty is evident here; the entrepreneur who has
expended his (preserving Smith’s gendered language) energy and intelligence is under
assault. His property rights are constantly threatened by ‘unknown’ enemies, but the
“powerful arm of the civil magistrate” prevents society from collapsing into anarchy.
Leaving aside the question of Smith’s classism, or his failure to recognize that theft is
also motivated by necessity, it is clear that there is an important connection between the
elements of liberal governmentality highlighted in Foucault’s study. Notice the ‘dangers’
confronted by the affluent, the risks which indefinitely multiply, the impossibility of
satisfying the desires of the poor (whom the wealthy “never provoked”, as if they are
guiltless); the only way to stave off the menacing other (an ‘unknown’ enemy, even
though Smith is quite willing to attach a face to the other, the face of the destitute) is by
appealing to the sovereign’s power, which keeps the masses at a ‘secure’ distance.
Finally, we encounter the third duty of sovereignty, which is the supervision of public
institutions. Under this category, Smith includes both the maintenance of thoroughfares
(a prerequisite for commerce),561 as well as obligations to fund public education for the
(to use Smith’s phrase) “inferior ranks of people.”562 He notes that “people of some rank
and fortune” are able to obtain an education before they enter an occupational field in late
560
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adolescence, but the “common people” are forced to enter a trade at an early age,
neglecting, for reasons of necessity, the acquisition of basic skills such as reading and
writing.563 The sovereign has a responsibility, therefore, to allocate revenue for public
education, in order to ‘better’ the working class. His argument is, at once, idealistic and
pragmatic; while he insists that even if the state did not benefit from educating laborers,
“it would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed”, it is
nevertheless the case that “[t]he state…derives no inconsiderable advantage from their
instruction”, such as the improvement of their conduct (recall that for Foucault,
government is “the conduct of conduct”),564 a “respect for their lawful superiors”565 and
the ability to recognize (and resist) political factionalism.566
Given the list of obligations assigned to the sovereign, therefore, what can we
conclude about Smith’s attitude towards government intervention?

Andrew Skinner

notes that “Smith’s list of policy recommendations was longer than some popular
assessments suggest. [He] emphatically did not think in terms of ‘anarchy plus the
constable’, to use Carlyle’s phrase.”567 Skinner is correct to recognize that the letter of
Smith’s text contradicts the spirit of contemporary libertarian interpretations. While my
counter-interpretation of Smith hopefully complicates the ‘minimalist’ reading by
highlighting the necessity (at least in Smith’s system) of a powerful sovereign with
extensive bureaucratic/administrative oversight, an interpretation which challenges the
traditional emphasis on the “invisible hand” guiding society towards prosperity through
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the interaction of self-interests, unencumbered by government intervention,568 it is
nevertheless important to avoid drawing the conclusion that Smith is an anti-liberal.
Rather, his work perfectly demonstrates the argument that liberalism is a technology of
power concerned with grounding liberty in a foundational context of security; thus, we
encounter a clear illustration of Foucault’s point, in a text which privileges the operation
of free markets and attacks the corruption as well as the inefficiency of bureaucrats—
precisely the kind of theoretical trajectory which should have proven resistant to
Foucault’s argument.
In outlining three implications of the new liberal technologies of power, Foucault
highlights the emergence of “dangers” which threaten the body politic, the proliferation
of disciplinary technologies and the “inscription” of liberty via mechanisms of
intervention/control.

How will liberalism counter the dissemination of risks, the

multiplication of crimes and transgressions, the pathologies which lurk in the body of
society’s other—or more precisely, in the body politic itself? Recall this passage from
Smith, which is a cry for order in the wilderness of ‘barbarity’: “He is at all times
surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never
appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the
civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it.” With enemies everywhere, how is it
possible to secure the “liberty” of the affluent?

Foucault on Disciplinary Power: Jeremy Bentham and the Panopitcon
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Before I can propose an answer to this question, it’s important to return to the earlier
discussion of biopower. In my introduction, I examined the differences between what
Foucault calls disciplinary power and biopolitics. Disciplinary power emerged first; as
Foucault writes, “[i]nstead of bending all its subjects in a single uniform mass, it
separates, analyzes, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of
necessary and sufficient single units. It ‘trains’ the moving, confused, useless multitudes
of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements—small, separate cells,
organic autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, combinatory segments.”569 In
short, it’s a political technology of division and hierarchies, a strategy of government
which isolates the body and reaches into the depths of the soul, producing individuals
who contribute to the reproduction of the body politic. According to Foucault, the
paradigmatic example of disciplinary technologies is Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon.
The idea of the Panopticon was formulated by Bentham (an admirer of Smith’s
economic theory)570 in a series of letters written during his 1787 trip to Russia (he had
traveled there to visit his brother Samuel, who was serving in an administrative capacity
on behalf of the British government).

The purpose of government is to provide

security,571 and more specifically the security of the community, which Bentham
conceives as a “fictitious body”572 (once again, therefore, we encounter the imagery of
the body politic). In the Russian letters, he outlines one of his most (in)famous strategies
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of policing, namely the formidable disciplinary structure which he called the Panopticon,
a microscopically ordered institution of surveillance and control. Bentham argued it was
a solution to numerous problems of cost, inefficiency and risk which subverted the
effectiveness of the judicial system (although he also insisted that the Panopticon design
was applicable to other institutional buildings, such as hospitals, asylums, factories and
schools). The details of the plan were examined at length by Foucault in Discipline and
Punish; I will therefore limit myself to a brief reconstruction of the essential aspects of
Bentham’s model.
The Panopticon was originally envisioned as a circular prison; at the
circumference of the building there was a ring of cells, and they were divided from each
other by partitions which isolated the convicts and prohibited communication; the cells
likewise contained two sets of windows, opening onto the outside and the center of the
penitentiary.573 The “inspector” of the prison occupied a “lodge” in the middle of the
circle, which also contained windows; there was a vacant, annular space between the
centrally located inspector’s residence (Bentham recommends that the inspector and
his/her family should live in the observation area; indeed, “[t]he more numerous also the
family, the better; since by this means, there will in fact be as many inspectors, as the
family consists of persons, though only one be paid for it”574) and the outer ring of cells
which allowed the guards to exercise constant supervision over the prisoners.575 Given
the design of the cells, which utilized what Foucault calls an “effect of backlighting”, the
inspector was able to “observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light,
573
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the small captive shadows in the cell of the periphery”576; indeed, Foucault sees the
Panopticon’s emphasis on visibility and transparency as a literal manifestation of the
Enlightenment’s terror of dark spaces, its desire to cast brightness into obscure corners of
human society, but in this case “illumination” operates as a principle of subjection.577
Yet the essence, the true ‘genius’ of his plan is, in his words, “the centrality of the
inspector’s situation, combined with the well-known and most effectual contrivance of
seeing without being seen.”578 In addition to the perpetual gaze directed towards the
inmates, their vision is restricted by blinds and partitions within the central apartments
which screen off the inspectors from the sight of the prisoners.579 There is a radical
asymmetry: the guard is able to watch every move and monitor every action without his
or herself being detected. Indeed, one of the effects which the Panoptic machine (with its
unrelenting gaze of authority, the inescapability of its observation) induces in the
convicts is the feeling that they are always being watched, even when no guards are
visible inside the central residence.580 It is a suspicion, however, which is never subject
to confirmation; the efficacy of the Panopticon is that it creates, albeit indirectly, a selfpolicing mechanism in the prisoner.581 The ideal arrangement of a prison would facilitate
surveillance of the inmate at every moment; given the obstacles of limited time and
money confronted by authorities, however, the Panopticon is an economic solution to the
dilemma of finite resources.582
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Bentham’s penitentiary, is captured in the following equation:

“power exercised

continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost”—in short, maximum coercive
effect with minimum expenditures.583
Yet Bentham also envisioned the application of the Panopticon model in other
contexts; in addition to the punitive aspects of his theory, he argued that the principles of
its architectural design were readily transferable to other institutional settings such as
asylums, factories, hospitals and schools. In his ‘Preface’ to the letters he imagines that
the generalization of the Panopticon will give birth to a utopian society of virtue, hygiene
and industriousness:

“Morals reformed—health preserved—industry invigorated—

instruction diffused—public burthens lightened—Economy seated, as it were, upon a
Rock—the Gordian knot of the Poor Laws not cut, but untied—all by a simple idea in
Architecture!”584 In the workplace, for example, the supervisor, like the prison warden,
benefits from a central observation post which allows him/her to monitor the activities of
workers; likewise, partitions are useful here, since they reduce the number of distractions
and eliminate potentially dangerous communication between employees.585 In addition,
Bentham highlights the importance of control in asylums,586 and he is enthusiastic about
the value of continual surveillance in hospitals (which would allow the doctors to
maintain a constant watch over his/her patients).587 Finally, the head-master of a school
is able to monitor the entire classroom; he writes that “[a]ll play, all chattering; in short,
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all distraction of every kind, is effectually banished by the central and covered situation
of the master” (where s/he is also able to detect, and arrest, any attempts to cheat).588
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault underscores the audacity of Bentham’s
project, which tried to produce a comprehensive solution vis-à-vis the ‘problem’ of
controlling political space and human agency by inventing a form of disciplinary power
which regulated institutions in the social body. Panopticism represents, in short, “the
general principle of a new ‘political anatomy’ whose object and end are not the relations
of sovereignty but the relations of discipline…Bentham dreamt of transforming the
disciplines into a network of mechanisms that would be everywhere and always alert,
running throughout society without interruption in space or in time.”589
As Felix Driver has noted, critics (especially historians) argue that Foucault’s
emphasis on the Panopticon as a signifier for generalized disciplinary practices in
modernity is indefensible, since Bentham’s project never exercised any significant
influence vis-à-vis the construction of penitentiaries (although there are examples of
prisons which conform to Bentham’s model), much les other institutional spaces.590 They
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have also contended that Foucault, in his characterization of disciplinary power as
totalizing and omnipresent, fails to recognize the existence of gaps in the implementation
of power which open up the possibility of resistance.591 In response to the first criticism
(i.e. that Foucault attributes an importance to Bentham’s project which does not
correspond to its historical significance) Driver offers the most effective response:
Foucault isn’t asserting that Bentham’s model represents the dominant architectural
model for prisons in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century; rather, the Panopticon
strikingly captures the logics of isolation and surveillance which characterized
disciplinary power in modernity. His description is, according to Driver, “thus to be read
as a model of a disciplinary programme” and not an empirical account of the
Panopticon’s success (or lack thereof) vis-à-vis penitentiary reforms.592

As for the

second point, it is a standard criticism of Foucault’s work, but it is based on a caricature
of his position; leaving aside the broader question of the relationship between resistance
and power in his work, which I will return to in the next chapter, Foucault noted that
Bentham’s scheme was unrealistic precisely because it did not factor in the importance of
opposition to the authoritarian gaze.593
In support of Foucault’s argument that the Panoptic logic is a model for
disciplinary practices which were implemented in non-carceral institutions, I will limit
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myself to the following examples.594 In his 1973-74 lectures at the Collège de France on
psychiatric power, Foucault explicitly compared the organization of the asylum to
Bentham’s utopia, calling it “une machine panoptique.”595 There were four aspects of
Bentham’s prison integrated into the design of the asylum in the early to mid-nineteenth
century, which allowed doctors to subject the bodies of the mad to a continuous
monitoring. First of all, there was an emphasis on permanent visibility; not only is the
patient watched incessantly, but it is also important that s/he is aware of the authoritarian
gaze, and recognizes that his/her madness is constantly observed; such awareness
ultimately has a therapeutic value, since s/he understands that the psychiatrist views
him/her as insane.596 Secondly, we encounter a principle of “centralized surveillance”,
but not in exactly the fashion Bentham imagined; rather, Foucault finds the operation of
“centralized surveillance” in the hierarchy of nurses, doctors, guardians, etc. who all
reported back to the privileged locus of knowledge-power, the director of the clinic (le
médecin-chef).597 Next, there is the isolation of the patient’s body (in the same way that
Bentham’s prisoners were isolated); it is important to avoid the potential contagion of
madness, to prohibit the communication of one form of insanity with another.598 Finally,
there is the similarity of incessant punishment; in the early-mid nineteenth century
asylum, the psychiatrist used a variety of corporeal torture instruments, which were
oriented towards the interdiction of certain actions (i.e. the chastity belt),599 the extraction
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of truth (water torture),600 and mechanisms of inscribing power on the body of the mad
(such as branding them with an iron).601
In addition, however, we can see the logic of the Panopticon operating in
factories. As they became more complex with highly differentiated labor functions,
supervisors were hired to monitor the workers in order to guard against fraud and
incompetence. Theft and inefficiency threatened to adversely affect the profitability of
the enterprise if they escaped undetected; therefore, it was necessary to subject every
worker to constant observation.602 Likewise, in French elementary schools (beginning in
the seventeenth century), instructors selected the best students to carry out the task of
recording the behavior of students; the ‘intendants’ were expected to note any kind of
deviant conduct, ranging from failure to wear a rosary to idle chatter during lectures.603
In both cases, therefore, we encounter the attempt to improve the efficacy of the gaze.
Indeed, the great tribunal of observation, which almost always doubles as a tribunal of
normalization, becomes the ordering principle of modern societies; as Foucault writes,
“[t]he practice of placing individuals under ‘observation’ is a natural extension of a
justice imbued with disciplinary methods and examination procedures…Is it surprising
that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble
prisons?”604
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As I noted in the Introduction, however, Foucault argued biopolitics has two
faces: we have already examined the first, which is disciplinary power. But there was a
second biopolitical technology of control which emerged after the disciplinary regime,
which Foucault calls “biopower.” In the next section, I want to highlight important
aspects of biopower, focusing on attempts to guard the collective ‘health’ of the social
body against ‘degeneration’.

Foucault on Biopower: Policing the Health of the Body Politic
First of all, what is the relationship between disciplinary regimes and biopower? In the
March 10 lecture from his 1975-76 course at the Collège de France (entitled Society Must
Be Defended), Foucault argues that disciplinary power centered on individuals, while
biopower targeted the population or the social body; disciplinary power is
“individualizing”, while biopower is “massifying”.605

In other words, “after a first

seizure of power over the body in an individualizing mode, we have a second seizure of
power that is not individualizing, but, if you like, massifying, that is directed not at manas-body but at man-as-species.”606 The two forms of power are different, therefore, to the
extent that ‘anatamo-politics’ isolated the subject, while biopower operated at the level of
aggregates. Referring to our earlier terminology, therefore, disciplinary power relates to
micro-bodies, while biopower focuses on the macro-body.
It is incorrect to insist, however, that we can identify an obvious point of rupture, or
construct a paradigm shift, between the two logics; rather, biopower was the continuation
of disciplinary regimes, albeit with important modifications. He contends that
605
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[t]his technology of power [i.e. biopower—W.R.]…does not exclude disciplinary
technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate, modify it to some extent, and
above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary
techniques. This new technique does not simply do away with disciplinary
technique, because it exists at a different level, on a different scale, and because it
has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments.607
Thus, while I characterize the two forms of power as ‘faces’ of ‘biopolitics’, there are
both similarities and differences. As I read Foucault, the similarities relate, primarily, to
a common point of application, namely the body, while the differences emerge vis-à-vis
the question of scale. In any case, I will highlight examples of biopower’s application in
the following discussion, and we can see areas of overlap in the cases I discuss,
emphasizing the continuities between the two regimes. And as Foucault himself noted,
the articulations of disciplinary/biopower often co-exist.
Let’s return, however, to the central problem, or one of the central problems, of the
chapter. What is the connection between liberalism and biopower? The answer, I think,
is this: in its attempts to create security for individuals, biopower was deployed as a
strategy for eliminating risks from the body politic. Here I want to look at an example
highlighted by Foucault which demonstrates the relationship between liberal
governmentality and biopower. Let’s begin, therefore, with the following question: How
did society respond to the ‘dangers’ or ‘risks’ which proliferated in the body politic?
According to Foucault, there was an explosion of theoretical discourses surrounding the
fear of ‘degeneration’, or a generalized anxiety concerning the question of hereditary
purity. The problem of degeneration, however, referred to a series of other, at first glance
tangential, areas of investigation or discourse, such as sexuality and perversion. As
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Foucault writes in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, during the nineteenth
century
the analysis of heredity was placing sex (sexual relations, venereal diseases,
matrimonial alliances, perversions) in a position with regard to the species: not
only could sex be affected by its own diseases, it could also, if it was not
controlled, transmit diseases and create others that would afflict future
generations. Thus it appeared to be the source of an entire capital for the specie4s
to draw from. Whence the medical—but also political—project for organizing a
state management of marriages, births and life expectancies; sex and its fertility
had to be administered. The medicine of perversions and the programs of
eugenics were the two great innovations in the technology of sex of the second
half of the twentieth century. [They were] innovations that merged quite well, for
the theory of ‘degenerescence’ made it possible for them to perpetually refer back
to one another.608
‘Degeneration’, therefore, was a risk to the body politic, or the population as a whole; the
danger of transmitting pathologies form one generation to the next, furthermore,
introduced the necessity of policing sexuality. Thus, the stability of the political order
was challenged by genetic factors, and one of the discourses or movements which
emerged from the theory of degeneration was eugenics.

Psychiatry, in particular,

exploited the connections between heredity and abnormality, and tried to expand the field
of medical interventions; in the 1974-75 lecture course at the Collège de France, for
example, Foucault notes that in the nineteenth century psychiatry increasingly abandoned
the idea that it was able to cure mental illness, and adopted the etiological principle that
medical disorders were hereditarily transmitted from one generation to the next, with an
inexorability which eliminated the necessity of treating the patient. Thus, psychiatry
assumes the role of guardian for the social order; to once again quote Foucault,
“[p]sychiatry no longer seeks to cure…It can offer merely to protect society from being
the victim of the definitive dangers represented by people in an abnormal condition…It
608
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claims a role of generalized social defense and, at he same time, through the notion of
heredity, it claims the right to intervene in familial sexuality.”609 As an illustration of the
relationship between questions of degeneration and sexuality, I will limit myself to one
example from the 1974-75 lecture course on abnormality (an example which is touched
on indirectly in the first volume of The History of Sexuality), namely the problem of
masturbation and the threats it posed to the bourgeois family.
It is important to specify the bourgeois family, since it contradicts the idea
(associated with Marxist readings of the history of sexuality) that the bourgeoisie tried to
establish controls on the sexual practices of the working class. It is indeed true that the
urban proletariat was eventually a target of ideological pedagogies concerning
reproduction, marriage, etc., but the campaign against the labor force emerged,
chronologically, after the ‘sexualization’ of the bourgeois private sphere. As Foucault
notes, “it was in the ‘bourgeois’ or ‘aristocratic’ family that the sexuality of adolescents
and children was first problematized, and feminine sexuality medicalized; it was the first
to be alerted to the potential pathology of sex, the urgent need to keep it under close
watch and to devise a rational technology of correction.”610 He argues that prior to the
mid-eighteenth century, the Western family was primarily a kinship network, a system of
transferring descent and social status from one generation to the next. Beginning around
1750, however, what Foucault calls the ‘cell family’ displaced the kinship model. In the
‘cell family’, we encounter a “restricted, close-knit, substantial, compact, corporeal, and
affective family core” in which
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parents were urgently enjoined to reduce the large polymorphous and dangerous
space of the household and to do no more than forge with their children, their
progeny, a sort of single body, bound together through a concern about infantile
sexuality, about infantile autoeroticism and masturbation.611
In other words, the new ‘cell family’ was a laboratory of social observation; the parents
obsessively monitored their children for traces of deviant sexual tendencies, especially
masturbation.

Indeed, coinciding with the emergence of the cell family we see an

explosion of literature concerning the dangers of onanism;612 ‘hygiene’ specialists shared
the assumption that masturbation was coiled at the heart of every pathology.613 Given the
immense risks associated with autoeroticism, therefore, parents had an obligation to
actively watch their children, paying attention to infinitesimal signs, the minutest
gestures, which would betray an interest in self-exploration.614 Likewise, if it was the
case that masturbation led to disease, the oversight of the child took on a medical
component; as Foucault notes, it meant that the parents were expected to notify the
proper medico-scientific authorities as soon as potentially abnormal behavior was
detected, linking the family up with an elaborate scientific/medical apparatus which
intervened in the name of social hygiene.615 The necessity of consultation with doctors,
in turn, produced a massive expansion of medical power, a new colonization of everyday
life by ‘authorities’ (not to mention the sexualization of the infant and children’s bodies,
which obviously had an important influence on the formation of psychotherapy).
Yet Foucault situates the campaign against masturbation in the larger context of
biopower’s increasing hegemony over society; he writes that “the nuclear family was
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required to take care [for] the child’s body quite simply because it was living and should
not die…[There was] a political and economic interest in the survival of the child.”616 He
characterizes the bourgeois concern with sexuality and hygiene as an affirmation, rather
than a repression, of the body, the body of an ascendant class which had to guard itself
against degeneration and guarantee its survival; thus, there is also a linkage with racist
discourses of the late nineteenth century.617 It was also the case, however, that parents
should educate their children according to certain schemas of rationality and
normalization. Indeed, Foucault argues that the “crusade against masturbation…is only
the chapter of a broader, well-known crusade for the natural education of children.”618
“Natural education” recognized a privileged role for the family in the instruction of
children, as well as emphasizing the importance of following conventions or rules “for
securing the survival of the children on the one hand and their training and normalized
development on the other.”619 As I indicated above, guaranteeing the “health” of the
children required the intervention of medical authorities; hence, “natural education”
needed to reconcile the “authenticity” of family life and parental supervision with the
oversight of bureaucrats who “protected” the child against corruption.620 Once again,
therefore, we encounter the basic dilemma of liberalism:

the “naturality” of

social/economic processes is guarded against “degeneration” by technologies of
intervention.
The education received from parents, in turn, was a preparation for instruction in
State institutions; around 1760, there was an increased demand for public education,
616
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which likewise coincided with the newly discovered risks of onanism. Foucault argues
that the common link between the two phenomena is their explicitly biopolitical
dimension.621 He writes that “[p]arents are not only asked to train their children so that
they will be useful to the State, but at the same time they are asked to cede back their
children to the State and entrust, if not their basic education, then at least their instruction
and technical training to an education directly and indirectly controlled by the State.”622
There was an implicit contract between parents and society: the State agreed to monitor
children and eliminate risk in the domestic sphere, with the understanding that parents
were obligated, as a form of recompense, to offer the talents and abilities of future
citizens to the body politic. Foucault imagines bureaucrats and technicians of power
addressing the bourgeoisie: “when we create for you this field of power so total and
complete, we ask you to give us in return your children’s bodies, or, if you prefer, their
abilities.”623

Thus, the Faustian bargain is struck, and liberalism’s obsession with

population begins to radiate into other discursive fields, such as sexuality, psychiatry and
education.
At first glance, Foucault’s example is trivial, or even irrelevant; how can we expect to
uncover the connection between liberalism and biopower by examining the anxieties of
bourgeois society? In actuality, however, the major elements of this relationship are
contained here; onanism is a danger to the social body, which it is important to combat.
But how do we guard the integrity of society’s hereditary ‘purity’? We must intervene,
of course, in the private sphere; but ultimately, we have to teach the child to exercise selfrestraint.
621
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indeed the ‘survival’, of the body politic. The child is normalized, emerging from the
process of ‘civilization’ as an autonomous subject, capable of turning his or her desires
towards ‘natural’ forms of labor and/or procreation. S/he is in control of the passions,
exercising self-governance and spiritual/corporeal discipline.

According to Nikolas

Rose,
[t]he government of freedom, here, may be analysed in terms of the deployment
of technologies of responsibilization. The home was to be transformed into a
purified, cleansed, moralized, domestic space. It was to undertake the moral
training of its children. It was to domesticate and familiarize the dangerous
passions of adults, tearing them away from public vice, the gin palace and the
gambling hall, imposing a duty of responsibility to each other, to home and to
children, and a wish to better their own condition. The family, from then on, has
a key role in strategies for government through freedom. It links public objectives
for the good health and good order of the social body with the desire of
individuals for personal health and well-being. A ‘private’ ethic of good health
and morality can thus be articulated on to a ‘public’ ethic of social order and
public hygiene, yet without destroying the autonomy of the family—indeed by
promising to enhance it.624
Rose’s term, which is admittedly awkward, nevertheless captures the logic of
governmentality which determined the nexus of liberalism/biopower; transforming
individuals into ‘responsible’ subjects who recognized the fragility of ‘civilization’ and
‘order’, biopower was the basis of stability in liberal societies. On the one hand, the
‘micro-body’ was integrated into a network of observation and discipline which produced
‘governable’ subjects; in addition, however, the ‘governable’ subject is ‘responsible’,
both to his/her family as well as the social, or ‘macro’, body.

The condition of

‘responsibility’ is autonomy, and the rationality/capacity for self-government of the
micro-body is constituted through biopolitical regimes of power. Thus, the individual is
conditioned to recognize his or her obligations to society; ‘private’ conduct is linked up
624
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with ‘public’ morality. And now we can answer the question I posed earlier, in relation
to Adam Smith: with enemies everywhere, both visible (i.e. the working poor) and
invisible enemies (i.e. masturbation and the ‘degeneration’ of society, with its origins in
private vice), how does the body politic defend its ‘integrity’? Via a double process: the
‘inclusion’ of micro-bodies who contribute to the ‘reproduction’ of the body politic, and
the exclusion of agents who are either (a) hereditary risks to the collective ‘health’ of the
social body or (b) incapable of accepting their ‘responsibilities’ to society.

I have

discussed ‘inclusion’ above; now, however, I want to highlight an example of biopolitical
exclusion in liberalism, focusing on the question of racism. Before I turn to the example,
however, I want to introduce Foucault’s examination of racism, which is informed by his
work on biopower.
As Foucault notes in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, biopolitical
strategies were the “anchorage points for the different varieties of racism of the
nineteenth and twentieth century.”625 Why is that the case? Recall that the reason, or at
least one important reason, for obsessively monitoring the sexual behavior of children
was to prevent them from engaging in practices which could lead to ‘degeneration’ in the
social body. In other words, the concerns about sexuality were, above all, motivated by
the question of population. Foucault argues that racism is located at the intersection of
biopolitics and population. In his March 17, 1976 lecture at the Collège de France, he
defines racism as
a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control:
the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the
biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the
hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are good and that others, in contrast,
625
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are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the
biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out groups that exist in
the population.626
Racism, therefore, is a strategy for dividing or segregating the biological field,
introducing a caesura between the normal and the pathological.

Racial ‘pathology’

threatens to destroy the biological integrity and hereditary normalcy of the body politic;
therefore, society is ‘justified’ in separating, and even exterminating, ‘inferior’ races
which ‘contaminate’ the population. There is, however, a second aspect of racism, which
standard characterizations generally ignore; the act of separation or killing—the logic of
apartheid—is, paradoxically, an affirmation of the life which survives.627

As the

‘impure’ elements are eliminated from the body politic, the population is ‘strengthened’
and its health is ‘restored’; the extermination of the other is an affirmation of society’s
power, and it emerges with a renewed vitality.628
Here I want to look at an example which demonstrates, in an admittedly graphic
way, the connections between population and sexuality in the racist imaginary, in
addition to highlighting the biopolitical operation of exclusion.

The history of

American segregation represents an attempt to prevent the ‘miscegenation’ or
‘contamination’ of ‘pure’ white bloodlines. Jim Crow laws tried to establish unequivocal
boundaries between blacks and whites (although this effort failed in practical terms,
especially in the realm of consumption629). The biopolitical desire for racial ‘purity’ was
626
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symbolized by the ‘one-drop rule’, a legal principle which classified any person with
African-American ancestry as black.630 The logic of racial purity, however, reached its
terrifying pinnacle in the spectacle of lynching.

Lynching was a strategy of

extermination, targeting blacks who demanded voting rights, challenged their employers
(either directly or indirectly, via union organization efforts) or exhibited ‘disrespect’
towards white ‘superiors’.631

One of the most commonly-cited justifications for

executing African-American men, however, was that they had raped white women, which
represented the ultimate affront to Southern ‘gentleman’; it was a violation of female
innocence, and more importantly it constituted a ‘transgression’ of Aryan racial purity.
The act of lynching was generally prefaced by a litany of the black person’s ‘crimes’,
read by members of the lynch party, followed by torture, dismemberment and
execution.632 An especially gruesome, yet highly symbolic, aspect of lynching was the
castration of alleged rapists. According to Catherine Holland, castration served two
functions. First, “it emasculated freedmen and thus undermined their ability to realize the
physical threat they were perceived to embody.”633 Secondly, it “worked to dramatize,
mobilize against, and vanquish rampant (white) anxieties provoked by the dissolution of
the markers of legal difference that had distinguished white men from black prior to
Reconstruction.”634 In short, it represented a strategy for eliminating the transgressor
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who had contaminated the (imagined) racial purity of WASP America’s body politic; it
was a method of ethnic cleansing.
Yet it is also an instructive example of the connections between sexuality and
population I alluded to above; there was, obviously, an element of revenge involved, but
castration added a biopolitical element to the murder of Southern blacks. Since they had
contaminated the population, it was necessary to eliminate the ‘offender’; in addition,
however, castration was a symbolic message to other blacks, that whites were unwilling
to tolerate the ‘pollution’ of the social body (which inevitably led, of course, to its
‘degeneration’). Here we encounter, therefore, the second face of biopower; the unity of
the body politic relied on ‘inclusionary’ disciplinary technologies of ‘responsibilization’,
yet it also demanded the exclusion of persons/groups who were different or ‘other’.
Thus, the unity of the body politic is achieved; between the disciplinary technologies of
power, which create governable subjects, and biopolitical logics of exclusion, which
eliminate ‘degenerative’ elements, the life of the social body is enhanced and
strengthened, its vitality continually renewed by the double process of normalization and
exile.

Liberal Governmentality: What Are the Philosophical Implications?
One question, however, which arises from my discussion in this chapter is the following:
what are the philosophical implications of Foucault’s genealogies (in this case, his
genealogy of liberal governmentality)? I can imagine liberals dismissing Foucault’s
work on governmentality as interesting historical work which is irrelevant for political
theory or philosophy. Yet this misses one of the essential points of Foucault’s work on
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the constitution of subjectivity.

Let’s return, for a moment, to the problem of

legitimation in the social contract. The social contract justifies the exercise of political
authority by highlighting the fact that autonomous subjects, of their own volition, agree
to transfer their sovereignty, or at least a part of their sovereignty, to a publicly
recognized legal entity, which in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau is called the body politic.
But where does the subject who authorizes ‘the Leviathan’ come from? How did it
become ‘free’?

Obviously the agent wasn’t born with the ability to calculate self-

advantage and reflect on the intricacies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma; rationality (of that
kind, at least) isn’t an innate property, and neither is autonomy. This is the vicious circle
of modern liberalism; as Torben Bech Dyrberg writes, “contract qua contract presupposes
that it is voluntarily entered by autonomous and rational individuals, otherwise it could
not be legally and morally binding. Yet this constitutive subject can, on the other hand,
only exist within a framework created by the contract (the social order), and this implies
that the contract not only presupposes the constitutive subject, but also takes an active
part in actually constituting it.”635 This is the blind spot of the initial decision procedure
in social contract theory (and especially its most important contemporary version, the
original position); it gives us no sense as to how political agency emerged in the first
place.636
Thus, an important philosophical implication of Nietzsche and Foucault’s work
on disciplinary power is that it offers the account which is absent from contract theory, or
at least from its recent developments. It is true, as I have indicated in Chapter 1, that
635
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Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are much better attuned to this question, but this, in turn,
forces us to recognize that the origins of ‘freedom’ are located, paradoxically, in forms of
determination. In short, the subject of liberalism has a history; it bears the scars of its
community, both mentally and physically. This is a point I made in Chapter 2, but it’s
worth re-iterating here, since it pertains to the relevance of Foucault’s insights for
political theory.

As I argued there, Rawls’s assumptions that we can strip away

‘contingent’ features of identity are problematic, since the ‘contingency’ of history
constitutes autonomy which is, in turn, presupposed by the original position. To return to
the language of liberal governmentality, ‘security’ is the condition of ‘liberty’.
In addition, remember that non-coercion is essential to Rawls’s project (but also
Habermas’s). An agreement which is extracted by force isn’t binding or valid; rather, the
parties must offer their consent freely. But how did we become the kinds of agents who
are capable of consenting to transfer our sovereignty to civil authorities? If Nietzsche
and Foucault are correct, the answer is clear: at least partially, through coercion. How,
therefore, will liberals who are interested in retaining the Rawlsian/Habermasian
emphasis on non-coercion respond to the apparent difficulty here? Is it the case that
coercion was permissible when it contributed to the formation of an ‘atuonomous’
subject, but impermissible when we’re agreeing to the rules of the social contract? If so,
why is the former acceptable, but not the latter?
This is a question I will return to in the final chapter; I can, however, indicate, at
least provisionally, my response to this dilemma. I will argue, again following Foucault,
that we must abandon the idea of ‘liberating’ subjects from coercion or political
technologies of subjectification (indeed, I put the term ‘liberating’ in scare quotes, since
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it presupposes autonomy, which is, in turn, a product of disciplinary technologies); rather,
it is important to recognize the inescapability of power in the constitution of ‘micro’ as
well as ‘macro’ bodies. It doesn’t follow, however, that political struggle is doomed to
failure, or that we must resign ourselves to oppression. This pessimistic conclusion is
only justified if we assume that power is intrinsically unjust or immoral, which I will
contest in the next chapter. An alternative is to begin thinking about specific forms of
power, asking whether or not, in a given context, power leads to domination, or whether
it is subject to reversal. Or so I will argue.
In addition to the problem of disciplinary inclusion in liberalism, however, I have
also highlighted the operation of exclusion in the construction of the body politic. How
does liberalism address the question of exclusion? There are forms of liberalism which
border on incoherence, since they emphasize universal inclusion and absolute tolerance.
I have already indicated, in Chapter Two, why I think unqualified tolerance is
indefensible, so I won’t repeat my arguments here. The overwhelming majority of
liberalism’s defenders, however, recognize the necessity of excluding forms of
‘otherness’ which are incompatible with values of pluralism and autonomy. At that
point, a new question arises:

do the proposed exclusions violate principles which

liberalism upholds? We can only answer this question on a case by case basis, but we
can say, as a general rule, that it is a more difficult problem for liberalism than for other
political theories, which openly and unapologetically admit the necessity of exclusion,
and don’t profess to value diversity of belief. In any case, in the next chapter I will, in
addition to outlining the implications of rejecting liberalism’s desire for an initial
decision procedure without power, deal with the question of exclusion, arguing (1) that
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every political theory (and a fortiori liberalism) has to exclude incompatible contents in
order to define itself or establish its identity, but (2) we should recognize the exclusions
as political, rather than moral. I am returning, in other words, to my discussion from
Chapter 2; I will come back to the criticisms of Rawls developed by Chantal Mouffe,
who admits the unavoidability of exclusion but argues that we have to interpret it in
political terms. What, however, is the difference between moral and political exclusions?
To give a preliminary answer, the former operate by identifying the other as ‘evil’, which
eliminates the possibility of dialogue, while the latter, at least in a democratic society, are
open to contestation and reversal. When we turn to liberalism as a practice of
governmentality, however, the problem is even clearer; I have argued in this chapter that
the unity of the body politic is constituted via the exclusion of agents who threaten to
‘contaminate’ the social body. Here we encounter of clash of two values which are
absolutely essential to the articulation of liberalism as a form of government: freedom
and security. On the one hand, autonomy is indispensable for liberal societies; at the
same time, however, ‘liberty’ can only flourish when the security of citizens is protected.
Hence, the difficulties of negotiating between two values which are critical to the
formation of liberalism as a form of praxis, a negotiation which verges on the impossible.
In any case, the next chapter will continue to pursue questions I have returned to
repeatedly in the dissertation, focusing on the necessity of exclusion in the construction
of political identities, as well as the importance of thinking differently about power.
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CHAPTER 4: ANTAGONIZING LIBERALISM, OR POWER AND THE DIALECTIC
OF INCLUSION/EXCLUSION
In the first chapter, I highlighted what Slavoj Zizek has called “the fundamental
ideological fantasy” (and I have referred to it subsequently), which is the idea of society
as a unified social body without antagonism or division. According to the corporeal
metaphor, the classes within society are (as Zizek puts it) complementary, rather than
heterogeneous and opposed, elements, and they contribute to the stability and oneness of
the community. Yet this fantasy simply conceals the failure of dominant ideologies to
erase the differences which constitute social orders; as Zizek writes, “fantasy is precisely
the way the antagonistic fissure is masked.”637

I have framed my examination of

liberalism, at least in part, in terms of its effacement of antagonism; I have argued that it
is caught up in Zizek’s “fundamental ideological fantasy” precisely because it pretends
that it has transcended, or at least has the conceptual resources for successfully
transcending, the corporatist fantasy. By valuing pluralism, diversity and tolerance,
liberals claim that they differentiate themselves from their historical adversaries, such as
the conservatism of the Old Regime and its vision of an organically unified body politic
(here, of course, I am thinking of the king’s body politic) as well as the political
biologism of twentieth century totalitarianism. Yet I have argued in the first three
chapters that both the theory and practice of liberalism exhibit unsettling continuities with
its supposed enemies. While it is important to emphasize that it is problematic to suggest
that liberalism and absolutist monarchies, or liberalism and totalitarianism, are reducible
to one another, such that we could eliminate the need for conceptual differentiation, it is
637
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nevertheless true that liberalism marginalizes the ‘other’, whether s/he is ‘mad’, a person
of color, female or simply ‘illiberal’ and, at the same time, defends the utilization of
disciplinary technologies to produce the ‘autonomous’, normalized subjects who
legitimize the social contract. This double movement of exclusion/inclusion, in turn,
structurally parallels logics that govern the policing of subjectivities in liberalism’s
historical competitors.
The difficulty for liberalism, of course, is that it explicitly privileges inclusion. The
guardians of the king’s boy politic celebrated a mystical, eternal social unity (which
never, of course, actually existed); likewise, the Nazis methodically executed the task of
‘cleansing’ the body politic. In both cases, the regime and its advocates unapologetically
targeted the enemies of the social order, the ‘others’ who threatened to undermine the
homogeneity of the body politic. In the shadows of totalitarianism, of course, the virtues
of inclusion are evident; liberalism, however, finds itself in the conceptual dilemma of
having to promote tolerance while at the same time excluding non-liberals.
In response to the charges mentioned above, liberal advocates can invoke the
familiar distinction between the normative principles defended by liberals and empirical
instantiations of liberalism in political regimes. Is it the case that, for example, practices
of exclusion within liberal societies represent aberrations or deviations from liberal
theory? I have tried to show, in the previous chapter, that even in Rawls’ ideal liberal
polity, which is highly sensitive to issues of pluralism and diversity, it is necessary to
exclude non-liberal comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a
political regime which is totally inclusive; even a communist society excludes the
enemies of the proletariat. In any case, in this chapter I will continue exploring the
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question of exclusion, arguing that liberalism (indeed, any political theory) necessarily
excludes elements which are incompatible with maintaining its political identity. Here I
draw on arguments from Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (among others) in order to
demonstrate the impossibility of total inclusion, even for a political orientation which has
privileged tolerance as a foundation of its theoretical identity.
There is, however, a second aspect of my critique. I have also focused on what I
called, following Foucault, ‘disciplinary inclusion’. In addition to excluding ideologies,
political orientations and ethnicities/genders who are ‘insufficiently rational’ to
participate in the social contract, liberal theorists have defended, and even celebrated, the
mobilization of disciplinary technologies in order to produce subjects who
‘autonomously’ participate in the legitimation of political regimes. The ‘autonomy’ of
the subject, which is at least in part represented by his or her ability to engage in selfpolicing and control rebellious desires that threaten to undermine the stability of the
social order, emerges from a complex network of practices and institutions. Thus, the
subject who ‘freely’ validates the social contract is him or herself caught up in a dense
web of governance; in short, the autonomous and rational subjects who are tacitly
presupposed by liberalism are already intertwined with coercive mechanisms of power.
This was one of the points I tried to highlight in Chapter 3, by appealing to Nietzsche
and, once again, Foucault: the liberty which is valorized by social contract theory
presupposes a ‘security’ which still appeals, albeit in subtly (as well as radically)
modified ways, to the old logics of what Foucault calls the Polizeiwissenschaften.
At the core of both criticisms is a suggestion that it is important to examine the
concrete mechanism of power celebrated in the writings of prominent liberals such as
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Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau. Indeed, the classical liberals understood this far better than
contemporary liberalism, which pretends it is capable of neglecting such discussions by
hiding behind the appeal to normativity. In the work of Rawls, for example, the initial
legitimation procedure occurs in the hyper-abstract context of his original position. Even
Political Liberalism, which is ostensibly dedicated to a more pragmatic and localized
justification of liberal-democratic regimes, continues to invoke the original position. Yet
when Rawls wants to defend the ‘overlapping consensus’ against its enemies, the
unavoidability of discussing questions of power becomes all the more evident.
Another aspect of my discussion in this chapter, then, is an examination of Foucault’s
analysis of power. If it is the case that ignoring or marginalizing discussions of power
represents, at the very least, a naïve belief that normative theory can afford to offer
prescriptions for the governance of society without examining how they are implemented
(a naïve belief which has potentially devastating consequences), and at worst a disregard
for the violence which often accompanies efforts to construct (or reconstruct) society in
the image of theoretical blueprints, then we need to shift our discussion away from the
normative and towards the empirical (while being careful not to completely abandon the
former). This part of the argument is premised, of course, on the assumption that political
theory is ultimately oriented towards praxis, and that when we formulate political theory
we are interested in thinking about the concrete organization of society. The argument
will necessarily fail to impress a theoretician who is uninterested in practical applications,
but as I have argued in previous chapters, political philosophy is directed towards
concrete social transformations, in addition to theory.

In any case, I want to highlight
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the importance of thinking about power in the context of political theory, and here, as I
noted above, my guide is Foucault.
Finally, this chapter closes with an overview of the dissertation’s argument, and offers
a series of reflections on the state of our current political impasses, as well as how we
could potentially move beyond them.

Arguing for the Unavoidability of Exclusion, and How to Conceptualize It: Laclau and
Mouffe
As I have indicated throughout the dissertation, liberalism strives for inclusion. Yet as I
have tried to demonstrate in previous chapters, it reaches its limits when it encounters its
‘others’ and defends practices of exclusion. Why is that the case? Here, I want to argue
that every political theory (and a fortiori liberalism) necessarily excludes certain
elements which are incompatible with its theoretical assumptions. In making my case, I
turn to the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, all of whom have challenged
certain key assumptions of contemporary liberalism, especially focusing on its
valorization of rationality and its desire to eliminate antagonism from political discourse.
This section, however, appropriates their work on the question of exclusion.
We can begin by noting that political philosophy has (at least historically) aimed for
universality or generality. What does it mean, however, to say that it searches for
universality or generality? Political philosophy tries to develop normative criteria for
determining the just social order. In Plato’s well-ordered city-state, therefore, each class
performs a specific function; indeed, his definition of justice is “doing one’s own
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work”638 (and in the just city-state, members of different, segregated classes avoid
interfering with one another’s labor639). In Aristotle, the state is directed towards the
highest end640 (which is the promotion of virtue641) and for Aquinas laws are oriented, at
least theoretically, towards the “common good”.642
What is liberalism’s position vis-à-vis the defense of strong normative principles
and prescriptions for achieving justice in society?

At first glance, liberalism is

distinguished from other political theories insofar as it opposes the idea of a “common
good”. Rather, it defends the importance of tolerating heterogeneous conceptions of the
good; it recognizes the pluralism of modernity, and the necessity of affirming differences
in conditions of radical pluralism. Or so we are told. But as I tried to demonstrate in the
previous chapter, liberalism is incapable of avoiding a ‘thick’ conception of the good,
since the second legitimacy of, for example, the deontological principles which explicitly
inform Rawls’s argument are subject to intense debate. It is problematic, therefore, to
take liberalism’s pretended rejection of strong comprehensive doctrines at face value.
Liberalism, like the dominant political theories of Greek antiquity and medieval
Christendom, also presupposes an idea of the “common good”, namely the idea that order
is best preserved when we respect the autonomy of others to choose which
comprehensive doctrines they affirm and/or deny. Thus, it adopts an inclusive stance
towards otherness.
Yet the importance of inclusion and defending autonomy, as we saw in the
previous chapter, in turn rests on strong ethico-political assumptions and necessitates the
638
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exclusion of doctrines which affirm monistic or singular conceptions of the good. While
Rawls’s political liberalism is even more inclusive than classical liberalism, admitting
any comprehensive doctrine which is ‘reasonable’, he still confronts the unavoidability of
excluding theories which are ‘unreasonable’ (and the ‘reasonability’ of a doctrine is
contingent, in a viciously circular way, on whether or not it affirms the values of liberal
democracies). In any case, the essential point here is that liberalism, like other political
theories, tries to formulate generalizable normative criteria or prescriptions for governing
society. Therefore, it necessarily excludes non-compatible orientations.643
Ernesto Laclau has argued, moreover, that every political theory is constructed
through acts or moments of exclusion. Why is that the case? Here, it is important to
recall the point I mentioned above: a political theory offers universalizable claims about
the structure of a just society. Yet as Laclau recognizes, in order to construct the
universal, it is necessary to eliminate the particular; otherwise, generality is tainted or
contaminated by specific contents. Appearances to the contrary, he is not engaging in
politically irrelevant thought experiments; rather, this problem takes us to the heart of the
following question:

Can liberalism, indeed any political movement, construct a

universalizable theory which is totally inclusive?

I will argue that the answer is a

resounding ‘no’, but in order to defend my position I have to begin with a set of
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arguments which are highly abstract.

Abstraction is, unfortunately, unavoidable, since

I’m trying to highlight structural features of every political theory. After I’ve examined
the formal aspects of the argument, however, I will offer specific examples which
illustrate the point.
Laclau’s approach to the question of identity is influenced by Ferdinand de
Saussure’s work on linguistics, and specifically the idea that the value of a sign is
relational, or identified by its differences from other signs in a linguistic network.644
Jacob Torfing gives the following illustration: “the meaning of the term ‘socialism’ is
given only in relation to the meaning of the terms ‘feudalism’, ‘capitalism’, etc.”645 It is
already evident, from this example, how his analysis is applicable to political concepts,
but Laclau has argued that Saussure’s model allows us to understand the operation of any
signifying system, including the formation of identities. In “Why Do Empty Signifiers
Matter to Politics”, he argues that “the totality of language is involved in each act of
signification.”646 If we return to Torfing’s example, we can appreciate this point;
“socialism” is only comprehensible through its difference from “capitalism”, which is
defined

in opposition to “feudalism”, etc. The differences, therefore, must constitute a

system or a totality; otherwise, signification is impossible647. In order to grasp the
system, however, we must differentiate it from another totality, which entails positing
limits on the field of signification (since without limits we couldn’t identify it as a
644
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system; we couldn’t distinguish, for example, system A from system B). At the same
time, positing a limit implies that there is an X which is excluded from the system; in
other words, “to think of the limits of something is the same as thinking of what is
beyond those limits.”648 We cannot, however, represent the limit of a signifying system;
if we could, it wouldn’t constitute a limit on the system. Rather, it would become one
more element in the totality of a signifying network. Thus, according to Laclau, “”if
what we are talking about are the limits of a signifying system, it is clear that those limits
cannot be themselves signified, but have to show themselves as the interruption or
breakdown of the process of signification.”649 The paradox of Laclau’s conclusion is
obvious: the system’s constituitive limits are both the condition of its possibility as well
as its impossibility, since the limits represent “a blockage of the continuous expansion of
the process of signification.”650 But in positing a limit, we also posit the existence of an
‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ of the system which is excluded; as Laclau writes, “the only
possibility of having a true outside would be that the outside is not simply one more,
neutral element but an excluded one, something that the totality expels from itself in
order to constitute itself.”651
While Laclau’s discussion is, as I mentioned above, highly abstract, it has
important implications for the conceptualization of political theory. We can begin with
the (relatively) straightforward examples:

the ‘system’ of Nazism constituted itself

through the exclusion of the ‘non-Aryan’ (including Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, etc.), and
Stalinism tried to unify the body politic through the elimination of ‘enemies of the
648
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regimes’ (i.e. ‘bourgeois sympathizers’, ‘capitalist pigs’, etc.).

In both cases, the

‘closure’ of the totality is ‘achieved’ (and I put the terms in scare quotes for reasons
which I will return to momentarily) through the expulsion of ‘impure’ or ‘contaminated’
elements. There is, of course, no surprise that the model explicates key aspects of
totalitarian theory/practice; totalitarianism, after all, was open about, and even celebrated
as a virtue, its exclusivity. The hypothesis becomes more interesting, however, if we turn
to contemporary liberalism. Is it the case that liberal political theory also operates
through exclusions? Does it constitute its identity by excluding the ‘non-liberal’ or
‘irrational’ other? Is Laclau’s argument valid for an inclusive, pluralistic system? I have
already touched on these issues in previous chapters; here, though, we can begin to think
about this problem via the concept of tolerance. Once again, I will turn to the work of
Laclau.
We can begin with the following question: how does an examination of tolerance
allow us to deal with the questions I presented above? One of the virtues of liberalism
(and here I think it is fair to characterize any liberalism in this way) is that it recognizes
the importance of tolerance.

As I indicated in my discussion of Rawls, however,

toleration encounters limits when we apply it in the realm of practice. As Laclau notes,
“[a]n unambiguous toleration would be one which has, within itself, no room at all for
intolerance.”652

He contends, however, that an “unambiguous” toleration is “self-

defeating”.653 There are two difficulties we immediately encounter. First of all, a tolerant
society which adopts a permissive attitude towards intolerance risks becoming its other,
i.e. an intolerant society. Secondly, there are certain practices which communities refuse
652

See Ernesto Laclau, “Deconstruction, Pragmatism and Hegemony” in Deconstruction and Pragmatism,
ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge, 1996), 50.
653
Ibid.

225
to tolerate because they are morally unacceptable.654 Is it the case that we can refer to
moral norms in order to construct transparent rules for determining what is, and is not,
tolerable? Laclau argues that the answer is ‘no’; rather than establishing a clear boundary
between the tolerant and intolerant, we have simply shifted the argument into the realm
of moral discourse. But this “ethical recasting of the issue…simply dissolves ‘toleration’
as a meaningful concept”.655 Indeed, ‘toleration’ implies an acceptance of practices I
disagree with; to once more cite Laclau, “[i]f what I tolerate is what I morally approve…I
am not tolerating anything. At the most, I am redefining the limits of a perfectly
intolerant position. Tolerance only starts when I morally disapprove of something and,
however, I accept it. The very condition of approaching the question of toleration is to
start realizing that it is not an ethical question at all.”656
Thus, in relation to the concept of “unambiguous toleration”, we are left with a
deadlock. Either we ground “tolerance” self-referentially, in which case it threatens to
become “intolerance”, or we can ground it in a different set of norms, it which case it is
dissolved.657 Laclau tries to formulate an exit from the aporia: he argues that in a
pluralistic society, tolerance requires suspension of ethical judgment concerning different
beliefs.

There is, however, a limit to our agnostic obligations; if a multicultural

community is unified by its affirmation of the principle of tolerance, its generosity can’t
be unlimited.658 In that case, however, we are back to Laclau’s structural model of
identity formation: “to be intolerant of some things is the very condition to be tolerant of
others. Intolerance is, at the same time, the condition of possibility and impossibility of
654
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toleration.”659 The system (here, call it tolerance) is constituted via its difference from
intolerance; therefore, we couldn’t define its specificity unless its conceptual other served
as a limit to its expansion. At the same time, the necessity of exercising intolerance, at
least in certain instances, represents the “impossibility” of pure, “unambiguous
tolerance”. Hence, Laclau’s conclusion: “intolerance is…the condition of possibility and
impossibility of toleration.”
Now, hopefully, the importance of Laclau’s argument for liberalism is beginning
to emerge.

Liberalism identities itself as a political theory which is tolerant, but

tolerance, if it means anything conceptually, requires a degree of intolerance when it is
confronted with non-liberal conceptions of the good.

Thus, it is forced to exclude

intolerant doctrines; indeed, this is, at least partially, how it differentiates itself from the
Old Regime or totalitarianism. Otherwise, how could we recognize the specificity of
liberal theories? There are obviously different ways of identifying the essential features
of liberalism, but they also require differentiation. If we choose ‘freedom’ as the basic
component of liberalism, for example, we will define it in opposition to societies which
limit autonomy (once again, the Old Regime and twentieth century totalitarianism come
to mind). Laclau’s central point, however, is that any political theory, indeed any form of
identity, will define itself as other than an excluded X; therefore, liberalism, to the extent
that it is a political theory/identity, necessarily excludes its others (whether we
characterize them as ‘irrational’, ‘evil’, ‘enemies of the state’, etc.).
I have already highlighted exclusions in Rawls’s political theory; if we return to A
Theory of Justice, for example, Rawls eliminates ‘contingent’ features of the agent from
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the original position660, and in Political Liberalism he argues that we have to “contain”
the plague of “unreasonable comprehensive doctrines”, since they resemble “war or
disease”.661 Thus, his conception of liberalism illustrates Laclau’s point. In order to
construct a ‘rational’ totality we have to exclude ‘irrational’ elements. If it’s the case that
every system necessarily excludes its other, however, is there any reason to criticize
liberalism?

Why should we single it out, given the inescapability of Laclau’s

framework? I will begin with the second question. Liberalism has a unique relationship
with the problem of exclusion; unlike its historical opponents, it defines itself as an
‘inclusive’ theory.

Thus, the unavoidability of exclusion is a special concern for

liberalism. But the first question is more important to answer, and it will allow me to
highlight one of the primary difficulties with liberalism’s attitude towards exclusion.
Here I want to highlight Chantal Mouffe’s position on this issue, which I mentioned
briefly in Chapter 2.
In “Democracy, Power and the Political” Mouffe argues that Rawls justifies
exclusions by appealing to moral, rather than political, concepts. She contends that one
of the key ideas in Political Liberalism is the concept of political morality. According to
Mouffe, Rawls (along with other important figures in contemporary liberalism, such as
Charles Larmore) tries to establish the parameters for a moral consensus on the basic
institutions of liberal societies, which would allow us to move beyond prudential or
modus vivendi defenses of liberalism.662 She examines his rationale for distinguishing
between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines; as she notes, the
660
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criteria for differentiating acceptable and unacceptable conceptions of the good refers, at
least in part, to the question of whether a conception threatens to subvert liberal values in
the public sphere.663 If that’s the case, however, the criteria of exclusion are actually
justified by appealing to political concepts, or difficulties created by ‘illiberal’ or
‘irrational’ worldviews.664 Thus, he obscures the issue by characterizing the exclusion in
moral language.

While Mouffe agrees that it is necessary to exclude non-liberal

comprehensive doctrines from the public sphere, she believes that we have to defend the
exclusions by referring to political, rather than moral, categories.665
An obvious question immediately arises:

why does Mouffe emphasize the

distinction between morality and politics? Isn’t the essential point that we have to
provide normative arguments for excluding conception X, and including Y? If we can
formulate adequate criteria with reference to political or moral concepts, what’s the
difference? According to Mouffe, it’s significant. In order to appreciate the point,
however, we must examine the key aspects, or at least one of the key aspects, of
Mouffe’s political theory. Mouffe argues, following Carl Schmitt, that the essence of the
political is the ‘friend-enemy’ distinction (although she attaches qualifications to her
endorsement, which I will return to momentarily).666

In Mouffe’s interpretation of

Schmitt, the ‘friend-enemy’ distinction is characterized by the formation of collective
identities which define themselves as ‘we’, in opposition to a ‘they’. As Mouffe writes,
the political “has to do with conflict and antagonism and is therefore the realm of
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decision.”667 She contends that liberalism is unable to recognize the irreducibility of
conflict in political life; in the following passage, she offers a description of
contemporary liberalism as well as a diagnosis of its fundamental misconceptions:
[T]he dominant tendency in liberal thought is characterized by a rationalist and
individualist approach which forecloses acknowledging the nature of collective
identities. This kind of liberalism is unable to adequately grasp the pluralistic
nature of the social world, with the conflicts that pluralism entails; conflicts for
which no rational solution could ever exist. The typical liberal understanding of
pluralism is that we live in a world in which there are indeed many perspectives
and values and that, owing to empirical limitations, we will never be able to adopt
them all, but that, when together, the constitute an harmonious and nonconflictual ensemble. This is why this type of liberalism must negate the political
in its antagonistic dimensions.668
Liberalism’s failure to understand “the ineradicable character of antagonism”, however,
is problematic.669

For Mouffe, the constitution of a we/they formation requires

antagonistic exclusions; the negation of the other is the condition of the community’s
identity. But it is important to determine how, precisely, we conceptualize antagonistic
relationships. As I indicated above, Mouffe argues that liberalism justifies excluding
“unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines by appealing to moral concepts (although on her
reading the terms of exclusion are political). What happens, however, if we defend
exclusion on the basis of moral language?
According to Mouffe, there is a significant danger here; it practical terms, it
entails a demonization of the other. Rather than seeing our adversary as a political
opponent, and confronting him or her in the public arena of ideas, we view him or her as
‘immoral’.

She writes that “instead of being constructed in political terms, the

‘we’/’they’ opposition constituitive of politics is now constructed according to moral
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categories of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’.”670 Indeed, as Rawls’s language demonstrates (recall
his observation that we have to treat unreasonable comprehensive doctrines like “war or
disease”) the “evil other” becomes, to once again quote Mouffe, a “moral disease”.671
And how can we deal with evil? It is the pure negation of good, with no redeeming
qualities, and since the other is ‘unreasonable’ to boot, there’s no hope of dialogue. How
can you reason with Thrasymachus? The only alternative, in that case, is to eradicate
alterity.672 The most obvious example in recent memory, of course, is President George
W. Bush’s reference to an “axis of evil”.673 Once Saddam became an ‘evil madman’ (in
addition to being ‘evil’ he was also ‘irrational’) who was determined to acquire weapons
of mass destruction and establish relationships with terrorists, there was no alternative to
war. In the run-up to Gulf War II, the administration viewed political dialogue with other
global actors as useless; it was simply a form of temporizing, a strategy for avoiding our
‘moral responsibility’. Hence Mouffe’s point.
While Mouffe’s arguments are powerful, there are (at least) three difficulties which
are evident. First of all, is there a necessary connection between the ‘moralization’ of
antagonism and destructive attitudes/behavior towards the other? Clearly the answer is
no; I do believe, however, that her hypothesis is intuitively plausible.

Dealing with

antagonism in a political context is, in all probability, more conducive to stability than
labeling your opponent ‘evil’, ‘unreasonable’ or a ‘disease’. This, however, brings me to
my second point (which is actually a question):

when Mouffe attacks the liberal

‘moralization’ of conflict, does she implicitly refer to moral principles?
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true, then isn’t the argument guilty of what Habermas calls a ‘performative contradiction’
(i.e. it presupposes, either implicitly or explicitly, the normative principles it criticizes)?
The answer to both questions, I think, is ‘no’; in Mouffe’s “The Ethics of Democracy”,
for example, she writes that “I am not arguing that politics should be dissociated from
ethics or moral concerns, but that their relation should be posed in a different way”.674 In
On the Political she returns to this question; there, she sharpens her response by
highlighting the distinction between ethics and morality, and argues that politics is an
ethical, rather than moral, project. In contrast to Habermas and Rawls, Mouffe does not
“attempt to present liberal democracy as the idealized model which would be chosen by
every rational individual in idealized conditions.”675 She characterizes “the normative
dimensions inscribed in political institutions as being of an ‘ethico-political’ nature, to
indicate that it always refers to specific practices, depending on particular contexts, and
that it is not the expression of a universal morality.”676 In this regard, she argues that
“since Kant morality is often presented as a realm of universal commands where there is
no place for ‘rational disagreement’. This is, in my view, incompatible with recognizing
the deeply pluralistic character of the modern world and irreducible conflict of values.”677
In other words, liberalism justifies exclusion by appealing to ‘universal morality’.
Mouffe, however, invokes ‘ethical’ criteria which are grounded in specific political
contexts. In particular, she argues that the exclusion appeals to ‘ethico-political’ ideas
which reflect the culture of liberal-democratic societies.678 Thus, it is incorrect to assert
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that political exclusions implicitly rely on moral assumptions, at least if we understand
‘morality’ as the expression of universally valid principles.679
undermines the charge of performative contradiction.

This fact, in turn,

At the same time, however,

Mouffe doesn’t eliminate ethical theory from political discourse; rather, political
exclusions draw on the community’s values.680 Finally, there is a third problem: if
exclusion is necessary, what is the difference between “moral” exclusion and “political”
exclusion? While Mouffe is less exact on this point, there are two parts to the answer.
First of all, political exclusion is more honest: it recognizes that antagonism and power
are unavoidable features of political life, and it doesn’t try to justify exclusion by
demonizing the other or labeling non-liberal comprehensive doctrines ‘unreasonable’.681
Rather, groups are excluded for political reasons (i.e. because they reject basic
presupposition of the political order in question). As Mouffe writes,
To call the anti-liberals ‘unreasonable’ is a way of stating that such views cannot
be admitted as legitimate within the framework of a liberal-democratic regime.
This is indeed the case, but the reason is not a moral one. It is because
antagonistic principles of legitimacy cannot coexist within the same political
association without putting in question the political reality of the state. However,
to be properly formulated, such a thesis calls for a theoretical framework that
asserts that the political is always constitutive—which is precisely what liberalism
denies.682
Secondly, by framing the exclusions as political rather than moral we indicate that the
limits between ‘permissible’ and ‘impermissible’ doctrines are fluid and subject to
rationality and that liberal democratic principles can be defended only as being constituitive of our form of
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debate. To once again cite Mouffe, “[i]nstead of trying to erase the traces of power and
exclusion, democratic politics requires that they be brought to the fore, making them
visible so that they can enter the realm of contestation.”683 If the other ‘irrational’ or
‘evil’ it is impossible (or at least very difficult) to engage in dialogue; if the other is
‘irrational’, then we can’t begin a conversation, since the agent isn’t subject to rational
persuasion, and if they’re ‘evil’, they don’t have any regard for the moral principles
which operate in a given community. But if the limits which produced an exclusion are
recognized as the contingent results of political discussion in an open society, the other is
invited to join the democratic process.
Here I want to highlight Mouffe’s arguments for an ‘agonistic’ theory of
democracy, which confronts the question of antagonism in a different way than
liberalism. I had noted earlier that Mouffe appropriates Schmitt’s work on the political,
arguing that antagonism is an irreducible feature of political life. She also, however,
expresses concerns about the implications of Schmitt’s conceptualization of the we-they
distinction. As Mouffe notes, Schmitt characterizes the political in terms of the friendenemy antithesis. In the Concept of the Political, for example, he writes that “[t]he
specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that
between friend and enemy.”684

While Mouffe recognizes, along with Schmitt, the

unavoidability of exclusions and conflict, it is important to emphasize the inherent
dangers of viewing the other as an ‘enemy’. She argues that we need to develop a new
way of thinking about the ‘we/they’ distinction. We can’t discard the insight that a
community always defines itself in opposition to an ‘other’; at the same time, however,
683
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we don’t necessarily have to interpret otherness as the face of a menacing alterity or an
enemy.685 Rather, we have to uncover a way of allowing conflict to operate in the space
of the political, without pretending that we can definitively eliminate antagonism via
rationality or procedural mechanisms. In short, Mouffe wants to combine the idea that
antagonism is ineradicable with the recognition that contemporary democracies are
pluralistic. How can we reconcile the two facts? In response to this question, Mouffe
offers what she calls an ‘agonistic’ theory of democracy; as she writes, “If we want to
acknowledge on the one side permanence of the antagonistic dimension of the conflict,
while on the other side allowing for the possibility of its ‘taming’, we need to envisage a
third type of relation.

This is the type of relation which I have proposed to call

‘agonism’.”686
What, therefore, is unique or specific to an ‘agonistic’ version of politics? We
can contrast it with ‘antagonism’; to once again cite Mouffe, “[w]hile antagonism is a
we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any common
ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although
acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize
the legitimacy of their opponents.

They are ‘adversaries’, not ‘enemies’.”687

Furthermore, “[w]e could say that the task of democracy is to transform antagonism into
agonism.”688 An ‘agonistic’ politics recognizes that we need consensus on foundational
political values (in a democracy, for example, the importance of liberty and equality), but
685

Indeed, Mouffe argues that “[a]ccording to Schmitt, there is no possibility of pluralism—that is,
legitimate dissent among friends—and conflictuality is relegated to the exterior of the democratic unity.”
Cf. her introduction to The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London: Verso, 1999), 5.
686
On the Political, 20.
687
Ibid.
688
Ibid. Also see Mouffe’s “For an Agonistic Model of Democracy” in The Democratic Paradox,
especially pages 98-105.

235
the meaning of basic principles is always subject to interpretation.689 Therefore, an
agonistic theory highlights the unavoidability of what Mouffe calls a “conflictual
consensus”.690

In a “conflictual consensus”, members of the community share

assumptions about ethico-political values. At the same time, however, they disagree
about how we should interpret core beliefs, or implement them in political practice.691 As
Mouffe writes, “[i]n a pluralist democracy such disagreements are not only legitimate but
also necessary. They provide the stuff of democratic politics.”692 I will return to this
question later in the chapter; next, however, I want to explore the question of antagonism,
and the constitution of political regimes, in greater detail.

We have examined the

unavoidability of exclusion in the construction of political systems and identities, but
now I will complicate the picture I sketched out above by returning to Laclau continuing
with my discussion of Chantal Mouffe.

Specifically, I will examine the roles of

antagonism and power in the construction of ‘universal’ norms. Following Laclau, I will
argue that ‘universal’ norms aren’t able to eliminate traces of particularity and history;
thus, it is problematic to believe that we can escape from the operation of power by
appealing to ‘coercion-free’ norms. In the first three chapters I tried to show how forms
of power, history and culture operate in social contract theory and liberalism; now, I want
to give a more formal demonstration of the same point. This will also begin to defuse
one of the counterarguments I mentioned earlier in the dissertation; I noted that one way
liberals can evade, or at least try to evade, the argument that social contract theory relies
on biopower in order to establish the conditions for a unified social body is to invoke the
689
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distinction between the contingent aspects of a theory and its normative ‘universality’. In
other words, they can dismiss the appearance of technologies of power in liberalism as
‘contingent’ departures from the ‘universal’ norms of non-coerced, autonomous
cooperation. In this section of the essay, I hope I can finally eliminate this argumentative
strategy by showing that the ‘universal’ is necessarily ‘contaminated’ (dare I say, the
body politic is necessarily ‘contaminated’) by the ‘contingency’ of power and social
division.

Universality, the Particular and Antagonism: Social Division in the Body Politic
In this section of the chapter, we can return to Ernesto Laclau’s work, focusing on
Emancipation(s). He approaches the relationship between universality and particularism
in an original way, via the problem of ‘incarnation’, or how the universal is manifested in
particular contents. According to Laclau, the Western philosophical tradition has adopted
four different, and historically successive, positions on the relationship between
universality and particularity. First of all, ancient philosophy argued that there is a sharp
point of demarcation between the universal and particular, and we can grasp the concept
of universality purely through the use of reason.693 On this interpretation, we are left
with two possibilities; as Laclau notes, “either the particular realizes itself in the
universal—that is it eliminates itself as particular and transforms itself in a transparent
medium though which universality operates—or it negates the universal by asserting its
particularism (but as the latter is purely irrational, it has no entity of its own and can only
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exist as corruption of being).”694 Thus, the particular is absorbed into the universal, and
its particularity is eliminated; or it exists in itself, in which case it is regarded as pure
negation and “corruption”. A second theory of universality is formulated by Christianity;
here the universal is incarnated in the body of a temporal subject, and God is the
“absolute mediator”. According to Laclau, this is an important moment in the Western
intellectual tradition, since it gives birth to a new logic governing the relationship
between universalism and particularity; now a “privileged agent of history” or a
“particular body” functions as the “expression of a universality transcending it”, with
God acting as the mediator between heaven and earth.695
The next major transformation occurs with the emergence of what he calls
“secularized eschatologies”; if Christianity posited God as the mediator between the
universal and particular, modernity grounds ‘salvation’ in a purely rational fashion,
which means that the principles of emancipation and the logics governing historical
processes are, as Laclau puts it, “fully transparent to human reason”.696 Accordingly, the
relationship between universality and particularity should also be accessible to human
reason; therefore, we can’t invoke a mysterious, transcendent entity to guarantee
mediation between the universal and particular.

Rather, the universal is grounded

immanently; or as Laclau writes, “we have to postulate a body which is, in and of itself,
the universal.”697 This means that the gap between reality and rationality is eliminated (at
least in theory) and universality is instantiated in the body of a particular historical agent,
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such as the European bourgeoisie or the proletariat.698 But this generated a new problem;
as Laclau writes, “[t]he universal had found its own body, but this was still the body of a
certain particularity—European culture of the nineteenth century.”699
Laclau highlights two examples of this discrepancy; on the one hand, European
imperialism understood itself as the representative of ‘universal’ values, and forms of
cultural otherness were interpreted as ‘particularities’. Thus, the process as colonization
was viewed as a struggle between the ‘universal’ values of European modernity and the
‘particular’ values of local cultures, rather than a conflict between two different
manifestations of particularity.700 On the other hand, and in a more progressive context,
we encounter the familiar difficulties of Leninism in the twentieth century; as Laclau
notes, “[b]etween the universal character of the tasks of the working class and the
particularity of its concrete demands an increasing gap opened, which had to be filled by
the Party as representative of the historical interests of the proletariat. The gap between
class itself and class for itself opened the way to a succession of substitutions: the Party
replaced the class, the autocrat the Party, and so on.”701 Here, of course, Laclau is
referencing Lenin’s attempt to address the question of proletariat consciousness; the
working class was unaware of its privileged historical role, so it needed a “vanguard” to
guide it towards a recognition of its emancipatory task. But this move simply creates a
new tension between the universal and particular; the Party, which is the incarnation of
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universality, disavows or refuses to acknowledge its particularity, which in turn leads to a
dismissal of other perspectives as “false consciousness.”702
In the wake of postmodernism, which correctly recognizes the dangers of
totalizing metanarratives that fail to understand the importance of particularity, there has
been a movement in the opposite direction, towards an uncritical valorization of the
specific and local. But as Laclau notes, there are difficulties here as well; if I establish
particularism as a normative principle without any appeal to broader universal values,
there is no criteria which allows us to differentiate, for example, between progressive and
reactionary forms of nationalism.703
particularism.

They are both, after all, manifestations of

Likewise, unless we assume, implausibly, that different forms of

particularism are necessarily compatible, we have to find ways of adjudicating disputes
between antagonistic parties in the social body.704 At that point, we have to invoke more
general criteria. In short, then, we can’t dispense with the category of “universality.”
But how should we think about it? And more specifically, how should we characterize
the relationship between the universal and particular?
In order to answer this question, I will return to Laclau’s essay “Why Do Empty
Signifiers Matter to Politics?” Earlier in the chapter, I had reconstructed part of Laclau’s
analysis concerning structural features of identity formation; according to Laclau, every
act of signification involves the totality of language, since the value of a sign is
established via its difference from other signs in a given system. The system is only
recognizable, however, if it is defined in opposition to an excluded other. Thus, we have
two systems; we can call them A and B, with A representing a system of differences, and
702
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B standing for its negation. If we think about A for a moment, we immediately notice
that its elements are different from one another (recall that Laclau follows Saussure here);
otherwise, we couldn’t recognize their specificity.

Laclau goes on to develop the

argument, however, by noting that the elements are, at the same time, equivalent to one
another insofar as they belong to system A rather than system B.705 If we apply the
argument to the construction of identities, for example, all the identities contained in A
are equivalent precisely insofar as they are constituted through the same exclusions.706 A
parallel logic of difference/equivalence is operable on the other side of the frontier, in
system B; as Laclau writes, “[i]n order to be the signifiers of the excluded…the various
excluded categories have to cancel their differences through the formation of a chain of
equivalences to that which the system demonizes in order to signify itself.”707 The
equivalent signifiers, in turn, represent what Laclau calls “an absent fullness.”708 They
form a community which is unified by its opposition to the other, but the system is
necessarily incomplete, since it has to exclude certain contents in order to constitute its
identity: thus, exclusion represents the possibility, as well as the impossibility, of the
system’s closure (otherwise, as we noted earlier, we couldn’t recognize the specificity of
this system).
How, though, can we represent a community of “absent fullness”? And why is
that a difficulty? Let’s examine the problem more closely. At this stage of the argument,
we can see that the identity of the signifiers are split; the signifiers differ from each other,
705

Cf. “Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?”, 38, as well as “Subject of Politics, Politics of the
Subject” in Emancipations, 52-53.
706
“Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?”, 38. Or, as Laclau writes in On Populist Reason, “vis-àvis the excluded element, all other differences are equivalent to each other—equivalent in their common
rejection of the excluded identity.” (70)
707
Ibid., 39.
708
Ibid., 42.

241
but they are also drawn into a chain of equivalence by negating the excluded other. As
the signifiers begin to form a chain of equivalence, however, their singularity is
increasingly dissolved in the movement toward sameness. Here is Laclau’s description
of this phase of his argument:
On the one hand, the more the chain of equivalences is extended, the less each
concrete struggle will be able to remain closed in a differential self…On the
contrary, as the equivalent relation shows that these differential identities are
simply indifferent bodies incarnating something equally present in all of them, the
longer the chain of equivalences is, the less concrete this ‘something equally
present will be’. At the limit it will be pure communitarian being independent of
all concrete manifestation. And, on the other hand, that which is beyond the
exclusion delimiting the communitarian space—the repressive power—will count
less as the instrument of particular differential repressions and will express pure
anti-community [as] negation. The community created by this equivalential
expansion will be, thus, the pure idea of a communitarian fullness which is
absent—as a result of the presence of the repressive power.709
Hence the difficulty:

what we now encounter is an equivalential chain, and the

particularity of the signifiers is collapsing in the movement towards a community unified
by its negation of the other. But if we’re trying to signify or represent this community of
equivalence which is constituted through the collapse of differences, we can’t resort to
another signifier to name the “absent fullness”; as Laclau notes, “in that case, the
‘beyond all differences’ would be one more difference and not the result of the collapse
of all differential identities.”710 How, then, do we represent it? According to Laclau,
“[p]recisely because the community as such is not a purely objective space of an
objective identity but an absent fullness, it cannot have any form of representation of its
own, and has to borrow the latter from some entity constituted within the equivalential
space”.711 In other words, the “absent fullness” of the community is represented by a
709
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particular signifier in the equivalential chain. But if all of the signifiers are formally
equivalent, how do we determine which one “stands in” for “absent fullness”?

For

Laclau, there is no formula or algorithm which allows us to determine that one signifier,
rather than another, will occupy the nodal point of representation; instead, we have to
examine the contingent historical circumstances within a given social space.712 For
Laclau, this is the paradigmatic example of hegemony; he writes that “[t]his relation by
which a particular content becomes the signifier of the absent communitarian fullness is
exactly what we call a hegemonic relationship.”713
But how does this abstract discussion illuminate the category of “universality”?
How does it fit in with the emergence of political identities? According to Laclau,
“universality” is always constructed through hegemonic logics in which a particular
content takes on the function of representing the universal. Laclau offers the following
example as an illustration of how the particular “stands in” for the universal. Assume
that in an oppressive, highly unpopular regime workers begin to demand higher wages
and call a strike. While their demands reflect particular interests—in this case, the
interests of the proletariat—they also reflect a deep-seated, generalized opposition to the
ruling class, which exists in every other part of society. Thus, the workers’ demands have
a particular, as well as universal, dimension.714 The workers’ strike, in turn, inspires
other forms of opposition to the regime; journalists begin to clamor for freedom of the
press, students challenge their professors, who are functionaries of the state, and demand
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intellectual openness, etc. While the complaints of the students, journalists and workers
represent particular interests, they begin to converge towards what Laclau calls “a chain
of equivalences in so far as they are bearers of an anti-system meaning.”715 In other
words, “the presence of a frontier separating the oppressive regime from the rest of
society is the very condition of the universalization of demands via equivalences.”716 As
the chain of equivalence becomes more extensive, however, the need grows for a
signifier which will capture the collective identity of the movement. But we can only
refer to particular demands or specific signifiers; therefore, one of them begins to
represent the totality of anti-system opposition.717 According to Laclau, “this is the
strictly hegemonic move: the body of one particularity assumes a function of universal
representation.”718
Thus, the site of the body politic is a struggle between particular elements who all
claim to represent ‘the universal’. The implication of Laclau’s argument is that the
‘universal’ element is itself a particular which has, through the contingencies of struggle
and revolt, emerged as the general signifier for a chain of demands.719 While Laclau’s
example focuses on opposition to an oppressive regime and the transformation of a
particular marginalized group into the stand-in for universality, however, his model also
has critical function; it serves to unmask the pretension to universality which inevitably
accompanies the rhetoric of a dominant class. Let’s return, then, to the imagery of the
715
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body politic, focusing on what Slavoj Zizek calls the “fundamental ideological fantasy”.
Now that we understand the importance, indeed the unavoidability, of hegemonic
struggle in the formation of the social body, we can understand what, precisely, is
entailed by the “fundamental ideological fantasy”. Here, once again, is the key passage
from Zizek:
the stake of social-ideological fantasy is to construct a vision of society which…is
not split by an antagonistic division, a society in which the relation of its parts is
organic, complementary. The clearest case, is of course, the corporatist vision of
society as an organic Whole, a social Body in which the different classes are like
extremities, members each contributing to the Whole according to its function—
we may say that ‘Society as a corporate Body’ is the fundamental ideological
fantasy.720
In short, therefore, it is the belief that we can transcend social division and unify the body
politic as a corporate entity. Yet if it’s the case that the body politic is the site of conflict,
and if it’s true that antagonism is an inescapable element of the social body, then it is
problematic to believe that we can reach a space of political unity which is beyond power
and struggle. Here we encounter a gap between the divisions which characterize actual
societies and the corporatist fantasy, which is the site of an ideological misrecognition.721
Zizek provides the following illustration:

Fascist political theory is a paradigmatic

example of the fundamental ideological fantasy; it strives for a unified social body or a
homogenized community without difference. But what, according to Fascism, prevents
society from achieving unity? What is the source of blockage? As Zizek writes, “[t]he
720
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answer is, of course, the Jew: an external element, a foreign body introducing corruption
into the sound social fabric.”722 According to the Fascist corporatist fantasy, “the ‘Jew’
appears as an intruder who introduces from outside disorder, decomposition and
corruption in the social edifice—it appears as an outward positive cause whose
elimination would enable us to restore order, stability and identity.”723 In actuality,
however, it is social antagonism itself, or social division, which prevents us from
reaching closure; the social body itself is always the site of contestation and struggle, of
power and exclusions, of difference and pluralism.724
Here I want to return, at least briefly, to Zizek’s example of the ‘Fascist corporatist
fantasy’, which illustrates the connection between biopower and the struggle for a unified
social body. Specifically, I want to examine the operation of racial politics in Nazi
Germany, in order to see how the elements fit together and operate at the level of praxis.
While this is, admittedly, a departure from the question of biopower’s relationship to
liberalism, it shows how different, and apparently unrelated, elements of the dissertation
are linked together in the context of praxis. And as I will argue in the following excurses,
Hitler’s genocidal experiment drew on aspects of American biopolitical fantasies; thus,
we encounter the thread of terror which binds liberalism and totalitarianism together.

Excurses: Biopower and the Body Politic in Nazi Germany
In a 1936 treatise on ‘state racial hygiene’, the Nazi medical specialist Ottmar von
Versucher clearly articulated the logic of biopower vis-à-vis the body politic of the
German nation. Commenting on a remark by Hitler, he writes the following: “‘The new
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State knows no other task than the fulfillment of the conditions necessary for the
preservation of the people.’ These words of the Fuhrer mean that every political act of
the National Socialist state serves the life of the people…We know today that the life of
the people is only secured if the racial traits and hereditary health of the body of the
people (Volksörper) are preserved.”725 Over two centuries after Hobbes and Locke we
encounter the imagery of the social body once again, this time in a decidedly new (yet
after Auschwitz, unsettlingly familiar) context. The language of the social body has
become the site of an ideological fantasy, an image of biological purity which doubles as
a political metaphor, with Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, homosexuals or non-Aryans representing
a cancerous, disease-carrying form of alterity which contaminates the body politic of the
German nation, a form of ‘antagonism’ which blocks the people from achieving a
‘utopia’ of racial homogeneity. In the Third Reich, politics was transformed into the
oversight of society’s collective health; thus, it was a paradigmatic example of
biopolitics. Here, then, I want to explore the connection between ‘the fundamental
ideological fantasy’ and biopower in the context of the Nazi racial state, departing from
Foucault’s March 17th, 1976 lecture at the Collège de France.
Foucault introduces his discussion of Nazism by highlighting the fundamental paradox
of biopower: how is a form of governmentality which is dedicated to the preservation of
life and strengthening the body politic able to, at the same time, authorize mass murder,
as in the case of the Final Solution? In other words, how can we account for the
extermination of entire races in biopolitical regimes? We have already discussed part of
Foucault’s answer in the previous chapter; racism divides society into ‘healthy’ and
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‘pathological’ elements, and in order to affirm the power (indeed, in order to guard the
collective health) of ‘superior’ ethnic groups it is necessary, first of all, to separate out
‘desirable’ hereditary persons from ‘defective’ individuals, and then exterminate the,
‘weak’ or ‘unfit’. With this analysis in mind, therefore, we can return to the statement I
cited from Versucher, and interpret it in the light of Foucault’s remarks concerning
Nazism; according to Foucault, “Nazism was in fact the paroxysmal development of the
new power mechanisms that had been established since the eighteenth century. Of
course, no state could have more disciplinary power than the Nazi regime. Nor was there
any

other

state

in

which

the

biological

was

so

tightly,

so

insistently,

regulated…Controlling the random element inherent in biological processes was one of
the regime’s immediate objectives.”726 Indeed, as Hitler’s revelatory language suggests,
that was the ONLY task of the National Socialist regime; again, “The new State knows
no other task than the fulfillment of the conditions necessary for the preservation of the
people.” Likewise, Versucher has, it seemed to me, correctly understood the essentially
biopolitical import of Hitler’s observation: “the life of the people is only secured if the
racial traits and hereditary health of the people are preserved.”
In Nazism, the life of the people (or the life of the body politic) was protected via
a double process of excluding the ‘unfit’ and encouraging the reproduction of ‘healthy
Aryans’; first of all, then, we have the expurgation or cleansing of the social body,
removing the alien, degenerative elements though sterilization or extermination, which
was complemented by pro-natalist policies for ‘hereditary desirables’.
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examine the two strategies in turn; in connection, they illuminate the most terrifying
aspects of political biologism’s theory/praxis.
I will begin with strategies of exclusion.

The Nazis practiced compulsory

sterilization on a massive scale, but the context for ‘racial hygiene’ was already
established in the Weimar Republic. In 1921, the Prussian Health Council expressed an
interest in eugenic sterilization (i.e. sterilization which served a ‘hereditary purpose’ by
guaranteeing that “defective” members of German society were unable to reproduce).727
At the time the question was deferred to a panel of experts; it re-emerged, however, when
the Prussian Ministry of Welfare’s Racial Hygiene Committee met to discuss the issue.728
The members of the Committee decided not to recommend pro-sterilization measures, at
least in part due to popular opposition. They suggested, rather, that the Ministry
investigate the sterilization laws in Switzerland and the United States.729

German

eugenicists were interested in American sterilization practices; Stefan Kühl notes that
after 1925, “scientific and medical literature [in Germany] regularly referred to the
Untied States.”730
The United States was, after all, a trendsetter in eugenics legislation. According
to Daniel J. Kevles, by the end of the nineteen-twenties twenty-four states had approved
compulsory sterilization practices.731 In the 1927 case of Buck vs. Bell the U.S. Supreme
Court had upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia statue which required the sterilization

727

Cf. Paul Weindling Health, Race and German Politics Between National Unification and Nazism, 18701945 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), 390.
728
Ibid., 391.
729
Ibid., 391.
730
Stefan Kühl, The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism and German National Socialism
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002), 24.
731
Cf. his In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (Cambridge: Harvard UP,
1995), 111.

249
of “feeble-minded” individuals.732 Writing for the majority in an eight to one opinion,
Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes offered the following comments: “We have seen more
than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would
be strange it if would not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices…Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”733 The Nazis, in
turn, were inspired by the American example,734 and the admiration was reciprocated;
Enzo Traverso cites a comment by Professor Harry Laughlin, the head of the Center for
Eugenicist Research in Cold Springs, New York, who, upon receiving an honorary
doctorate from the University of Heidelberg in 1936 (as Traverso notes, well after the
new German government had carried out thousands of forced sterilizations against
“degenerative” elements of its population), argued that this was “proof that German and
American scientists understood eugenics in the same way.”735
Mutual admiration aside, the Nazi’s Law to Prevent Hereditarily Sick Offspring
(Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses) was announced in 1933,736 which
legalized compulsory sterilization for persons with one of nine ‘diseases’, including
“hereditary feeble-mindedness, schizophrenia, manic-depression, hereditary epilepsy,
Huntington’s chorea, hereditary blindness, hereditary deafness, hereditary malformations
and…severe alcoholism.”737 As Paul Weindling notes, the inclusion of alcoholism on the
list is significant; it reflects the fact that the German temperance movement was, at least
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in part, “the breeding ground for later, more comprehensive programmes of…social
hygiene”738 (as early as 1903, the racial theorist Ernst Rüdin had argued that alcoholism
caused hereditary degeneration, and he proposed sterilization, which helped to eliminate
a defective genetic stock from the body politic).739 In any case, between 1934 and 1945
approximately 360,000 people were “legally” sterilized. The totals for “undesirables”
such as Jews, Gypsies and persons of mixed ancestry are unknown; it is, however, fair to
assume that the number was sizeable.740
Another exclusionary strategy of the Nazis was “euthanasia”. Hitler emphasized
the high costs of institutionally housing the disabled or mentally ill. Eventually a ‘final
solution’ to the question was proposed by the Bavarian health minister Walther Schultze,
and chronically sick people with psychological difficulties were exiled to concentration
camps.741

The euthanasia policies represented an extension of the logic which governed

sterilization practices; once again, it was necessary to eliminate the hereditary
degeneratives who threatened the integrity of the body politic. ‘Anti-social’ elements
such as “gypsies, vagabonds, beggars and criminals were packed off to these
concentration camps”742 and ‘euthanised’.
Finally, we encounter the radicalization of medical killing: the Holocaust. Jews
were portrayed as “cancers” which contaminated the German body politic (or, even more
frequently, as bacteria, viral infections, vermin, parasites, etc.). Robert Proctor, for
example, offers the following anecdote:

“[i]n a 1936 lecture on radiotherapy in

Frankfurt, the SS radiologist Prof. Hans Holfelder showed students in attendance…a slide
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in which cancer cells were portrayed as Jews (the same slide depicted the X-rays
launched against these tumor-Jews as Nazi storm troopers).”743 The logic of Versucher’s
position is clearly demonstrated in this example: the life of the people is intertwined with
the hereditary purity of the body politic. A set of comments by Giorgio Agamben will
illuminate the theories which legitimated the Holocaust even further. In a brief essay
entitled “What is a People?” (included in the compilation Means without End) Agamben
notes that almost all of the major Romance languages denote two very different things
with the word “people” (in Italian, popolo; in French, peuple and in Spanish pueblo): on
the one hand, it signifies the totality of the population, and on the other, it refers to the
“common” or “ordinary people” (indeed, Agamben notes that even in English we tend to
adhere to a distinction between “the people” and “ordinary people”). Agamben reflects
on this peculiar split at length in the following passage:
Such a widespread and constant semantic ambiguity cannot be accidental: it
surely reflects an ambiguity inherent in the nature and function of the concept of
people in Western politics. It is as if, in other words, what we call people was
actually not a unitary subject but rather a dialectical oscillation between two
opposite poles: on the one hand, the People as a whole and as an integral body
politic and, on the other hand, the people as a subset and as a fragmentary
multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies; on the one hand, an inclusive concept
that pretends to be without remainder while, on the other hand, an exclusive
concept known to afford no hope; at one pole, the total state of the sovereign and
integrated citizens and, at the other pole, the banishment…of the wretched, the
oppressed, the vanquished.744
The specific example which Agamben refers to in this context is, once again, the
extermination of the Jews; he writes that
we ought to understand the lucid fury with which the German Volk—
representative par excellence of the people as integral body politic—tried to
eliminate the Jews forever as precisely the terminal phase of the internecine
743
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struggle that divides People and people. With the final solution—which included
Gypsies and other unassimilable elements for a reason—Nazism tried obscurely
and in vain to free the Western stage from this intolerable shadow so as to
produce finally the German Volk as the people that has been able to heal the
original biopolitical fracture.745
It is also important, however, to recollect that logics of extermination and/or ethnic
cleansing have operated in so-called socialist regimes, such as the former Soviet Union,
as well as in liberal regimes, including the United States, where the Native Americans
were victims of ethnic cleansing. Hardt and Negri have noted, for example, that the
constitution of American liberty presupposed limitless horizons: the project of Manifest
Destiny envisioned an imperial America stretching from one gleaming shore to the
other.746 The fantasy of open spaces, however, necessitated the forced removal and/or
genocidal murder of Native Americans, who inhabited the vistas of ‘freedom’ and
represented an obstacle to American expansion.747 They write that “[l]iberty and the
frontier stand in a relationship of reciprocal implication: every difficulty, every limit of
liberty is an obstacle to overcome, a threshold to pass through.”748
The connection between Nazism and the ravaging of North America by
Europeans is even more direct, however; National Socialist “foreign policy” likewise
dictated the necessity of ethnic cleansing.

Hitler envisioned Central Europe as a

volkloser Raum (a space without people),749 with its inhabitants enslaved (Slavs, like
Jews and Gypsies, were considered members of an inferior race). After its residents were
evacuated, it would serve as the vaunted Lebensraum for the Aryan master race—a
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Lebensraum, as Agamben notes, which doubled as a Todesraum.750 Hitler’s geopolitical
project, therefore, appears as a continuation of the Western colonial fantasy; citing a
disturbing passage in which the Führer explicitly situates his continental aggression in
the lineage of previous European conquests, such as the British annexation of India, the
Spanish invasion of the ‘New World’ and the “settlement” of North America (the phrase
is Hitler’s), Charles Mills writes that Hitler “saw himself as simply doing at home what
his fellow Europeans had long been doing abroad.”751 Likewise, Enzo Traverso
highlights a reference to the German conquest of Eastern Europe and Russia; Hitler
opined that “[t]he natives will have to be shot. Our sole duty is to Germanize the country
by the immigration of Germans, regarding the natives as Redskins.”752
Recall, however, I had alluded above to a second strategy developed by Nazism in
order to guarantee the “life of the people” or the body politic, namely the implementation
of pro-natalist technologies. As Claudia Koontz has noted, “[n]owhere else in Europe or
the United States has so comprehensive a drive been launched to increase the
birthrate.”753 Tax policy was used to stimulate reproduction (parents with six or more
children were exempt from paying personal income tax).754 Likewise, women who had
five or more children were recognized as national heroes; women with five children were
given a bronze medal, while six children earned a silver medal; seven, however, was
worthy of gold.755 In addition, antiabortion laws were drafted, since it was important to
guarantee the survival of Aryans (although in 1936 an SS officer lamented that a
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significant number of abortions were still performed, often in the “racially most valuable
circles.”)756 Finally, women received state indoctrination in “racial science” classes,
including study of the “Ten Commandments for Choosing a Partner.” The list contained
injunctions such as “[i]f hereditarily fit, do not remain single”, “[w]hen choosing your
spouse, inquire into his or her forebears” and “[h]ope for as many children as
possible.”757 This is an example of Nazism’s ‘inclusionary’ face.
In any case, this example ties together several threads of the dissertation’s
argument: the Nazi fantasy of a unified body politic was operationalized via a double
process:

the exclusion of ‘unfit’ subjects/ethnic groups on the one hand, and the

encouragement of ‘Aryan’ women to reproduce German citizens with ‘impeccable’
bloodlines. We have the organicist vision of society, in which the ‘cancers’, or the
pathological elements in society which introduce division, sickness, and illness into the
‘healthy’ and unified social body; the other prevents society from achieving its fullness.
It is important to eliminate the source of contagion, then; at the same time, we must
affirm ‘normal’ or ‘healthy’ examples of life; we need citizens who are both hereditarily
pure, as well as obedient, governable subjects. Thus, biopower is the source of the body
politic’s unity.
Foucault on the Subject and Power
I have focused, up to this point, on the construction of the body politic, examining the
‘fundamental ideological fantasy’ and why it is, in the final analysis, impossible to
eliminate antagonism, division and power from the social body. A second theme of the
dissertation, however, is the failure of liberalism to recognize that ‘governable’ subjects
756
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are constituted through biopolitical technologies of power. In Chapter 2, for example, I
highlighted Rawls’s elimination of ‘contingent’ features of agency in the original
position, arguing (along with Michael Sandel) that we can’t understand the decisions of
individuals, even in a highly abstract procedural model, without referring to a history
and/or tradition which inform, for example, the selection of the difference principle. I
argued that Nietzsche traces the outlines of a genealogy of the ‘rational’ self, revealing
that the governable self is the product of discipline, habituation and culture. The project
of Nietzschean genealogy has been continued by Foucault, most notably in Discipline
and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality. Like Nietzsche, Foucault
highlights the embodied subject, and recognizes that “[t]he body is always directly
involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest
it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out ceremonies, to emit signs.”758 Indeed,
throughout the dissertation I have made a similar point, and at the end of the previous
chapter I argued that, contra liberals who emphasize the necessity of extricating
ourselves from power (which, if Laclau’s arguments concerning the necessity of
exclusion are correct, is a theoretical impossibility, not to mention the practical
difficulties), we must begin thinking about an ethics of how we use power. In this regard,
I will examine the later work of Foucault, where he explicitly addresses the question of
the subject and power, or more exactly the relationship between the subject and power. It
is here, I contend, that we can see the development of an alternative to liberalism’s
emphasis on non-coercion which acknowledges the realties of political antagonism while
at the same time refusing to abandon ethical reflection/practice.
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First of all, I will highlight an objection which appears often in the secondary literature
concerning Foucault. Up to this point, I have focused on the passivity of (micro) bodies,
emphasizing the normalizing operation of power which creates individuals, and more
particularly what I have referred to as ‘governable’ subjects. It is tempting to conclude
that power is a totalizing force which pre-empts resistance by controlling subjects and
manufacturing ‘docile bodies’ who contribute to the reproduction of the social body.
Indeed, I have used language very similar to this, throughout the dissertation. And I do
think that I have offered a plausible interpretation of how the unity of the body politic is
achieved (or we can imagine, at least, a structurally similar process), with the caveat that
antagonism and division are inescapable features of societal organization, in clear
opposition to the problematic assumptions of the fundamental ideological fantasy. But
the picture I have sketched out admittedly privileges what Foucault calls the
‘objectivizing’ aspects of power. As a result, I may have given the impression that I am a
functionalist, or that I fail to recognize the possibility of resistance to power. As I
mentioned in Chapter Three, this was a standard criticism raised against Foucault, and
more generally the work of historians, philosophers and social critics who have examined
the possibilities opened up by his genealogical research. Here then, I want to examine
the problem in greater detail, as well as Foucault’s response (or at least one of his
responses) to this purported weakness.
Charles Taylor has articulated the difficulties with Foucault’s position in his essay
“Foucault on Freedom and Truth”, which is a well-developed critique of Foucault’s work
on power. Taylor writes that “the Foucaultian thesis involves combining the fact that any
set of institutions and practices form the background to our actions within them, and are
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in that sense unremovable while we engage in that kind of action, with the point that
different forms of power are indeed constituted by different complexes of practice, to
form the illegitimate conclusion that there can be no question of liberation from the
power implicit in…practices.”759 Here, I’m less interested in responding to Taylor’s
charges (although my discussion of Foucault’s essays/interviews on the subject and
power will, I anticipate, do that indirectly)760; nor do I intend to pursue the question of
Taylor’s own interpretive blindspot, which is evidenced by his failure to appreciate the
ways in which his own critique is located within a set of disciplinary apparatuses and
regimes of truth.761 Rather, his remark captures the spirit of a popularized caricature of
Foucault’s argument; according to this reading, he offers us no hope of opposition vis-àvis the merciless logic of Power.
In the interest of fairness, I do believe that Foucault gave the impression that we
are ‘trapped’ by power, especially if we review his work from the mid-1970’s.762 But if

759

Cf. Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David
Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 92.
760
A highly effective response to Taylor is developed by Paul Patton; cf. his “Taylor and Foucault on
Power in Freedom” in Political Studies 37 (1989): 260-76. Indeed, in his comments (located in the same
issue, pages 277-81) Taylor admits that “Foucault towards the end of his life began to make his own moral
position fairly clear” (277), a point he had denied in the original essay (which is cited in the previous
footnote).
761
For a masterful and valuable example of this kind of reading, see Paul Bové’s “The Foucault
Phenomena”, which is the introduction to the English translation of Gilles Deleuze’s Foucault, trans. Seán
Hand (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1998), especially pages vi-xix.
762
In describing the Panopticon, for example, Foucault writes that “[v]isibility is a trap” (Discipline and
Punish, 200). Even if Foucault gives the impression that we can’t resist power, however, there is textual
evidence which demonstrates that he didn’t, in fact, hold that view. In a 1982 interview, for example,
Foucault’s interlocutor asks him if there is no escaping power, or if we’re always ‘trapped’, to which
Foucault replies, “En fait, je ne pense pas que le mot <<piégés>> soit le mot juste. Il s’agit d’une lutte,
mais ce que je veux dire, lorsque je parle de rapports de pouvoir, c’est que nous sommes, les uns par
rapport aux autres, dans une situation stratégique. Parce que nous sommes homosexuals, par exemple, nous
sommes en lutte avec le gouvernement et le gouvernement est en lutte avec nous. Lorsque nous avons
affaire au gouvernement, la lutte, bien sûr, n’est pas symétrique, la situation de pouvoir n’est pas la même,
mais nous participons ensemble à cette lutte. L’un de nous prend le dessus sur l’autre, et la prolongement
de cette situation peut déterminer la conduite à tenir, influencer la conduite, ou la non-conduite, de l’autre.
Nous ne sommes donc pas piégés. Or nous sommes toujours dans ce genre de situation. Ce qui veut dire
que nous avons toujours la possibilité de changer la situation, que cette possibilité existe toujours.” Cf.

258
we turn to the latter half of the decade, and chart the course of Foucault’s evolution until
his death in 1984, we can recognize a persistent concern with ethical questions, focusing
on the possibilities of resistance and self-transformation; in other words, his emphasis
shifts from an objectivizing and ‘passive’ view of the self to a more ‘active’ conception
of the subject. In this regard, I will examine his essays and interviews on the relationship
between subjectivity and technologies of control, (focusing specifically on “The Subject
and Power”), arguing that they allow us to begin formulating, or at least thinking
originally about, normative criteria regulating the exercise of power. I will also comment,
albeit much more briefly, on Foucault’s ‘aesthetics of existence’; my primary focus,
however, is how we can move beyond the idea of ‘non-coercion’ without collapsing into
Realpolitick or even nihilism. While this is, admittedly, a difficult task, and I can only
offer, by reconstructing the work of Foucault, the outlines of a theoretical re-orientation, I
think this is a more productive form of ethico-political reflection than the standard liberal
approach (at least in political philosophy), which begins, as Marx would say, in the
heavens and descends to the earth.
We should start the discussion by highlighting a premise which is, depending on
your perspective, either self-evident or scandalous. In an interview conducted in January
of 1984, approximately five months prior to Foucault’s death, he responded to the
following observation: “You are very far from Sartre, who told us power is evil.”763 I
will simply bracket the question of whether or not this is an accurate characterization of
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Sartre’s view; rather, I’m interested in Foucault’s reply. He agrees with the comment,
and suggests that the notion of power as intrinsically ‘evil’
is very far from my way of thinking, [but] has often been attributed to me. Power
is not evil. Power is games of strategy. We all know that power is not evil! For
example, let us take sexual or amorous relationships: to wield power over the
other in a sort of open-ended strategic game where the situation may be reversed
is not evil; it’s part of love, of passion and sexual pleasure. And let us take, as
another example, something that has been rightly criticized—the pedagogical
institution. I see nothing wrong in the practice of a person who, knowing more
than others in a specific game of truth, tells those other what to do, teaches them
and transmits knowledge and techniques to them. The problem in such practices
where power—which is not in itself a bad thing—must inevitably come into play
is knowing how to avoid the kind of domination effects where a kid is subjected
to the arbitrary and unnecessary authority of a teacher, or a student put under the
thumb of a professor who abuses his authority.764
The concern for Foucault, therefore, is with the use of power: is the other a victim of
domination, or are we involved in an open-ended “strategic game” where it is possible to
imagine reversals and transformations of the relationship, and the distribution of power is
open to contestation? As Foucault notes, “the important question here…is not whether a
culture without constraints is possible or even desirable but whether the system of
constraints in which a society functions leaves individuals the liberty to transform the
system.”765 Indeed, he contrasts his approach with Habermas’s, and argues that
the idea that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of
truth to circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian
to me. This is precisely a failure to see that power relations are not something
that is bad in itself, that we can break free of. I do not think that a society can
exist without power relations, if by that one means the strategy by which
individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others. The problem, then, is
not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of completely transparent communication
but to acquire…the ethos, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these
games with as little domination as possible.766
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There are three different aspects of the previous references worth examining in greater
detail. First of all, we have the idea that power is an inescapable facet of social relations;
indeed, in any society which requires the coordination of efforts between humans (which
is, of course, any form of human society), power inevitably emerges.

Teachers,

bureaucrats, parents, fellow workers, etc. all need to “direct and control the conduct of
others.” But (and here we encounter the second important aspect of the passages I
mentioned above) most of us would, I assume, agree that the “control” a police officer
exercises when s/he pulls over an individual who is driving erratically and threatens to
kill his/her passenger or other motorists is acting ethically; likewise (to return to
Foucault’s example) a teacher’s attempts to “direct…the conduct” of his/her student isn’t
intrinsically evil. There are, of course, more trivial examples which qualify as forms of
power, given Foucault’s definition; the worker who asks his/her fellow employee to hand
him/her a tool is, at least indirectly, “directing” the conduct of another person. Again,
however, I presume that we don’t have a serious ethical difficulty with the examples I
cited above.
We can present other examples, however, and arrive at very different conclusions.
Imagine a college student who isn’t able to express his/her opinion in class because it
challenges the assumptions of the professor, and s/he is afraid of retaliation. Or, to return
to the workplace example, think about a supervisor who actively discourages his/her
workers from forming a union, or practices discrimination against homosexuals. Or, to
demonstrate the importance of context in determining whether or not power relations are
objectionable, think about our hypothetical police officer. Now, however, instead of
stopping the driver for a DUI he pulls him/her over for DWB—“Driving While Black”.
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In all of the examples, I presume, we object to the operation of power insofar as it has
become domination (or at least that’s one reason why we object to the examples). But we
don’t object to the operation of power in itself, as the first set of examples clearly shows.
Indeed, it’s important to recall that feminism and the struggles against colonialism were
movements of empowerment, and I don’t see any reason to apologize for that; rather, we
should celebrate the efforts of the oppressed to restore a balance to the field of power,
and assert what Foucault calls their “liberty of transforming the system”.

Hence,

Foucault’s rejection of the argument that power is intrinsically ‘evil’.
There is, however, a third aspect which I will examine more closely, and it takes us to
the heart of Foucault’s attempt to re-think the ethics of power. Foucault contrasts, at least
implicitly, the legitimate exercise of power with ‘domination’ or ‘domination effects’.
But what is domination? How are the terms opposed? And why, exactly, is domination
problematic? I’ll begin my reconstruction of Foucault’s comments vis-à-vis domination
by examining his definition of the term. In the interview I cited earlier (where Foucault
discusses the question of whether or not power is ‘intrinsically evil’), he offers the
following remarks:
The analysis of power relations is an extremely complex area; one sometimes
encounters what may be called situations or states of domination in which the
power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to
adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an individual or
social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them
and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political or military
means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination. In such a
state, it is certain that practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally
or are extremely constrained and limited.767
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Thus, relations of domination are forms of interaction where the possibility of reversal is
effectively blocked. They are the product of economic, political or military forces which
have temporarily prevented the contestation of existing forms of stratification or
oppression, and to the extent that they freeze, or at least attempt to freeze, the existing
organization of society, they significantly reduce, or even eliminate, the scope of freedom
or autonomy. And it is clear that Foucault identifies ‘domination’ as a serious threat in
the context of power relations; recall the earlier quote, in which he argues that we must
develop strategies for avoiding what he calls ‘domination effects’.

Discussing the

pedagogical relationship, he argues that “I see nothing wrong in the practice of a person
who, knowing more than others in a specific game of truth, tells those other what to do,
teaches them and transmits knowledge and techniques to them.” Rather, “the problem in
such practices where power—which is not in itself a bad thing—must inevitably come
into play is knowing how to avoid the kind of domination effects where a kid is subjected
to the arbitrary and unnecessary authority of a teacher, or a student put under the thumb
of a professor who abuses his authority.”768 What is objectionable, apparently, is the fact
that the student is subjected to the power of the instructor without any possibility of
challenging his/her “unnecessary” authority. But if domination is objectionable, and it is
contrasted with the legitimate exercise of power, we can already recognize how we begin
moving towards an ethics of power; we must guard against the danger of power relations
becoming fixed or static, thereby losing their fluidity and reversibility.
In that case, however, we can also begin defining “power relations” more adequately.
It appears that they are in opposition to, or at least at odds with, domination. According
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to Foucault, a power relation is “an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or
present actions.”769 Unlike violence, which resorts directly to force or coercion and
“closes off all possibilities”770 for the agent, power relations assume that (1) the ‘other’ is
a subject who is capable of acting, and (2) if we are confronted by power, a field of
responses, reactions or even possibilities of resistance open up.771 If violence encounters
opposition, therefore, it tries to crush it; as Foucault notes “its opposite pole can only be
passivity”, and any sign of intransigence by the other leads to his/her obliteration. Power,
however, recognizes that the agent is capable of action, and seeks to direct his/her
conduct. Indeed, Foucault argues that ‘power’ isn’t a form of violence, nor is it a
contractual agreement between two parties; rather, it is closer to the sixteenth century
definition of ‘government’ we had examined in Chapter Three. Recall that it is “a
‘conduct of conducts’ and a management of possibilities”; according to Foucault, “[t]o
govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others.”772 When we
characterize government or power as the attempt to direct the conduct of others, however,
we always presuppose that the other is capable of acting, and the capacity for action, in
turn, requires freedom. As Foucault writes,
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are ‘free’. By
this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of
possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and
several modes of behavior are available. Where the determining factors are
exhaustive, there is no relationship of power: slavery is not a power relationship
when a man is in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance
of escape…Consequently, there is not a face-to-face confrontation of power and
freedom as mutually exclusive facts, but a much more complicated interplay. In
this game, freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power.773
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Foucault argues, therefore, that we must dispense with the idea that power is antithetical
to freedom; rather, we should see “the recalcitrance of the will” as a constant challenge to
power. Anticipating Mouffe, he recommends exchanging the language of “antagonism”
for a discourse of “agonism”; as he puts it, the relationship between the subject and
power is “less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a
provocation.”774
Here, I want to discuss two aspects of the passages I cited above in greater detail.
First of all, we have the idea that power and freedom are inextricably connected, which is
in contrast with standard accounts (exemplified by Taylor’s essay) of Foucault’s work on
power. They assume that Foucault believes we’re ‘trapped’ by power, without any hope
of resistance. But this is clearly a misinterpretation of essays such as “The Subject and
Power”, where he argues that, in actuality, freedom is the condition, or at least one of the
conditions, of power relationships. Indeed, rather than viewing freedom as the opposite
of power, we should recognize the agonistic contestation which characterizes
governmentality. Secondly, however, notice the implicit, or actually explicit, difference
between power relationships and slavery. Foucault argues, admittedly counterintuitively,
that there is no power involved in the enslavement of an individual, precisely because
they’re not free. His conclusion only seems problematic, however, because we generally
associate power with subjugation. If we re-define power relationships as the attempt to
“act on the actions of others”, with the corollary assumption that, if the other is capable of
action they are, at least in a minimal sense, free, it becomes clear why slavery isn’t an
example of power. Indeed, slavery more closely resembles what Foucault refers to as
774
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“domination”, where existing forms of social organization, and the stratifications,
oppressions and strategies of control which inevitably accompany of institutional
systems, are effectively blocked or frozen, and (as a result) no longer subject to
contestation.
Thus, we have the contours of a normative theory regulating the exercise of power. It
contrasts domination effects, or relationships between subjects/collectivities where one
party controls the means of production, political institutions, and military force (etc.) and
is able to block the possibility of reversals, with power, which necessarily presupposes
the freedom of the agent and the potential that s/he will resist the other’s attempt to direct
his/her conduct. Thus, power relationships exhibit an openness and fluidity which are
closed off by effects of domination. At the same time, if it is true that “power relations
are not bad in and of themselves…it is a fact that they always entail risks.”775 As I
interpret Foucault, the “risk” of exercising power is that it involves the danger of
eliminating possibilities of resistance, at which point it becomes domination. In order to
avoid domination, therefore, we have to struggle against individual and/or collective
agents who attempt to monopolize the field of power, as well as reflecting critically on
our own relationships with others.
But how does this discussion relate to my general criticisms of liberalism? In the
first three chapters I have examined the ‘objectivizing’ functions of liberal political
technologies which target the ‘micro-body’. At least one liberal response, which I have
examined in previous sections, is that we appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to liberal
principles of non-coercion when we condemn, or challenge the legitimacy of, biopolitical
775
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strategies of control. I have already mentioned the difficulties with the idea of ‘noncoercion’; it often presupposes that we must ‘escape’ from power, or in the language of
the social contract it assumes that we can construct a social body which is no longer
divided by antagonism. Even if we argue, however, that contemporary liberalism is
different from its classical predecessors, insofar as it recognizes the importance of
pluralism and diversity, there is still the problem of whether idealized speech
situations/decision procedures actually help us to think about the realties of political
organization in particular, and intersubjective relationships more generally, if they fail to
take into account the operation of power. Rather than imagining conditions in which
‘micro-bodies’ can interact without interference from others, therefore (which already
presuppose a very specific, and controversial, conception of what Isaiah Berlin called
‘negative freedom’776), we should acknowledge that power is an inescapable aspect of
social relations, or that the social body is always the site of contradictions and
differences, and articulate strategies for avoiding domination.
But a new question arises: why should we avoid domination? At least one
answer, of course, is that it represents a monopolization of power. Why, however, is that
problematic? One potential response, again referring to the work of Foucault, is that it
limits our capacities for self-development, or—why not?—autonomy. In an April 1983
interview with Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Foucault, drawing on the ancient
Greeks, asks the following question: “[I]n our society, art has become something that is
related only to objects and not to individuals or life…[A]rt is something which is
specialized or done by experts who are artists. But couldn’t everyone’s life become a
776
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work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object but not our life?”777 It’s
not possible to examine the competing interpretations of Foucault’s ‘aesthetics of
existence’, but as Johanna Oksala notes, “[t]he idea of creating oneself as a work of art
has fueled a lot of heated criticism against Foucault.”778 In any case, I can anticipate an
important objection: Isn’t this simply a return to the normative criteria of classical
liberalism? Indeed, isn’t ‘freedom’ the cornerstone of liberal political theory? And if
that’s the case, haven’t we come full circle? In the final analysis, what’s the difference
between Foucault’s position and Locke’s or Mill’s?

Thomas McCarthy, for example,

argues that “[t]his model now enables us to make sense of the possibilities of resistance
and revolt that, Foucault always insisted, are inherent in systems of power. It corrects the
holistic bias we found in the work of the late 1970s. The question now is whether he
hasn’t gone too far in the opposite direction and replaced it with an individualistic
bias.”779
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While I disagree with McCarthy’s assessment of Foucault’s work from the midto-late 1970’s (i.e. that it is “too holistic”), he is correct to highlight the dangers of a
hyper-individualistic politics and/or ethics. Indeed, Foucault’s emphasis on transforming
the self into a ‘work of art’ appears to ignore the constraints imposed on subjects by
disciplinary technologies. Our possibilities for self-invention are limited by historical
conditions. Is it the case, then, that Foucault is abandoning his most valuable genealogical
insights in favor of traditional liberalism? Here I will simply highlight one key difference
between Foucault and versions of liberalism which posit an ahistorical conception of the
subject: Foucault, in opposition to ‘disembodied’ theories of the self in contemporary
liberalism, recognizes that the body “manifests the stigmata of past experience and also
gives rise to desires, failings and errors.”780 Indeed, the task of genealogy is “to expose a
body totally imprinted by history”.781 The difference is that Foucault emphasizes the role
of history, culture and discipline in the constitution of the liberal ‘micro-body’. He
thematizes the importance of power relationships, a critical point which is ignored in the
work of Rawls. It is necessary, therefore, to add a qualification to Foucault’s ‘aesthetics
of existence’: against the constraints of biopower and normalization, we can invoke the
project of transforming the self into a work of art, with the recognition that the
possibilities of self-creation are circumscribed by a tradition; indeed, I don’t think
Foucault rejects this idea. He notes that the subject engages in his or her own unique
form of self-interpretation, and even self-creation, but the matrices of interpretation are
handed down by culture and society; he writes that “if I am…interested in how the
subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices
780
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are nevertheless not invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in
his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed on him by his culture, his society, and
his social group.”782 While McCarthy is correct to highlight the potential danger of an
aestheticized ‘dandyism’ in Foucault’s last interviews, therefore, the fear is ultimately
misplaced, given the caveats I mentioned above.

Conclusion: The Imagery of the Body Politic Today
My purpose, in any case, isn’t to sketch out a normative program or template in
opposition to the liberal conceptualization of the body politic. Given the limitations of
the project, it is impossible; in order to adequately construct, or even minimally outline,
alternatives to the ‘fundamental ideological fantasy’, I would have to begin a second
dissertation. My primary intention in this chapter was twofold: I wanted to indicate that
liberalism, in its attempt to construct a ‘universalizable’ theory, necessarily excludes
incompatible doctrines or practices; in addition, I have emphasized the importance of
reflecting on the question of power, and more specifically the issue of how we use it,
which is generally either marginalized or completely overlooked in liberal political
theory. The discussions of exclusion/inclusion allow us to see that (1) exclusion isn’t a
‘contingent’ feature of liberalism; rather, it’s a necessary component of any political
theory or form of identity, and a fortiori of liberalism, and (2) power is an important
aspect of social relations; therefore, when liberalism posits a disembodied view of the
self, it fails to recognize that the ‘governable’ subject is the product of culture, discipline
and history. Liberalism’s ‘fundamental ideological fantasy’ is a body politic which is
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unified, without conflict or antagonism; but if my assumptions are correct, the body
politic is actually a site of hegemonic struggles, resistances and confrontations, in which
individuals/collective groups are excluded, while others are normalized and become
‘citizens’ of the state. As I have conceded in the discussion of Rawls, of course, political
liberalism does recognize the necessity of excluding non-liberal conceptions of the good,
but the exclusions are characterized in moral, rather than political, terms. Likewise, the
social contract tradition excludes agents from the initial decision procedure in order to
construct a unified social body, but the criteria they employ are problematic. And in the
final analysis, of course, they envision a body politic which moves with (as Locke
argues) a single will.
As for the question of ‘disciplinary inclusion’, there are important differences
between classical and contemporary liberalism.

Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, for

example, recognize the formative role of education, religion and ideology in the creation
of governable subjects, but they fail to acknowledge the problem of domination. As for
contemporary liberalism, the origin of political agency is completely ignored; hence, the
necessity of beginning to think, once again, about the operation of power. In the course
of my argument, I have also highlighted alternatives ways of thinking about the social
body which recognize that it is a site of difference, conflict and pluralism. In closing,
then, I will highlight potential directions for thinking about the body politic today,
indicating trajectories which take into account the problems I’ve examined in my
dissertation.
I’m tempted to begin with a paraphrase of Sartre: biopower is the unsurpassable
horizon of our time. Undoubtedly the point is overstated; nevertheless, I agree with
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Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who write that “[i]n many respects, the work of
Michel Foucault has prepared the terrain for…an investigation of the material functioning
of imperial rule.”783 As they note, “the great industrial and financial powers…produce not
only commodities but also subjectivities. They produce agentic subjectivities within the
biopolitical context:

they produce needs, social relations, bodies and minds.”784

Likewise, Agamben emphasizes that “our private biological body has become
indistinguishable from our body politic, experiences that once used to be called political
suddenly were confined to our biological body, and private experience present
themselves all of a sudden outside us as body politic.”785 Unlike liberalism, therefore,
which either refuses to acknowledge, or fails to recognize, the importance of biopower in
the constitution of subjects, a re-conceptualization of the body politic must depart from
the materiality of power relationships. The social body, as I have indicated above, is a
space of contestation and hegemonic struggle; thus, the work of Mouffe offers a
promising avenue for characterizing the body politic in a new way, which breaks with the
contractarian ideological fantasy of a unified polis without division or antagonism At the
level of the micro-body, Foucault’s ethics of power recognizes the importance of greater
autonomy for the subject, so that s/he can create and re-create his or herself; in short, we
must affirm our modernity, or our capacity for self-invention.786 Judith Butler’s work
stands out in this regard, specifically in relation to gender and the possibilities of
transgressing, and ultimately re-defining, the static categories which limit our capacity
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for discovering and experimenting with new styles of thinking/ living.787 As Spinoza
writes, “nobody has as yet determined the limits of the body’s capabilities; that is,
nobody has as yet learned from experience what the body can and cannot do”788, but there
are new attempts to explore its potential, beyond the constrictions imposed by
domination.
To speak in a more general way, re-defining the body politic as a space of
hegemonic struggles or the site of power relationships789 means that the articulation of
society’s identity (or, for that matter, the identity of the subject) is contingent and subject
to modification. In other words, with the recognition of liberalism’s contingency, we can
begin to think about political alternatives; as Foucault writes,
In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied
by whatever is singular…and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in
brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation
into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over
(franchissement).790
In contemporary political theory, and especially on the left, we are in danger of forgetting
that liberalism does not represent, as Fukuyama puts it, the “end of history”; we are
suffering from a collective failure of imagination. But if the body politic is the site of
power relationships, and if liberalism’s hegemony is a contingent result of biopolitical
technologies, then we have the ability to re-define our field of possibilities. A new
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conceptualization of the body politic, therefore, must go beyond the ‘fundamental
ideological fantasy’; we must construct what Mouffe calls a ‘conflictual democratic
consensus’ which abandons the illusion of organically unifying the social body. What
will it look like, precisely? That is unclear; I do, however, agree with Hardt and Negri
when they write that “[o]nly the multitude through its practical experimentation will offer
the models and determine when and how the real becomes possible.”791
In closing, then, I have attempted to highlight problematic aspects of the imagery of
the body politic, and the logics which govern the construction of the social body, in
classical and contemporary liberalism.

I have focused on the conceptualization of

exclusion as well as practices of disciplinary inclusion, both of which pose significant
theoretical problems for liberalism. Finally, I have indicated how we can begin to think
about the body politic (and the politics of embodiment) in a new way. The primary focus
of my dissertation was critical, exposing the limitations of a political system which is
given to us, at least in our present historical moment, as inescapable and necessary. I
have tried to uncover its contingency and its complicated relationship with power; the
next task, therefore, is to invent a new, less totalizing, fashion of envisioning the social
body, as well as (and even more importantly) modifying the practices which have limited
our capacity for self-exploration.
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